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INTRODUCTION

Prior to 1960, cash tender offers1 were virtually nonexistent
in the United States.' In the period of business growth that followed, however, they gained an aura of respectability and came
into vogue as a method of corporate acquisition.' During this
period, the dearth of meaningful federal regulation of the cash
tender offer process4 stood in sharp contrast to the long-standing

1 In general, cash tender offers are publicized requests made to shareholders of
one company for tenders of their securities at a fixed cash price. See infra note 56.
2 Only eight cash tender offers were made before 1960. The aggregrate amount of
those offers totaled less than two hundred million dollars. In 1966, however, there were
over one hundred cash tender offers which, in the aggregate, totaled almost one billion
dollars. H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2811, 2812.
3 See E. ARANOW & H. EINHORN, TENDER OFFERS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 65-66
(1973) (discussing nine factors that were responsible for the proliferation of cash tender
offers in the 1960s); see also L. Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 497-99
(2d ed. 1988) (suggesting that Americans copied the British "takeover bids").
4 Exchange tender offers-requests made to shareholders of one company for tenders of their securities in exchange for securities of the acquiring company-did occur
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and elaborate federal regulation of the proxy campaign, which
was the traditional method of capturing corporate control.' Indeed, the federal scheme for proxy regulation harkened back to
the proxy rulemaking power Congress gave to the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) in the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 (Exchange Act).6 By the 1960s, federal, regulation consisted7
of a detailed set of rules governing the entire proxy machinery.
Then in 1968, Congress closed the regulatory gap by adopting the
Williams Act,' which amended the Exchange Act.9 The Williams
Act, which was modeled in several respects after the proxy
rules,1" instituted a comprehensive regulatory scheme for both
cash tender offers and substantial acquisitions of securities.

prior to the 1960s, and they were subject to the registration requirements of the Securities Act of 1933 (Securities Act), 15 U.S.C. §§ 77 a-77aa (1988). See L. LOSS, supra note
3, at 498. Mergers are not tender offers.
5 See H.R. REP. NO. 1711, supra note 2, at 2-4, reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS at 2812-13; S. REP. NO. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-4 (1967); L. Loss,
supra note 3, at 498 (stating that "there was no federal regulation remotely comparable
to the proxy rules"); Sowards & Mofsky, Corporate Take-Over Bids: Gap in Federal Securities
Regulation, 41 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 499, 501-02 (1967).
6 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1988) (original version at ch. 404. tit., I, § 14, 48 Stat. 881
(1934)). Congress prohibited the solicitation of proxies (in respect of certain securities)
in contravention of rules that the SEC "may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the
public interest or for the protection of investors." Id.
7 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-1 to -14, -101 (sched. 14A), -102 (sched. 14B) (1990) (version that was current in the 1960s at 17 C.F.R § 240.14a-1 to -12, -101, -102 (1967)).
Proxy regulation is also based on 15 U.S.C. § 78n(b)-(c) (1988), and the SEC rules thereunder, 17' C.F.R. § 240.14b-1, .14b-2, .14c-1 to .14c-7, .1'c-101 (sched. 14C) (1990).
8 Pub. L No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (1968) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§
78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-() (1988)).
9 The Williams Act added § 13(d)-(e) and § 14(d)-(f to the Exchange Act, 15
U.S.C.' §§ 78a-7811 (1988).
10 Congress was aware of the parallel between proxy contests and tender offers. See
Full Disclosure of Corporate Equity Ownership in Corporate Takeover Bids: Hearings on S. 510
Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 90th Cong.,
1st Sess. 206 (1967) [hereinafter Senate Hearings]. SEC Chairman Manuel Cohen explained that "[t]he procedures provided by the bill in the case of contested tender offers
are analogous to those now followed when contending factions solicit proxies under the
Commission's proxy rules." Id. at 20-21. Note that three of the tender offer provisions of
the Williams Act were incorporated into § 14 of the Exchange Act, the section governing proxies. Two commentators have argued that Congress' effort to model the tender
offer disclosure requirements after those applicable to proxy statements was unwise because shareholders involved in a tender offer do not have the opportunity to utilize the
information disclosed. Jorden & Woodward, An Appraisal of Disclosure Requirements in
Contests for Corporate Control, 46 GEO. WAsH. L. REV. 817, 843 (1978).
11. Sections 14(d) and 14(e) regulate tender offers, § 13(d) regulates substantial acquisitions of securities, and § 13(e) and § 14(f) regulate both tender offers and substantial acquisitions.
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The overriding objective of the Williams Act was to provide
evenhanded protection to all participants in the tender offer process. In particular, the Act sought to ensure that shareholders of
the target company had the information, and time necessary to
consider an offer, that shareholders were treated fairly, and that a
competitive balance was maintained between the tender offeror
and the target company.' 2 To further these statutory goals, Congress adopted a broad antifraud/antimanipulation provision explicitly addressed to the tender offer context 3 and granted the
SEC specific rulemaking authority, 4 which the SEC has used extensively.
The Supreme Court has decided three cases under the tender
offer provisions of the Williams Act at the time of this writing:
Piper v. 'Chris-Craft Industries5 in 1977, Schreiber v. Burlington
Northern, Inc. 6 in 1985, and CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America'7 in 1987. In each case, the Court interpreted the legislation
restrictively, denying private parties rights or remedies claimed to
derive from the statute.' These three decisions have had immense impact on corporate takeovers. By consistently embracing a
restrictive interpretation of the Williams Act, the Court has paved
the way for an increasing paramountcy of state law in the regulation of tender offers. Furthermore, because proxy regulation has
remained primarily a matter of federal law, the entrance of state
law into tender offer regulation has created a dichotomy in the

12 For a discussion of the goals and provisions of the Williams Act, see infra text
accompanying notes 53-109.

13

15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1988).

14 Id. §§ 78m(d)(1)-(2), 78m(d)(5)-(6), 78m(e)(C12), 78n(d)(1), 78n(d)(4)-(5), 78n(d)(8),
78n(e)-(f).

15 430 U.S. 1 (1977).
16 472 U.S. 1 (1985).
17 481 U.S. 69 (1987).
18 The Supreme Court has interpreted the Williams Act in one other case, Rondeau
v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49 (1975). However, Rondeau, which was the Court's
first Williams Act decision, did not involve the tender-offer provisions of the Act, but
rather involved § 13(d) of the Act. In Rondeau, a target company sued a purchaser for

timely reports as required by § 13(d). The target sought a permanent infailing to file
junction prohibiting the acquisition of additional shares, and the issue before the Court
was whether the target had to demonstrate irreparable harm in order to secure the re-

quested injunctive relief. The Court held that irreparable harm must be demonstrated
and found that since only a technical, unintended violation of the Act had occurred, relief should not be granted. Id. at 58-59, 65. Thus, by adopting a restrictive approach to
the remedial aspects of the Act, Rondeau is consistent with the three tender offer cases
that were to follow. Chief Justice Burger delivered the opinion in Rondeau and was
joined by Justices Stewart, White, Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist. Justices Douglas,
Brennan, and Marshall dissented.
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regulation of the two methods of capturing control of an unwilling target. The story how all of this happened tempts the pen!
Before the passage of the Williams Act, the Supreme Court,
in 1964, rendered a landmark 'decision under the proxy rules
which signalled that the rules Were to be construed liberally and
expansively. In fI. Case Co. v. Borak,19 the Court held that a ,private party 'had standing to maintain an implied cause of action
for violations of the proxy antifraud rule. Keenly aware that neither the rule nor the statutory provision under which the rule was.
adopted expressly permitted private lawsuits; the Court nonetheless created, by judicial interpretation, a federal implied right of
action for.'damages and rescission. The Court realized that without such a private r6medy, victims of deceptive proxy statements
would be relegated to state law for remedial -relief.2" Borak,
which was the first Supreme Court decision "to imply a private
securities statute, 2 1 naturally
right of action under any
had a substantial effect on proxy battles-each side of the contest
was almost assured a federal cause of 'action if the other side
violated the rules.
-Borak also served as 'a guidepost, at least initially, for the
federal courts that were called upon to apply the new tender
offer law, which, like the proxy rules, did not contain express
liability provisions. Indeed, during the early years of the Williams
Act's life, the lower federal courts granted virtually every participant in the tender offer process standing to sue for violations of
the Act.22 Then in 1977, in Piper, the Supreme Court denied an
unsuccessful tender offeror standing to sue a competing offeror
and target management for damages under the antifraud provision of the Williams Act.23 Although the Court was careful to
limit its holding to damage suits brought by a tender offeror un-.
der the antifraud provision, 24 federal courts have read Piper as a
general limitation on the standing of both offerors and targets to
sue for damages under all provisions of the Williams Act. Some
courts have questioned the propriety of equitable relief as well.2 5
As a result, reliance on state law is 'often the only alternative for
'federal

19 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
20

1& at 434.

21 See L. Loss, supra note 3, at 926-27.
22 See cases cited infra note 139.
23 Pipe, 430 U.S. at 42.
24 "Id. at 42 n.28.
25

See infra notes 205-07 and accompanying text.
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parties aggrieved by violations of the Act. The Piper Court, however, specifically distinguished and preserved its holding in Borak. 6
Thus, for over a decade, there has been a disparity in the remedial aspects of the proxy rules and the Williams Act that glows with
an incandescent illogic: two-way standing and federal law for
proxy violations, but often no standing and state law for tender
offer violations.
In 1985, in Schreiber, a target shareholder-the one tender
offer particip.nt that seems to have survived Piper with the right
to sue under the Williams Act-brought suit against a tender offeror, the target, and the directors of the target for damages,
alleging that they had engaged in manipulative tender offer practices within the meaning of the antimanipulation provision of the
Act.2 7 Specifically, the shareholder claimed that the offeror's revocation of a hostile tender offer coupled with the substitution of
a friendly tender offer (after negotiations with target management) was a manipulative distortion of the market for the target
stock that resulted in a diminished payment in the second offer
to those shareholders who had tendered during the first offer.
The defendants' conduct was not accompanied by any misrepresentation, and the conduct was completely disclosed.2" The Supreme Court rejected the shareholder's claim, holding that tender
offer practices were not manipulative unless there was some sort
of misrepresentation or nondisclosure. 29 Any claim the shareholder may have had for breach of fiduciary duty or breach of
contract was left to be addressed in a state forum. As might be
expected, the Court's restrictive interpretation of tender offer manipulation in Schreiber had import that extended well beyond the
facts of the case; it made nondeceptive but unfair tender offer
conduct exclusively a question of state corporation law by foreclosing challenges under federal law, and it raised serious questions about the validity of several SEC rules that seek to prevent
this type of tender offer conduct.
Just as Piper and Schreiber laid the groundwork for a growing
prominence of state judicial regulation of the tender offer process, CTS in 1987 countenanced state legislative regulation. The
events that led up to this third visit from the Supreme Court
span a twenty-year period and are best described chronologically.

26
27

Pipers, 430 U.S. at 41.
Schreiber, 472 U.S. at 4.

28 Id. at 12-13.
29 Id. at 12.
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Although the states have never attempted to pass legislation regulating proxy contests,3" in the ten-year period after the Williams
Act was adopted, approximately three-quarters of the states enacted tender offer legislation, and this legislation gave target companies more protection than the federal statute." In general, these
statutes had extraterritorial application, imposed a precommencement waiting period, and gave the state government the power to
pass on the merits of the offer. The proliferation of these socalled first-generation state takeover statutes gave rise to a considerable number of constitutional attacks in both federal and state
courts, and most of the courts ruled that the statutes at issue
were unconstitutional, both under the commerce clause as substantially interfering with interstate commerce and under the stipremacy clause as being in conflict with the Williams Act. Then
in 1982, in Edgar v. MITE Corp.,32 the Supreme Court held that
the Illinois statute was unconstitutional on commerce clause
grounds,33 and a plurality of the Court argued that the statute
was preempted by the Williams Act. 4 Although MITE had the
effect of invalidating all remaining state takeover legislation, it
embodied guidelines that the state legislatures could follow if they
wished to adopt new takeover laws that avoided the constitutional
infirmities of the Illinois statute.
Predictably, after MITE, a second generation of state takeover
statutes soon emerged. 5 These statutes narrowed the bases for
asserting jurisdiction and were couched as substantive state regulation of corporate governance, utilizing traditional areas of state
corporation law .such as shareholder voting rights or mergers.
They were of various types, but an exemplar is the control share
acquisition law. Under this type of statute, once a tender offeror
has acquired a specified percentage of shares in the target company, a majority of the disinterested target shareholders must agree
to give the offeror the right to vote its shares. In CTS, the Supreme Court tested the constitutionality of a control share acquisi-

30 L Loss, supra note 3, at 449 n.1.
31 For a discussion of this first round of state takeover legislation and the constitutional challenges that were made, see infra text accompanying notes 386-402.
32 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
33 Id. at 646.
34 Id. at 629. The majority opinion did not address the Williams Act or the preemption issue. For a discussion of the plurality opinion in MITE, see infra text accompanying notes 403-14.
35 For a discussion of the second-generation takeover statutes and the constitutional
challenges that were made, see infra text accompanying notes 415-24.
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tion statute adopted in Indiana. The Court held that the Indiana
statute was a legitimate exercise of state authority and found that
it neither interfered with interstate commerce nor conflicted with
the Williams Act. 6 CTS resulted in a new wave of state statutes,
often on the Indiana model.3 7 This legislation, now more constitutionally secure, added another asymmetry to proxy and tender
offer regulation only federal legislation applied in the proxy area,
but both federal and state legislation applied to tender offers.
The Congress of 1968 would be unsettled by this story of the
development of tender offer law, because, as this Article argues,
the Supreme Court has emasculated the Williams Act by a faulty
construction of the Act's provisions and purposes and, as a result,
has derailed tender offer regulation from the federal track Congress intended. The Article maintains that by deferring to state
common-law remedies in Piper, by bowing to state corporation law
in Schreiber, and by approving state legislative strategies in CTS,
the Court has adopted a philosophy of federalism which is so
vigilant in safeguarding the rights and powers of the states that
state law has been allowed to disturb the federal design for the
regulation of tender offers. The Article also maintains that if
today's lawmakers evaluated the federal design Congress envisioned when it passed the Williams Act, they would find that this
design is as desirable today as it was in 1968. The Article therefore concludes that Congress should infuse renewed potency into
the Act by nullifying the Court's trilogy of tender offer cases.
Such action, the Article observes, would put tender offers and
proxy contests on an equal footing from a regulatory standpoint
and thus make the regulation of corporate takeover battles primarily the domain of federal law.
Organizationally, Part I of the Article summarizes the legislative history, objectives, and pertinent provisions of the Williams
Act. Part II criticizes Piper and argues that Congress wanted all
tender offer participants to have standing to sue under the Williams Act. Part III evaluates Schreiber and maintains that the Williams Act was meant to prohibit certain nondeceptive but unfair
tender offer practices. The impact of Schreiber on targets' defensive tactics, on bidders' offensive strategies, and on the SEC's
tender offer rules is also analyzed. Part IV criticizes CTS and ar-

36 CTS, 481 U.S. at 86-87, 94.
37 For a discussion of state takeover legislation after CTS, see infra text accompanying notes 470-500
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gues that the major types of state takeover statutes currently 'in
force are preempted bythe Williams Act. Finally, Part V discusses,
the Article's conclusion that Congress should negate Piper,
Schreiber, and CTS with legislation that gives unquestioned primacy
to federal law in the regulation of tender offers. Specific recom-"
mendations for this needed congressional action are then set
forth.
I.

A.

THE WILLIAMS ACT

Legislative History and Statutory Objectives

The dramatic increase in the number of cash tender offers in
the 1960s created a large gap in the federal securities laws."8
Tender offerors were able to operate in almost complete secrecy
with no obligation to disclose information to shareholders of the
target company when making a bid."9 Moreover, target share38 Unlike exchange tender offers (see supra note 4), cash tender offers were not subject to the registration requirements of the Securities Act. See H.R. REP. No, 1711, supra
note 2, at 3, reprinted in 1968 U:S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 2812-13; S.'REP,
No. 550, supra note 5, at 2-3; Bromberg, The Securities Law of Tender Offers, 15 N.Y,L.F.
462, 463 (1969); Hamilton, Some Reflections on Cash, Tender Offer Legislation, 15 N.Y.L.F.
269, 273-75 (1969); Hayes & Taussig, Tactics of Cash Takeover Bids, 45 HARV, Bus. REv.
135, 137 (1967). As a result, the only provisions of the federal securities laws that had
any potential application to the cash tender offer process were the insider trading provisions of rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1990), and § 16 of the Exchange Act, 15
U.S.C. § 7 8p (1988). See L. Loss, supra note 3, at 498. State law was not much better
-than federal law. Only one state, Virginia, had enacted a takeover statute at the time the
Williams Act was adopted, and that statute had been on the books for only four
months. See Take-Over-Bid Disclosure Act, ch. 119, 1968 Va. Acts 167 (repealed 1989).
And at common law, majority shareholders selling a controlling block had been held
liable to the corporation or minority shareholders but only when they had reason to
believe that the purchaser was likely to mismanage the'corporation or loot it. See, e.g.,
Perlman v. Feldman, 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 952 (1955);
Insuranceshares Corp. v. Northern Fiscal Corp., 35 F. Supp. 22 (E.D. Pa. 1940); Gerdes
v. Reynolds, 28 N.Y.S.2d 622 (Sup..Ct. 1944). See generally Andrews, The Stockholder's
Right to an Equal Opportunity in the Sale of Shares, 78 HARV. L REV. 505 (1965); Bayne,
A Philosophy of Corporate Control, 112 U. PA. L. REV. 22 (1963); Hill, The Sale of Controlling Shares, 70 HARV. L. REV. 986 (1957); Jennings, Trading in Corporate Control, 44 CALai.L. REv. 1 (1956); Leech, Transactions in Corporate Control, 104 U. PA. L. REv. 725
(1956). In addition, parties seeking to thwart'a tender offer could have been held liable
-at common law for the tort of interference with a prospective advantage. See W.
KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 130, at
1005-31 (5th ed. 1984); infra notes 208 & 210; see also Fleischer & Mundheim, Corporate
Acquisition by Tender Offer 115 U. PA. L. REV. 317, 356 n.150 (1967). Common-law tort
actions, however, were extremly limited and, at bottom, did not provide a viable remedy
for intentional misconduct in the tender offer context, See, e.g., Middlesex Concrete
Prod. & Excavating Corp, v. Carteret Indus. Ass'n, 37 N.J. 507, 518-19, 181 A.2d 774,
781 (1962).
39 The offeror was under no obligation to disclose its identity, the source of its
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holders were often forced to act hastily on offers before target
management or other groups had an opportunity to present opposing arguments or competing offers.4" Finally, the various participants in the tender offer process, as part of their offensive or
defensive strategies, were able to engage, frequently with impunity, in numerous deceptive and manipulative practices. 4'
Convinced that the regulatory gap should be filled and that
some of the abusive tender offer practices that had arisen should
be curbed, in 1965 Senator Harrison Williams introduced Senate
Bill 2731.42 The bill, an avowedly promanagement proposal,4 3
imposed precommencement disclosure requirements on tender
offerors and purchasers of substantial blocks of a company's securities.4 4 No action was taken on the bill,45 but it was revised
with the assistance of the SEC and
reintroduced by Senator Wil4
liams in 196746 as Senate Bill 510. 1

funds, its associates, or its future plans if control were obtained. H.R. REP. NO. 1711,
supra note 2, at 3, reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 2812-13. Senator Thomas Kuchel deplored the "tragedy" of the "rape" of corporations by raiders acting under a "cloak of secrecy." Senate Hearings, supra note 10, at 43.
40 The offeror was under no obligation to give target shareholders any specified
time to consider the offer, and often the offers were made under conditions suggesting
that a "hasty deposit" was necessary because the transaction would be conducted on a
"first[-]come, first[-]serve[d]" basis. Senate Hearings, supra note 10, at 17; H.R. REP. No.
1711, supra note 2, at 3, reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 2812-13.
Pressure tactics were also used by target management to lull shareholders into "refusing
a tender offer on the basis of unsubstantiated or irrelevant arguments." Senate Hearings,
supra note 10, at 204-05.
41 See Senate Hearings, supra note 10, at 60, 62, 196, 236.
42 S. 2731, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1965); see 111 CONG. REc. 28,257-60 (1965).
43 Senate Bill 2731 had a somewhat limited objective and has been aptly characterized as the "Incumbent Management Protection Act." See Moylan, Exploring the Tender
Offer Provisions of the Federal Securities Laws, 43 CEO. WASH. L. REV. 551, 553 (1975).
44 The bill required that "any cash tender offers and, indeed, any substantial accumulation of shares . . . be preceded by the filing of public information." 111 CONG.
REc. 28,259 (1965). Senator Williams saw such disclosure as "the only way that corporations, their stockholders, and employees [could] be adequately prepared in advance to
meet the threat of the takeover specialist." Id. That Senator Williams envisioned the
threat as an ominous one is evidenced by his remarks when introducing the bill: "In
recent years we have seen proud old companies reduced to corporate shells after whitecollar pirates have seized control with funds from sources which are unknown in many
cases, then sold or traded away the best assets, later to split up most of the loot among
themselves . . . ." Id. at 28,257.
45 E. ARANow & H. EINHORN, supra note 3, at 66.
46 See 113 CONG. REG. 854-57, 24,662-64 (1967); 112 CONG. REc. 19,003-07 (1966).
47 S. 510, 90th Cong. 1st Sess. (1967). The bill was co-sponsored by Senator Kuchel
and had the approval of virtually all the major stock exchanges. See 113 CONG. REC.
24,665 (1967).
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The new bill reflected a shift in attitude. Although still committed to the principle of disclosure of information, Congress
realized in the interim period that tender offers provided a useful
check on inefficient, entrenched management, and that therefore
any bias in the legislation in favor of target management was not
wise because it might prevent some offers from ever being
made.4 8 As a result, in revising Senate Bill 2731, Senator Williams followed the SEC's suggestion that the administrative approach of neutrality in the regulation of proxy contests-an approach firmly grounded on the Exchange Act's legislative history 49-would

0
also be appropriate for tender offer regulation.

Hence, instead of the promanagement approach taken in Senate
Bill 2731, Senate Bill 510 embraced a policy of neutrality, which
was accomplished by imposing restrictions on the conduct of target management and others who opposed the tender offer and by
reducing the constraints on the conduct of the tender offeror.5 1
48 S. REP. No. 550, supra note 5, at 3. Congress also was convinced that tender
offers fostered competitive bidding for target stock, thus affording target shareholders
the opportunity to tender their shares at a premium. 113 CONG. REC. 24,666 (1967) (remarks of Sen. Javits). Furthermore, Congress believed that a promanagement bill, even if
it did not prevent some offers from ever being made, would give management a decided
advantage by precluding a fair and free flow of information to target shareholders from
offerors and management alike, to the detriment of target shareholders. See Edgar v.
MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 635 (1982) (plurality opinion) (suggesting that the advance
disclosure requirements of S. 2731, which would have had the effect of allowing a target
company to disseminate information to its shareholders about an offer before the offer
was ever made, created a harmful imbalance in the flow of information to target shareholders).
49 The Senate report on the bill that became the Exchange Act is quite explicit on
this point:
It is contemplated that the rules and regulations promulgated by the Commission will protect investors from promiscuous solicitation of their proxies, on
the one hand, by irresponsible outsiders seeking to wrest control of a corporation away from honest and conscientious corporation officials, and, on the other
hand, by unscrupulous corporate officials seeking to retain control of the management by concealing and distorting facts.
S. REP. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 77 (1934).
50 The SEC submitted numerous comments on S. 2731 to Senator Williams along
with a revised version of the bill. See 112 CONG. REC. 19,003-07 (1966).
51 The final version of S. 510 reflected the SEC's suggested changes and contained
further modifications added during the hearings on the bill. See 113 CONG. REc. 854-57
(1966); Hamilton, supra note 38, at 275-76. The provisions of S. 510 that attempted to
neutralize S. 2731 were as follows: first, the prior-notice mandate was dropped, and S.
510 adopted the concurrent disclosure requirement of § 14(d)(1). Second, S. 510 granted
the SEC rulemakirng power in § 14(d)(4) to regulate target management
countersolicitations. Third, S. 510 added' § 14(e), the antifraud provision, which was
made, applicable to the offeror and opponents of the tender offer. Finally, S. 510 gave
the SEC authority in § 13(e) to impose a regulatory scheme on a corporation's purchas-
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Senator Williams explained: "We have taken extreme care to
avoid tipping the scales in favor of management or in favor of
the person making the takeover bids." 2
As subsequently enacted in 1968, the Williams Act had two
intertwined objectives: protecting investors through disclosure of
information, and preserving the viability of the tender offer process through regulatory neutrality.53 Congress sought to provide
target shareholders with full and balanced disclosure of information and sufficient time to evaluate this information so that they
would be able to make an unhurried, informed choice. Congress
also sought to avoid tipping the balance of regulation in favor of
the offeror or target management so that target shareholders
would not be effectively deprived of an opportunity to make the
choice. Guided by these twin objectives, the Act provided an
evenhanded solution for the market problems stemming from
tender offers and the tactics used to thwart them and established
standards of conduct for all participants in the tender offer process.

es of its own shares. See 112 CONG. REC. 19,003-07 (1966); Note, Cash Tender Offers, 83
HARV. L. REv. 377, 381 n.28 (1969) [hereinafter Note, Cash Tender Offers]; Note, Private
Litigation Under the Williams Act: Standing to Sue, Elements of a Claim and Remedies, 7 J.
CORP. L. 545, 548 n.31 (1982) [hereinafter Note, Standing to Sue]; Note, Cash Tender Offers: A Proposed Definition, 31 U. FLA. L. REv. 694, 701 n.56 (1979) [hereinafter Note, A
Proposed Definition].
52 113 CONG. REG. 24,664 (1967).
53 The House and Senate reports appear to indicate that the two purposes are of
equal importance, although the point is arguable. The evolution of the Williams Act
manifests a congressional attempt to create a comprehensive legislative scheme that
would both protect investors and preserve the viability of tender offers as a method of
corporate acquisition. While neutrality was perceived by Congress as a principal means
of providing investor protection, it was also viewed as a distinct goal that Congress was
apparently unwilling to subordinate, particularly after it had so painstakingly avoided "tipping the balance" in favor of either the target or offeror. See H.R. REP. No. 1711, supra
note 2, at 4, reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 2813; S. REP. No.
550, supra note 5, at 3; see also Note, Standing to Sue, supra note 51, at 548-59; infra
note 177. But see Note, Tender Offer Regulation-Injunction Standards Under the Williams
Act, 45 FORDHAM L. REv. 51, 54 (1976) (arguing that investor protection is the predominant purpose); Note, Cash Tender Offers, supra note 51, at 700 (same). For a discussion
of the Supreme Court's view on the purposes of the Williams Act, see infra text accompanying notes 162-66. Some legal commentators contend that the Williams Act is not
neutral, but they disagree on which side the Act favors. Compare Booth, The Problem
With Federal Tender Offer Law, 77 CALIF. L. REv. 707, 715 (1989) (the Williams Act favors the bidder) with Fischel, From MITE to CTS: State Anti-Takeover Statutes, the Williams
Act the Commerce Clause, and Insider Trading 1987 SuP. CT. REv. 47, 72-73 (the Williams
Act favors target management).
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B.

Overview of the Statute

The Williams Act added sections 13(d)-(e) and-sections 14(d)-'
(f) to the Exchange Act,5 4 and these sections were amended into
their current form in 1970."5 The major provisions relating to
tender offers 56 are contained in sections 14(d), 14(e), and 13(e).'

54 See supra note 8. In general, the Williams Act and the SEC rules thereunder are
applicable only to acquisitions of a class of equity security registered pursuant to § 12 of
the Exchange Act,, 15 U.S.C. § 781 (1988). See id.§§ 78m(d)(1), 7 8m(e)(1), 78n(f). But see
infra notes 58-59 & 106.
55' Act of Dec. 22,-1970, Pub. L. No. 91-567, 84 Stat. 1497 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§
78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(e) (1988)). The 1970 amendments, among other things, extended the
strictures of § 14(d) to exchange tender offers by deleting the 1968 exemption in §
14(d) for offers pursuant to a Securities Act registration statement. Consequently, exchange tender offers are governed by both th6 Securities Act and the Williams Act. Id. §
4, 84 Stat. at 1497 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)).
56 Congress intentionally left open the question of what types of purchases are encompassed by the operative term "tender offer." See Takeover Bids: Hearings on HR.
14475, S. 510 Before the Subcomm. on Commemre and Finance of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1968) [hereinafter House Hearings]
(statement of Manuel F. Cohen, Chairman, SEC). Both the statutory provisions themselves and the legislative history indicate, however, that Congress was primarily focusing
on "conventional" tender offers when it passed the Williams Act. See Note, The Developing Meaning of "Tender Offer" Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 86 HARv. L REV.
1250, 1260-61 (1973). Yet, the legislative documents also suggest that Congress contemplated that the Act would extend beyond orthodox tender offers to encompass certain
open market and privately negotiated purchases of securities when such an extension was
necessary to effectuate the statute's purposes. See 113 CONG..REC. 854, 856 (1967) (remarks of Sen. Williams).
Although the SEC has authority to promulgate an interpretive rule defining the
term "tender offer," it cannot seem to make up its mind whether a definition is appropriate or feasible. See Comment, Toward a Definition of "Tender Offer", 19 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 191, 207-08 n.62 (1982); Note, A Proposed Definition, supra note 51, at 704. In
1976, the SEC investigated the possibility of defining a "tender offer" but found there
was no consensus on the meaning of the. term. Notice of Proposed Tender Offer Rules,
and Schedules, Exchange Act.,Release No. 12,676, [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH)
80,659, at 86,695-96 (Aug. 2, 1976). Several years later, the SEC again
considered and rejected defining the term. Proposed Tender Offer Rules and Schedule,
Exchange Act Release No. 15,548, [1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
81,935, .at 81,213 (Feb. 5, 1979). Then, in late 1979, the SEC released for public comment a proposed rule that defined the term. Proposed Amendments to Tender Offer
Rules, Exchange Act Release No. 16,385, [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 1-82,374, at 82,601-06 (Nov. 29, 1979). The proposed rule, however, was never
adopted. By and large, the SEC, like Congress, seems reluctant to define the term, large
ly out of a. realization that once a definition is put in place, purchasers whose transactions may well warrant the regulation which §§ 14(d) and 14(e) provide may be able to
structure the transactions so as to evade the application of these Williams Act provisions.
Because the SEC has never adopted a precise regulatory definition, the task has
been delegated to the federal courts for determination, on a case-by-case basis. Since
1979, most courts, however, have been guided by a test proposed by the SEC in
Wellman v. Dickinson, 475 F. Supp. 783, 823-24 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), aFfd, 682 F.2d 355 (2d
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These three sections will be discussed more fully below, but in
brief, section 14(d) regulates third-party tender offers,57 section
14(e) is the general antifraud/antimanipulation provision for all
tender offers,58 and section 13(e) governs a company's purchase
of its own securities, including by way of tender offer.5 Section
13(d) regulates sizeable acquisitions of a company's securities by a
third party if the securities are not acquired by means of a tender
offer,6" and section 14(f) governs transactions subject to section
Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1069 (1983). The test lists eight factors that are characteristic of a tender offer, and courts utilizing this SEC profile have indicated that all
eight factors need not be present to find a tender offer. See, e.g., id. at 824; Hoover Co.
v. Fuqua Indus., [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
97,107, at
96,148 (N.D. Ohio June 11, 1979). The Second Circuit, however, in Hanson Trust v.
SCM Corp., 774 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1985), trumped the SEC's eight-factor test, stating that
"the elevation of [the test] to a mandatory 'litmus test' seemed unwise and unnecessary."
Id. at 56-57. Rather, the court concluded that a tender offer exists whenever the
solicitees need the protections of § 14(d). Id. at 57-58.
The difficulty in drawing a bright line between those acquisitions that are tender
offers and those that are truly open market and privately negotiated purchases is of little
solace to corporate planners advising clients who intend to embark on substantial buying
programs. For if advice that no tender offer will be involved turns out to be wrong, the
acquiror may face an SEC enforcement suit sterilizing the shares purchased or rescinding
the entire transaction for failure to comply with § 14(d) in executing the transaction. See
15 U.S.C. § 78u(d) (1988) (granting the SEC authority to institute enforcement suits); 1
T. HAZEN, THE LAW OF SEcuRITIEs REGULATION § 11.18, at 736 (2d ed. 1989) (stating
that a violation of § 14(d) may give rise to an implied right of action for private injunctive relief).
57 Section 14(d) applies only if after consummation of the tender offer, the offeror
will own more than five percent of the class of securities sought. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(1)
(1988). Also, issuer tender offerors are specifically exempted from § 14(d). Id. §
78n(d)(8)(B).
58 It is the SEC's position that § 14(e) applies to every tender offer, even those not
subject to § 14(d). See supra note 54. Thus, under the SEC's view, § 14(e), applies to
tender offers for unregistered equity securities and debt securities whether or not registered under § 12 of the Exchange Act. See Adoption of Amendments to Tender Offer
Rules, Exchange Act Release No. 16,384, [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH)
82,373, at 82,577 (Nov. 29, 1979); Proposed Amendments to Tender Offer
Rules, Exchange Act Release No. 16,385, supra note 56, at 82,601. But see L.P. Acquisition Co. v. Tyson, 616 F. Supp. 1186, 1188-90 (E.D. Mich.) (holding that "the scope of §,
14(e) is limited to tender offers for registered equity securities"), rev'd in part, vacated in
part, on other grounds, 772 F.2d 201 (6th Cir. 1985); Conard, Tender Offer Fraud: The
Secret Meaning of Subsection 14(e), 40 Bus. LAw. 87, 89-95 (1984) (arguing that Congress
was not conscious of a difference in coverage between § 14(e) and any other section of
the Williams Act).
59 All issuers that have a class of equity securities registered pursuant to § 12 are
subject to § 13(e), and § 13(e) applies to purchases by such issuer of any of its equity
securities. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(e) (1988).
60 Section 13(d) requires any person, after acquiring more than five percent of a
corporation's securities, to file with the SEC and to furnish the corporation, within 10
days of the acquisition, essentially the same information that a tender offeror must supply under § 14(d). Id. § 78m(d)(1); see infra text accompanying note 66. The information
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13(d) or section 14(d) when the transactions contain a private
agreement for the transfer of control.6 Pursuant to authority
contained in the Williams Act,6 2 the SEC adopted rules in 1968
to implement this statutory structure.63 These skeletal, emergency
rules have evolved over the last two decades into a detailed regulatory scheme governing both tender offers and sizeable acquisitions of securities.64
C.

The Major Tender Offer Provisions

1. Section 14(d)
Section 14(d) establishes the primary disclosure obligations of
the tender offeror. Upon making a tender offer to the target
shareholders, the offeror must file with the SEC, and furnish the
65
target company, detailed information about itself and the offer.
In general, the required disclosures include the identity and background of the offeror, the source and amount of funds or other
consideration to be used in making the purchases, the extent of

must also be sent to each national securities exchange where the securities are traded.
17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-1 (1990). Section 13(d) does not apply to issuer repurchases. 15
U.S.C. § 78m(d)(6)(C) (1988). The purpose of § 13(d) is to alert the marketplace to new
aggregations of stock holdings that might represent, a potential change in corporate control. GAF Corp. v. Milstein, 453 F.2d 709, 717 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 910
(1972); see Comment, Section 13(d) and Disclosure of Corporate Equity Owneiship, 119 U. PA.
L. REV. 853, 871 (1971). Although the open market and privately negotiated purchases
governed by § 13(d) are frequently a harbinger of a § 14(d) tender offer, there are
significant differences in the regulation of the two types of acquisitions. Under § 13(d),
the required disclosure of information is made after the acquisition, whereas under §
14(d), it is made concurrently with the commencement of the offer. Further, § 13(d),
unlike § 14(d), contains no provisions regulating the fairness of the transaction. See infra
text accompanying notes 83-88. Finally, there is no specific antifraud provision, comparable to § 14(e), applicable to § 13(d)-regulated purchases. Rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. §
240.10b15 (1990), however, may apply to purchases governed by § 13(d).
61 Under § 14(f), if there is a private agreement that a majority of the directors will
be designated or elected (otherwise than at a shareholder meeting) after the acquisition,
the corporation must file with the SEC and send to its shareholders a statement containing the same type of information that would be required'under the proxy rules if
the persons so designated or elected were nominees for election as directors at a meeting of shareholders. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(f) (1988); see 17 C.F.R. § 240.14f-1 (1990). See also
Ratner, Section 14(l): A New Approach to Transfer; of Corporate Control, 54 CORNELL L
REv. 65 (1968).
62 See supra note 14.
63 See 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13d-1, .13d-2, .13d-101 (sched. 13D), .13e-1, .14d-1 to .14d-4,
.14d-101, .14f-1 (1968).
64 See id. §§ 240.13d-1 to .13d-7, .13d-101 (sched. 13D), .13e-1, .13e-3, .13e-4, .13e100 (sched. 13E-3), .13e-101 (sched. 13E-4), .14d-1 to .14d-10, .14d-100 (scled. 14D-1),
.14d-101 (sched. 14D-9), .14e-1 to .14e-3, .14f-1 (1990).
65 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(1) (1988).
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the holdings of the offeror in the target company, and the purpose of the purchases.6 6 The offer itself and any subsequent solicitations made to the target shareholders by the offeror must
also be filed with the SEC and delivered to the target company.67 In a series of rules adopted under section 14(d), the SEC
has augmented considerably this statutory framework." Rule
14d-3 69 provides more specific filing and transmission requirements; 70 rule 14d-671 sets forth information that must be disclosed in the offer and subsequent solicitations made to the target
shareholders; 72 and rules 14d-47" and 14d-5"4 establish three
nonexclusive methods of disseminating the offer to the target
shareholders: 5 long-form publication in a newspaper, summary

66 Section 14(d) requires disclosures of the type specified in § 13(d), in addition to
other information the SEC may require. Id.

67

Id.

68

Rule 14d-1,

defines terms frequently used in the rules adopted under § 14(d)

(regulation 14D) and under § 14(e) (regulation 14E). 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-1 (1990). Rule
14d-2, which triggers the operation of regulation 14D, defines the "date of commencement of a tender offer" as essentially the date the tender offer is first published or sent
or given to target shareholders. Id. § 240.14d-2. Under rule 14d-2(b), however, an offeror
may make a public announcement of the offer as long as it complies with the filing,

dissemination, and disclosure obligations of regulation 14D within five business days. Id.
§ 240.14d-2(b). Safe harbor provisions for brief public announcements that do not constitute rule 14a-2(b) public announcements are set forth in rule 14d-2(d)-(e). Id. § 240.14d2(d)-(e). One of the major purposes of rule 14d-2 was to create a conflict between the
rule and those state takeover statutes, pre-MITE, that imposed a precommencement waiting period. The conflict buttressed the SEC's preemption argument. See infra notes 399402 and accompanying text. The events in the MITE litigation, however, preceded the
adoption of rule 14d-2. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 636 n.11 (1982).
69 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-3 (1990).
70 The information filed with the SEC and transmitted to the target company by
the offeror is called a tender offer statement. The information that must be disclosed in.
this statement is set forth in schedule 14D-1, id. § 240.14d-100. See id. § 240.14d-3(a).
The tender offer statement must also be sent to any competing bidder, to each national
securities exchange where the securities sought are listed, and the National Association
of Securities Dealers, Inc. (NASD) if the securities sought are quoted in NASDAQ. See
id. § 240.14d-3(a).
71 Id. § 240.14d-6.
72 The information that must be disclosed to the target shareholders depends on
the method used by the offeror to disseminate the offer. In general, the required disclosures include major portions of the tender offer statement. See id. § 240.14d-6(c).
73 Id. § 240.14d-4.
74 Id. § 240.14d-5.
75 Information disseminated in compliance with rule 14d-4 is deemed "published,
sent or given to security holders" for purposes of § 14(d)(1). The dissemination of an
exchange tender offer is governed by the Securities Act if the transaction has to be
registered. Adoption of Amendments to Tender Offer Rules, Exchange Act Release No.
16,384, supra note 58, at 82,585. Further, when the exchange tender offer is registered,
the prospectus must contain information about both the offeror and the target, which
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advertisement in a newspaper, 6 and use of a shareholder list. If
the offeror chooses the shareholder list, method of dissemination-a method that had been developed by the SEC for proxy
contests in rule 14a-7 77 -the target company is given the option
either to furnish the list to the offeror or to mail the offeror's
78
materials to the target shareholders at the offeror's expense.
The elaborate scheme of disclosure obligations imposed on the
tender offeror under section 14(d) is designed. to ensure that
information about the offeror and its qualifications is made publicly available and that the target shareholders are able to respond
to the offer with actual knowledge of this information.
To maintain a neutral regulatory balance, section 14(d) also
governs solicitations and recommendations in connection with the
tender offer that are made to target shareholders by the target
company and other tender offer participants. The SEC is given
79
specific rulemaking power to regulate these communications;
and at present, rule 14d-9-patterned after rule 14a-11, a special
proxy rule applicable to contested elections° 'establishes filing,

presents some difficulties for the offeror when target management is not cooperative. See
L. Loss, supra note 3, at 498.
76 If an offeror uses a summary advertisement to disseminate the offer, the offeror
must furnish its tender offer materials to any target shareholder on request. 17 C.F.R. §
240.14d-4(a)(2) (1990).
77 Id. § 240.14a-7., Under rule 14a-7, if a nonmanagement group wishing to solicit
proxies requests a shareholder list, management must furnish the list o- mail the
nonmanagement group's proxy materials. The rule only applies, however, if management
has solicited proxies or intends to solicit proxies. Moreover, the nonmanagement group
must bear the cost of any expenses incurred.
78 See id. § 240.14d-5. Rule 14d-5 is based on the SEC's rulemaking power under §
14(d) and § 14(e). See Proposed Tender Offer Rules and Schedule, Exchange Act Release
No. -15,548, supra note 56, at 81,225-27; supra note 14 and accompanying text; infra text
accompanying note 95. Rule 14d-4 provides that any offeror that makes an adequate
publication in a newspaper .of a long-form publication or of a summary advertisement
may use the shareholder list method of dissemination described in rule 14d-5. 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.14d-4(a)(3) (1990). During the first year of its effectiveness (1980)," rule 14d-5 was
rarely used. Since most tenders are made by arbitrageurs who purchase their shares
during the course of the tender offer, the offerors presumably did not consider the
added cost of dissemination using a shareholder list worthwhile. See R. JENNINGS & H.
MARSH, SEcURITIEs REGULATION 690 n.1 (6th ed. 1987).

79 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(4) (1988).
80 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-11 (1990). Rule 14a-11, which applies only to solicitations
involving contests for the election or removal of directors, requires every "participant"
(except the company) in such solicitations to file with the SEC and each national securities exchange where securities of the company are listed information regarding the identity and background of the participant and the participant's interests in securities of the
company. See i& § 240.14a-11(c), -102 (sched. 14B). Each shareholder solicited must receive a summary of the greater part of this information. See id. § 240.14a-11(d)(3). Fur-
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transmission, and disclosure requirements for the target and certain specified persons related to the target or the offeror.8 1 Upon making a solicitation or recommendation to target shareholders, the regulated party must provide the shareholders with detailed information about itself and the nature of the solicitation
or recommendation. Also, this information and certain other disclosures must be filed with the SEC and furnished to the offeror
and the target (if the target is not the party making the communication).8 2" Rule 14d-9 is aimed at assisting target shareholders in
evaluating the merits of the solicitation or recommendation and
in assessing the interest of the party making the communication.
Section 14(d) and the rules thereunder are not limited to
disclosure. They also regulate the terms under which the offer
must be conducted by conferring valuable rights on target shareholders. The explicit statutory rights which have been amplified
by SEC rules are as follows: first, target shareholders who tender
their shares may withdraw them while the offer is still open and,
if the offeror has not purchased their shares, any time after sixty
calendar days from the commencement of the offer. (Section
14(d) provides that shareholders may withdraw their tendered

ther, rule 14a-11 carves out an exception from the general requirement of the proxy
rules by allowing either side to solicit proxies before furnishing a proxy statement in
certain situations. See id. § 240.14a-3(a), -11(d).
81 Id. § 240.14d-9.
82 The information filed with the SEC and furnished to the offeror and the target
is called a tender offer solicitation/recommendation statement. The information that
must be disclosed in this statement is set forth in schedule 14D-9, id. § 240.14d-101. See
id. § 240.14d-9(a). The solicitation/recommendation statement must also be sent to each
national securities exchange where the securities being sought in the tender offer are
listed and to NASD if the securities sought are quoted in NASDAQ. See id. §. The target shareholders must receive at least a summary of major portions of the information
disclosed in this statement. See id. § 240.14d-9(c).
There is, however, an exemption from all the requirements of rule 14d-9 for the
target company's initial, limited communication regarding the tender offer-the stop-lookand-listen communication. See id. § 240.14d-9(e). A target company relying on this exemption must state in the communication that on or before a specified date (which
cannot be later than 10 business days from the commencement of the offer) it will advise the target shareholders of its position with respect to the offer. This subsequent
communication, which is required in any event, will be a solicitation or recommendation
subject to rule
14d-9. See id. § 240.14d-9(f); infra text accompanying note 99. Juxtaposed, the stop-lookand-listen communication exemption for targets in rule 14d-9(e) and the public announcement exemption for offerors in rule 14d-2(b) (see supra note 68) maintain a neutral regulatory balance: they both allow the regulated party to initiate its defense or
offense largely unregulated. Furthermore, by way of rough analogy, the exception in
proxy rule 14a-11, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-11 (1990) (allowing solicitations prior to furnishing a written proxy statement), comes to mind. See supa note 80.
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shares at any time until the expiration of seven calendar days
after the commencement of the offer, but rule 14d-7 extends the
withdrawal period to the life of the offer.)8" Second, if the ten-

der offer is for less than all the outstanding shares (a partial offer) and more than the requested number of shares is tendered,
the offeror must purchase the shares pro rata. (Section 14(d)
limits the proration requirement to shares tendered during the
first ten calendar days of the offer, but rule 14d-8 extends the
proration requirement to the life of the offer.)8 4 Third, if the
offering price is increased, the offeror must pay the increased
price to all tendering shareholders."5 The SEC has taken the initiative to flesh out section 14(d) with two additional substantive
requirements that are intended to prevent offerors from discriminating among target shareholders. Both of these requirements are
contained in rule 14d-10. 86 First, a tender offer must be open to
all target shareholders owning the class of securities sought in the
offer.8 Second, all target shareholders must be paid the highest
83 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(5) (1988); 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-7 (1990). Pursuant to statutory
authority cont3ained in § 14(d)(5), the SEC in 1979 extended the withdrawal period to
the first 15 business days of the 6ffer and established a withdrawal right 'of 10 business
days after the commencement of a competing offer. Adoption of Amendments to Tender Offer Rules, Exchange Act Release No. 16,384, supra note 58, at 82,591. In 1986,
the SEC extended the withdrawal period to the life of the offer, and withdrawal rights
upon commencement of a competing bid were eliminated. Adoption of All-Holders and
Best-Price Rule, Exchange Act Release No: 23,421, [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH)
84,016, at 88,197 (July 11, 1986).
84 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(6) (1988); 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-8 (1990). Section 14(d)(6) was
specifically designed to reduce the pressure on target shareholders to deposit their
shares hastily when the offer was made on a first-come, first-served basis. 113 CONG.
REC. 856 (1967). The extension of the proration period to the life of the offer by the
SEC in 1982 was deemed necessary because public shareholders had problems receiving
the offering materials and making an investment decision during the statutory 10-calendar-day proration period. See Adoption of Pro Rata Rule, Exchange Act Release No.
19,336, [1982-1983 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
83,306, at 85,651 (Dec.
15, 1982). Because § 14(d)(6), unlike § 14(d)(5), does not grant the SEC rulemaking authority, rule 14d-8 was based, for the most part, on the SEC's rulemaking power under
§ 14(e). See id. at 85,652; infra note 378.
85 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(7) (1988). The statutory increased-price provision becomes
particuarly significant if several transactions are integrated as parts of a single tender
offer. 1 T. HAZEN, supra note 56, § 11.14, at 713-14; see L. Loss, supra note 3, at 513.
86 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-10 (1990). Rule 14d-10, which contains the best-price and the
all-holders requirements, was not adopted by the SEC until 1986. The rule was adopted
primarily under §§ 14(d) and 14(e). See Adoption of All-Holders and Best-Price Rule,
Exchange Act Release No. 23,421, supra note 83, at 88,188. The SEC contends, however,
that the protections provided by rule 14d-10 are implicit in § 14(d). See Proposed
Amendments Regarding Equal Treatment of Target Shareholders, Exchange Act Release
No. 22,198, [1984-1985 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 83,797, at 87,560-61
(July 1, 1985); infra text following note 381.
87 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-10(a)(1) (1990). The all-holders requirement of rule 14d-10
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88
consideration paid to any other shareholder during the offer.
The substantive regulatory scheme of section 14(d)-which
amounts to federal corporation law-is designed to ensure that
target shareholders are treated fairly and that they have adequate
time to consider the communications from both the offeror and
target management in deciding whether to tender, sell into the
market, or retain all or part of their securities.

2.

Section 14(e)

Section 14(e) has two prongs. The first prong, which is borrowed from rule 14a-9, the proxy antifraud rule, 9 makes it unlawful for anyone to make untrue or misleading statements in
connection with any tender offer.9" The second prong, which resembles section 10(b) of the Exchange Act,9 1 makes it unlawful
for anyone to engage in fraidulent, deceptive, or manipulative
acts or practices in connection with any tender offer.9 2 An allencompassing provision, section 14(e) is directed at the conduct
of the offeror, the target company, and any other tender offer
participant that is seeking to influence the target shareholders'

does not prevent an offeror from making a tender offer that excludes all shareholders
in a state where the offeror is prohibited from making the tender offer by governmental
action pursuant to a state statute, as long as the offeror has in good faith tried to comply with the statute. Id. § 240.14d-10(b)(2).
88 Id. § 240.14d-10(a)(2). The best-price provision of rule 14d-10 does not, however,
prohibit more than one type of consideration as long as shareholders are permitted to
elect among each type and the highest consideration of each type paid to any shareholder is paid to any other shareholder receiving that type of consideration. Id. § 240.14d10(c). The best-price provision is designed, for example, to prevent a bidder from paying
a higher consideration to the employee-shareholders of the target company than it is
paying to other shareholders. See Proposed Amendments Regarding Equal Treatment of
Target Shareholders, Exchange Act Release No. 22,198, supra note 86, at 87,563 n.13.
Also, if the bidder decreases the offering price (for example, because the target company
sells a significant portion of its assets to a third party as a defensive measure), the bestprice provision requires that the bidder pay the decreased price to all target
shareholders-those who tendered before the decrease in price (but did not withdraw
their shares) and those who tendered after the decrease in price. See Proposed All-Holders and Best-Price Rule, Exchange Act Release No. 22,791, [1985-1986 Transfer Binder)
83,955, at 87,981 (Jan. 14, 1986). In the release adopting
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
rule 14d-10, the SEC indicated that the best-price provision would allow a bidder to
reduce the offering price without having to terminate the offer and commence a new
offer, as had previously been required. Adoption of All-Holders and Best-Price Rule,
Exchange Act Release No. 23,421, supra note 83, at 88,187.
89 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1990).
90 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1988). The first prong of § 14(e) does not track rule 14a-9
exactly. For example, rule 14a-9 refers to "false" rather than "untrue" statements.
91 Id. § 78j(b).
92 Id. § 78n(e).
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choice or' the outcome of the offer. 93 Hence, it covers, for example, the disclosures required by section 14(d) and the offensive or
defensive tactics that may be used in the contest.9 4
The efficacy of section 14(e) 'was substantially enhanced by
the 1970 amendments to the Williams Act, which gave the SEC
rulemaking power to define and prescribe means reasonably designed to prevent the fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative practices prohibited by section 14(e).95 And pursuant to this authority, the SEC has adopted two prophylactic rules that are central to
the regulatory scheme for tender offers. These rules add to the
disclosure requirements and substantive protections of section
14(d) and ,create more federal corporation law. In these rules, the
SEC has singled out for regulation two abusive tender offer practices that had developed in takeover battles: an unnegotiated,
surprise tender offer of short duration (the so-called "blitzkrieg"
or "Saturday night special") and target management's silence on
its position regarding an offer when silence maximized a tactical
advantage. First, under rule 14e-1, all tender offers must be held
open at least twenty business days. 6 Also, upon the announcement of an increase or decrease in the percentage of securities
sought or the consideration offered, the offer must remain open
for ten business days.9 Second, under rule 14e-2, within ten
business days of the commencement of a tender offer, a target
cbmpany must publish or send to its shareholders a reasoned
statement indicating that it recommends acceptance or rejection
of the offer, is remaining neutral, or is unable to take a position.9" Because the target's statement of position pursuant to this
rule constitutes a solicitation or recommendation within the mean-

93 Furthermore, § 14(e) may apply before a tender offer formally commences, as in
the case of a "creeping" tender offer. SEC v. Gaspar, [1984-1985 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
92,004, at 90,979 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 15, 1985) (citing cases).
94 Litigation under § 14(e) is a tactic itself, even if standing to sue is denied. See
L. Loss, supra note 3, at 527-28 ("Section 14(e) is beginning to rival Rule 1lb-5 as the
subject of litigation. It would not be an exaggeration to say that there has hardly been a
contested tender offer in which both sides have not hurled § 14(e) thunderbolts at each
other." (footnote omitted)).
95 Act of Dec. 22, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-567, sec. 5, §-.14(e), 84 Stat. 1497, 1497-98
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1988)).
96 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-l(a) (1990).
97 Id. § 240.14e-l(b). In addition, the offeror must pay the consideration offered or
return the securities deposited, promptly after the offer is terminated or withdrawn. Id. §
240.14e-1(c).
98 Id. § 24 0 .14 e-2.
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ing of section 14(d),99 the target must also comply with rule. 14d9.100

3.

Section 13(e)

By and large, the Williams Act left unregulated a company's
purchases of its own securities. Section 13(e), however, gives the
SEC broad rulemaking power to regulate these repurchases. Specifically, the SEC is authorized to define fraudulent, deceptive, or
manipulative acts and practices that might occur in connection
with an issuer repurchase program, and to adopt means reasonably designed to prevent such acts and practices.1 0'
The SEC has not used its section 13(e) rulemaking authority
to regulate all issuer repurchases. 10 2 Yet, it has adopted two
rules under section 13(e) that are critical to the tender offer regulatory scheme. Rule 13e-1 prohibits a target company from purchasing its securities during a third party's tender offer for its
shares unless a statement is filed with the SEC by the target and
the target shareholders have received (within the past six months)
the substance of the information filed with the SEC."0 3 The in-

formation that must be disclosed relates to the manner and purpose of the purchases and the source of funds to be used.'
Thus, rule 13e-1 seeks to maintain a neutral balance by regulating
the not uncommon tactic used by a target company to defeat an

offer: repurchasing large quantities of its own securities in compe-

99 Id. § 240.14d-9(f).
100 In addition to rule 14e-1 and rule 14e-2, the SEC has adopted rule 14e-3, id. §
240.14e-3, under § 14(e). Rule 14e-3 outlaws certain "insider" trading transactions in
connection with a tender offer by defining the transactions as "fraudulent," "deceptive,"
or "manipulative" practices within the meaning of § 14(e). Specifically, it prohibits
tippees from the tender offeror or target from trading in target securities prior to public
disclosure of the tender offer. Id. § 240.14e-3(a). Tipping per se is also prohibited as "a
means reasonably designed to prevent" fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative practices
within the meaning of § 14(e). Id. § 240.14e-3(d).
101 15 U.S.C. § 78m(e)(1) (1988). Section 13(e) indicates that the § 13(e) rules may
require the issuer to provide its shareholders with whatever information the SEC considers necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors,
such as the reasons for the purchase, the source of funds, the number of shares to be
purchased, the price, and the method of purchase. Id.
102 The SEC, however, has adopted rule 10b-18, 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-18 (1990), which
provides a safe harbor for issuer repurchases. See infra note 282.
103 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-I (1990). In order for rule 13e-1 to apply, the third-party
tender offer must be for a class of equity securities of an issuer that is subject to §
13(e) (see supra note 59), and the issuer must comply with the rule upon making purchases of any of its equity securities.
104 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-l(a) (1990).
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tition with the third-party offer, either through market transactions or by a tender offer for its own shares."' 5 Furthermore,
when the repurchases are sought by tender offer, rule 13e-4 imposes an additional layer of regulation."0 6 Under rule 13e4-which applies whether or not a third-party offer is outstanding-a company making a "self-tender" must comply with the
same disclosure requirements, and grant its shareholders the same
substantive rights, established in section 14(d), section 14(e), 0 7
and the rules thereunder for third-party tender offers.'0 8 In formulating rule 13e-4, the SEC took the position that section 13(e)
did not limit it to adopting exclusively disclosure requirements
and that some substantive regulation was necessary to prevent

105 Facially, this tactic may appear to be self-defeating, since the securities reacquired
by the target cannot be voted and the amount of securities needed by the offeror to
gain control will thereby be reduced. The collateral effects of the repurchases, however,
should deter or thwart the offer. The target's repurchases may drive up the market price
of the securities such that shareholders will sell in the market rather than tender, or the
repurchases may substantially deplete the target's cash (or increase its debt) such that it
is no longer an attractive target.
106 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-4 (1990). Another layer of regulation is imposed by rule 13e3, id. § 240.13e-3, if a "going private" transaction is involved, that is, if the effect of the
repurchases or tender offer is cessation of reporting obligations under the Exchange Act.
There is no rule 13e-2. Although § 13(e) applies only to issuers that have a class of
equity securities registered under § 12 of the Exchange Act (see supra note 59), the SEC
has used its rulemaking authority under § 10(b) of the Exchange Act to extend the coverage of rule 13e-3 and rule 13e-4 to issuers that merely have reporting obligations under § 15(d) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78o(d) (1988). See 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e3(c), -4(a) (1990).
107 Even in the absence of rule 13e-4, § 14(e) would apply to issuer tender offers.
See Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579, 595-96 (5th Cir.), esi. denied, 419
U.S. 873 (1974); Adoption of Amendments to Tender Offer Rules, Exchange Act Release
No. 16,384, supra note 58, at 82,581; see also Henry Heide, Inc., [1972-1973 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
78,838, at 81,836 (May 1, 1972).
108 In brief, rule 13e-4 first defines "fraudulent, deceptive, and manipulative acts and
practices" simply as fraud, deception, and manipulation, borrowing the exact language of
rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1990). Id. § 240.13e-4(b)(1). In effect, rule 13e-4 then
goes on to provide that as means reasonably designed to prevent such acts or practices
in connection with an issuer tender offer, the issuer must comply with the provisions
applicable to third-party tender offers. Id. § 240.13e-4(b)(2)-(f)(11). There is one rule 13e4 requirement, not applicable to third-party tender offers, that stands out: after terminating a self-tender, an issuer is subject to a cooling-off period of 10 business days before it is allowed to purchase in the market any of its securities which were sought in
the offer. Id. § 240.13e-4(0(6). According to the SEC, rule l3e-4(0(6) is an
"antimanipulation" provision designed to prevent the issuer from supporting an. artificial
market price for its securities (that were the subject of the offer) after termination. See
Adoption of Rules Regarding Tender Offers by Issuers, Exchange Act Release No.
16,112, [1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 82,182, at 82,210 (Aug. 16,
1979).

NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66:241

fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative
conduct which may occur
10 9
in the absence of such regulation.

II. STANDING TO SUE UNDER THE WILLIAMS ACT
A.

Enforcement of the Williams Act: A Preliminary View

Although Congress and the SEC carefully crafted the Williams Act regulatory scheme, neither the statute nor the rules
contain an explicit reference to enforcement. The incorporation
of the Williams Act provisions into the Exchange Act, however,
makes sections 21(d) n ° and 32(a)111 of the Exchange Act applicable to Williams Act transgressions. Under section 21(d), the
SEC may institute enforcement proceedings to enjoin violations,
and section 32(a) imposes criminal penalties when the violations
are willful. Also applicable to the Williams Act is section 18112
of the Exchange Act, one of the Act's three express civil liability
provisions. Section 18 establishes a modicum of private enforcement by imposing liability on anyone who makes an Exchange Act
filing that contains a false or misleading statement. The liability
runs only in favor of a person who purchases or sells securities
"at a price which was affected by such statement," and the damages recoverable are those caused by reliance on the statement." 3
Section 18 suits, therefore, could crop up whenever filings are required under any of the Williams Act provisions, but because of
its strict reliance and causation requirements,
section 18 has
4
turned out to be almost a dead letter."
At the time the Williams Act was adopted, it did not appear,
however, that sections 21(d), 32(a), and 18 would be the exclusive
means of enforcing the Act. The likelihood that the federal courts
would permit implied private rights of action to supplement enforcement of the Act seemed high. The federal courts had been
implying private rights of action, following a common-law tradition, long before the enactment of the first federal securities stat-

109 See Adoption of Rules Regarding Tender Offers by Issuers, Exchange Act Release
No. 16,112, supra note 108, at 82,206.
110

15 U.S.C. § 78u(d) (1988).

111

Id. § 78ff(a).

112

Id. § 78r.

113 Id. § 78r(a). The plaintiff cannot know that the statement was false or misleading, and the defendant is relieved of liability if he proves "that he acted in good faith
and had no knowledge that [the] statement was false or misleading." Id.

114 See Note, Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934: Putting the Bite Back into
the Toothless Tiger, 47 FORDHAM L. REv. 115, 116 (1978).
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utes in 1933 and 1934;"' and by the time the Williams Act was
.on the books, the courts generally tended to favor the implication
of private actions under the federal securities laws." 6
B.

The Implication of Private Rights of Action Under the Federal
Securities Laws Before Piper

The first major decision dealing with implied rights of actions
based on the federal securities laws, Kardon v. National Gypsum
Co.,"

7

was rendered in 1946 by the District Court for the East-

ern District of Pennsylvania." 8 In Kardon: the court implied a
private right of action for damages on behalf of a defrauded seller of 'securities under section 10(b)" 9 of the Exchange Act and
rule 10b-5,12 ° which ban the use of manipulative or deceptive
devices in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
but do not contain an express right to sue. The result in Kardon
was predicated on the so-called tort theory for implying private
rights of action. According to this theory, any person who
breaches a statutory duty is liable to any injured member of the
class for whose benefit the statute was intended.'' The Kardon

115 The idea of implying private actions from statutory provisions was invented by
the English courts, and the doctrine was first used by the U.S. Supreme Court in Texas
& Pac. Ry. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33 (1916). See L. Loss, supra note 3, at 924-25;
Schneider, Implying Private Rights and Remedies Under the Federal Securities Acts, 62 N.C.L.
REV. 853, 853 (1984).
116 In general, the courts have ruled that a § 18 remedy is not exclusive. See 2 T.
HAZEN, supra note 56, § 12.8, at 49 & n.21 (citing cases). -InHerman & MacLean v.
Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375 (1983), the Supreme Court held that implied civil liability
under rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1990), is not precluded by the express remedy
of § 11 of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1988). Since § 18 is § 11's sister provision in the Exchange Act, it seems probable that the Supreme Court would rule that the
remedies under rule 10b-5 and § 18 are also cumulative. But see Note, The Exclusivity of
the Express Remedy Under Section 18(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 46 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 845 (1978).
117 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
118 The first decision holding that an implied right of action existed under the federal securities laws was Baird v. Franklin, 141 F.2d 238 (2d. Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S.
737 (1944). Prior to Baird, however, the courts had implied a damages remedy from a
federal securities statute when the statute expressly authorized an equitable remedy. See,
e.g., Deck-ert v. Independence Shares Corp., 311 U.S. 282 (1940); Geismar v. Bond &
Goodwin, Inc., 40 F. Supp. 876 (S.D.N.Y. 1941).
119 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1988).
120 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1990).
121 See Pitt, Standing to Sue Under the Williams"Act After Chris-Craft: A Leaky Ship on
Troubled Waters, 34 Bus. LAW. 117, 162 n.333 (1978); see also R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH,
supra note 78, at 836-37. In American jurisprudence, the tort theory emanates from Texas & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33 (1916). See supra note 115.
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court stressed that a remedy should be implied under the theory
unless there was a clear legislative intention that it should be denied. 122 In 1971, in Superintendent of Insurance v. Bankers Life &
Casualty Co.,123 the Supreme Court unanimously recognized the
holding in Kardon by explicitly acquiescing in what had become
an overwhelming acceptance by the lower federal courts of implied actions under section 10(b) and rule 10b-5.124 Moreover,
the Court in Bankers Life took pains to note that there was redress under section 10(b), "whatever might be available as a reme125
dy under state law."

Bankers Life was consistent with the Supreme Court's seminal
decision in 1964, J.. Case Co. v. Borak,126 unanimously holding
127
of
that an implied right of action existed under section 14(a)
8
the Exchange Act and rule 14a-9,1 the proxy antifraud provision. In Borak, a shareholder of the acquiring company in a merger sued those proposing the merger on the grounds that they had
obtained the required shareholder approval by circulating false
and misleading .proxy solicitation material in violation of rule 14a9. The shareholder-plaintiff, on behalf of himself and other shareholders similarly situated, sought rescission of the merger or damages. In ruling on the shareholder's claim, the Court examined
the legislative history of section 14(a) under which rule 14a-9 was
adopted and found that one of its "chief purposes" was to protect
investors by preventing "management or others from obtaining
authorization for corporate action by means of deceptive or inadequate disclosure in proxy solicitation."'2 9 The Court, however,
was unable to point to any statements in the legislative record
mentioning private rights of action. Nonetheless, the Court held
that private rights of action for damages or injunctive relief were
implicit in the statute because they were essential to accomplish.
ing a legislative purpose and because they provided a necessary
supplement to the SEC's efforts in enforcing the proxy rules. 3 °

122
123
124
der §
125
126
127
128
129
130
ments

Kardon, 69 F. Supp. at 512, 514 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
404 U.S. 6 (1971). Justice Douglas delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
Id. at 13 n.9 ("It is now established that a private right of action is implied un10(b).").
Id. at 12.
377 U.S. 426 (1964). Justice Clark wrote the opinion of the Court.
15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1988).
17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1990).
Borak, 377 U.S. at 431-32.
Id. at 431-33. The Court noted that the SEC examines over 2,000 proxy stateeach year and that time does not permit an independent examination of each
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Thus, as the basis for its decision, the Court relied on a variation
of the tort theory utilized in Kardon and on the so-called effective
enforcement theory of implying private rights of action: private
actions should be implied when necessary to assist in the enforcement of the statute involved.13 ' Then, after "noting that
proxy violations also cause injury to the corporation, the Court
held that the shareholder-plaintiff had standing to bring both
direct and derivative actions under section 14(a).' 3 2
In remanding the case for a trial on the merits, the Borak
Court underlined the primary role of federal law in the remedial
aspects of proxy regulation. 133 The Court emphasized that the
district court had the power to grant all necessary remedial relief
since federal law governed not only the propriety of the proxy
solicitation material but also the validity of the solicited proxies
and the consequences of invalidity, even though questions of state
corporation law might ultimately be involved. In the same vein,
the Court warned the district court that if the shareholder-plaintiff were merely granted a declaratory judgment (stating that false
and misleading proxy solicitation material had been circulated in
violation of rule 14a-9), he would be forced to turn to state law
for retrospective relief; and if the state law happened to attach no
responsibility to the use of false and misleading proxy solicitation
material, the purpose of rule 14a-9 would be eviscerated.
Taking their cue from the Borak Court's expansive approach
to the interpretation of the proxy rules, the lower courts have enlarged the class of plaintiffs that have standing to sue and have
extended this grant of standing beyond the antifraud rule to the
other proxy rules as well.1 4 The courts have .concluded that a
one. Id.
131 See Pitt, supra note 121, at 162 n.333. Actually, the Court framed the issue as
whether § 27 of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1988), authorizes an implied private action for rescission or damages in favor of a shareholder to redress violations of §
14(a). But § 27 simply confers exclusive jurisdiction on the federal courts to hear actions
brought under the Exchange Act.
132 Borak, 377 U.S. at 432.
133 Id. at 434-35. The Court, therefore, confusedthe subject matter jurisdiction question with the implication question. See Schneider, supra note 115, at 863-64; see also L.
Loss, supra note 3, at 929 ("[T]he Court reached the right result not for the wrong
reason but for no reason at all."). The Court corrected its erroneous reading of § 27 in
Borak 15 years later in Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 577 (1979)
("Section 27 creates no cause of action of its own force and effect; it imposes no liabilities.").
134 See, e.g., Haas v. Wieboldt Stores, 725 F.2d 71 (7th Cir. 1984) (rule 14a-7, 17
C.F.R. § 240.14a-7 (1990) (shareholder list rule)); New York City Employees' Retirement
Sys. v. American Brands, 634 F. Supp. 1382 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (rule 14a-8, 17 C.F.R.
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corporation has standing to sue opposition groups, such as outsiders seeking control and insurgent shareholders involved in election contests or other contested matters. 135 Also, the courts
have maintained that a group opposing management has standing
to sue the corporation and that two groups, external to the corporation, have standing to sue each other. 136 Moreover, plaintiffs have been accorded standing to sue for both damages and a
wide range of equitable remedies.' 3 7 The judicial broadening of
standing to sue under the proxy rules was based chiefly on
Borak's policy of vigorous enforcement of the federal securities
laws. through private litigation. And regarding the two-way standing that has resulted, Professor Loss, the doyen among securities
regulation scholars, has stated: "Either side in a contested [proxy]
solicitation has a legitimate interest, in view of the statutory purpose, to cry 'Foul' against the other."1 38
When litigation under the Williams Act came along, the lower courts assumed, with ample judicial precedent under sections
10(b) and 14(a) to draw upon, that implied rights of action existed under the various provisions of the new statute. Moreover,
relying explicitly or implicitly on Borak and its progeny, the courts
granted virtually all tender offer participants standing to sue for
damages and equitable relief. 139 Both tendering and non-

§ 240.14a-8 (1990) (shareholder proposal rule)); cf. Rauchman v. Mobil Corp., 739 F.2d
205, 207 (6th Cir. 1984) (existence of implied private action under rule 14a-8 assumed
but "substantial reservations" expressed).
135 See, e.g., Greater Iowa Corp. v. McLendon, 378 F.2d 783 (8th Cir. 1967);
Studebaker Corp. v. Cittlin, 360 F.2d 692 (2d Cir. 1966).
136 See, e.g., Union Pac. R.R. v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 226 F. Supp. 400 (N.D. Ill.
1964) (proxy battle betweer two railroads attempting to take over a third railroad), cited
with approval in Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 385 (1970); U.S. Smelting,
Ref. & Mining Co. v. Clevite Corp., [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH)
92,691 (N.D. Ohio, June 17, 1968).
137 See Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787, 799-803 (2d Cir.
1969) (assuming standing to sue for damages or equitable relief); see also Lynch v. Fulks,
97,831 (D. Kan. Dec. 12, 1980)
[1981 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
(standing for injunction); Clayton v. Skelly Oil Co., [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH)
92,745 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 30, 1977) (standing for damages).
138 L. Loss, supra note 3, at 944.
139 See, e.g., Lowenschuss v. Kane, 520 F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1975) (standing of tendering shareholder to sue for damages); Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579, 596
(5th Cir.) (standing of nontendering shareholder to sue both individually and derivatively
denied, 419 U.S. 873 (1974); H.K. Porter Co. v. Nicholson File Co.,
for damages), cert.
482 F.2d 421 (1st Cir. 1973) (standing of target company and offeror to sue for injunctive relief and damages); Electronic Specialty Co. v. International Controls Corp., 409
F.2d 937 (2d Cir. 1969) (standing of target company to sue for injunctive relief);
McCloskey v. Epko Shoes, 391 F. Supp. 1279 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (standing of nontendering
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tendering shareholders of the target company were found to have
standing to sue tender offerors and the target itself. Target companies were accorded standing to sue the offeror, and offerors
were granted standing to sue the target and competing offerors.
The logic underpinning two-way standing in Williams Act litigation was cogently summarized by the Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit:
[I]mplying for the offeror and the target's management reciprocal rights of action for damages seems only fair given that
each has a heavy economic stake, and that each is subject to
what has been aptly described as 'symmetrical" statutory obligations ....

Each is victimized when the other commits illegal

4
acts to defeat or accomplish takeover bids.1 1

In the mid-1970s, the transformation from the politically liberal Warren Court to the conservative Burger Court spawned a
new judicial philosophy: the role of the federal judiciary should
not be expanded and access to the federal courts should be restricted. 4 ' As a manifestation of this 'philosophy, the Supreme
Court shied away from its prior expansive approach to implying
private rights of action, becoming less hospitable and at times
even hostile.'
The federal securities laws were not spared. Indeed, the Court not only refused to imply new rights of action
under the federal securities statutes but also limited significantly
the scope of the implied actions that already existed. 4 ' The

shareholder to sue for injunctive relief and damages); Broder v. Dane, 384 F. Supp.
1312 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (standing of tendering shareholder to sue for injunctive relief); see
also E. ARANOW, H. EINHORN & G. BERLSTEIN, DEVELOPMENTS IN TENDER OFFERS FOR
CORPORATE CONTROL 104, 175 n.14 (1977) [hereinafter ARANOW, EINHORN &
BERLSTEIN]; Pitt, supra note 121, at 131-32.
140 H.K. Porter Co. v. Nicholson File Co., 482 F.2d 421, 424 (1st Cir. 1973) (citation
omitted).
141 See Powell, What the Justices Are Saying ...
62 A.B.A.J. 1454, 1455 (1976). See
generally Conard, Securities Regulation and the Burger Court, 56 U. COLO. L. REV. 193
(1985) (demonstrating that the transformation in the Court occurred as a result of
changes in membership and because some Justices changed sides); Lowenfels, Recent
Supreme Court Decisions Under the Federal Securities Laws: The Pendulum Swings, 65 CEO.
LJ. 891 (1977) (analyzing nine cases in which the author observes the following trends:
defendants win, SEC's views rejected, and plaintiffs encouraged to pursue their rights in
state rather than federal courts).
142 See Comment, Implied Rights of Action in Federal Legislation: Harmonization Within
the Statutory Scheme, 1980 DuKE LJ. 928, 928-29. The-Court reaffirmed that implied private actions existed under § 14(a) in Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970),
and under rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1990), in Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United
States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972).
143 The Court's restrictive approach to implied private actions during the period

-
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Court's retrenchment was heralded in, 1975 by Cort v. Ash,144 a
non-securities case, in which the Court articulated a four-pronged
test for implying private rights of action from statutes not expressly providing for them. The four factors were as follows:
First, is the plaintiff "one of the class for whose especial benefit
the statute was enacted"-that is, does the statute create a federal right in favor of the plaintiff? Second, is there any indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to create
such a remedy or to deny one? Third, is it consistent with the
underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to imply such a
remedy for the plaintiff? And finally, is the cause of action one
traditionally relegated to state law, in an area basically the
concern of the States, so that it would be inappropriate to
infer a cause of action based solely on federal law? 45
As is apparent on its face, the Cort test implicitly abandoned
Borak's effective enforcement theory, and borrowed, in part, from
the tort theory used in Kardon. The presumption of legislative
intent, however, was shifted. Under the tort theory, as indicated
above, a private right of action would be implied unless the legislature evidenced a contrary intention. Under Cort, a private right
of action would be implied only if Congress indicated that such
an implication was intended. The test also reflected a change in
the Court's view of federal-state relations. In Borak and Bankers
Life, the Court was willing to imply a federal cause of action even

from 1975 to 1977 is exemplified by the following seven cases: Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Barbour, 421 U.S. 412 (1975) (customers of a broker-dealer member of the
Securities Investor Protection Corporation (SIPC) have no implied right of action under
the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78aaa-78111 (1988), to compel the SIPC to perform its duties); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S.
723 (1975) (plaintiff claiming an implied action under rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5
(1990), must be a purchaser or seller of securities); Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Co., 422
U.S. 49 (1975) (plaintiff must demonstrate irreparable harm to obtain equitable relief in
an implied action under § 13(d)); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976)
(scienter is a necessary element in damage suits brought under rule 10b-5); TSC Indus.
v. Northway, 426 U.S. 438 (1976) (the standard of "materiality" in implied actions under
rule 14a-9, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1990), contemplates a showing by the plaintiff that
there was a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would have considered
the omitted fact important in deciding how to vote); Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430
U.S. 1 (1977) (tender offeror has no standing to assert an implied private action for
damages under § 14(e)); Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977) (minority shareholders in a short-form merger cannot recover under rule 10b-5 on the grounds of unfairness or lack of notice).
144 422 U.S. 66 (1975). Co0t was a unanimous decision, and the opinion was written
by Justice Brennan.
145 Id. at 78 (citations omitted).
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if state law was displaced, whereas in Cort, the existence of applicable state law tended to militate against implication. The Court's
first occasion to apply its new test in the securities context came
in 1977 in a suit brought under the Williams Act, Piper v. ChrisCraft Industries.4 6
C.

The Piper Case

1. Denial of Standing to a Tender Offeror
The litigation in Piper involved a contest for control of Piper
Aircraft Corporation (Piper) between Chris-Craft Industries, Inc.
(Chris-Craft) and Piper's "white knight," 14 7 Bangor Punta Corporation (Bangor Punta). The takeover contest, which followed
Chris-Craft's successful, hostile cash tender offer for eighteen
percent of Piper common stock, centered upon competing exchange tender offers made by Chris-Craft and Bangor Punta. After a hard-fought battle in the marketplace, Bangor Punta
emerged the victor, holding over fifty percent-as compared with
Chris-Craft's forty-two percent-of the Piper shares. 148 But be-

fore Bangor Punta had obtained control, Chris-Craft brought suit
under section 14(e) for damages and injunctive relief against the
Piper management and Bangor Punta,149 alleging (1) that the
Piper management, in response to Chris-Craft's cash tender offer,
issued a misleading press release and sent untrue and misleading
letters to Piper shareholders, and (2) that Bangor Punta had filed
misleading financial statements with the SEC in connection with
its exchange tender offer.1 50 The gist of Chris-Craft's claim was
that it had been denied a fair opportunity to gain control of Piper by reason of these violations of section 14(e). 15' After pro-

146 430 U.S. 1 (1977).
147 A white knight" is a merger partner or competing offeror that target management finds acceptable.
148 A summary of the takeover contest involved is set forth in Piper, 430 U.S. at 4-9.
149 Chris-Craft also sued First Boston Corporation-Piper's investment banker and
Bangor Punta's underwriter for its exchange offer. Id at 4-5.
150 Chris-Craft also brought suit against Bangor Punta for damages and injunctive
relief under rule 10b-6, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-6 (1990). In general, rule 10b-6 prohibits a
company whose stock is in the process of distribution from purchasing its stock or
rights to purchase its stock until the distribution is finished. See infra note 282. ChrisCraft alleged that Bangor Punta made cash purchases of Piper stock during Bangor
Punta's exchange offer and that these purchases constituted purchases of Bangor Punta
stock rights. Piper, 430 U.S. at 7, 9-10.
151 See Piper, 430 U.S. at 17 n.14; id. at 51 (Blackmun, J., concurring). But see id. at
54 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that Chris-Craft also claimed injury resulting from the
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tracted litigation that lasted six years, the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit held that Chris-Craft had standing to sue under section 14(e), that the defendants had violated section 14(e),
and that these violations caused Chris-Craft injury. As a consequence, Chris-Craft was awarded thirty-six million dollars in damages against the defendants (jointly and severally)-the largest
amount of damages that had ever been awarded in a securities
case152-and Bangor Punta was enjoined for five years from voting the Piper shares that 1it
had acquired in its exchange offer in
53
14(e).
section
of
violation
The Supreme Court accepted the Second Circuit's judgment
for certiorari review' 54 and reversed, 7-2, in an opinion written
by Chief Justice Burger. 5 5 In addressing only the threshold
issue of Chris-Craft's standing, the Court held that a tender offeror, suing qua tender offeror, did not have standing to sue for
damages under section 14(e). 56 In light of this holding, the
Court also vacated the injunction entered against Bangor Punta,
concluding that it was based on the impermissible award of damages. In the Court's view, Chris-Craft had explicitly waived any

impairment of the value of its investment in Piper stock).
152 Pitt, supra note 121, at 139.
153 The lower court litigation is summarized in Piper, 430 U.S. at 9-21. Irk brief,
Chris-Craft first sought a preliminary injunction and it was denied. Chris-Craft Indus. v.
Piper Aircraft Corp., 303 F. Supp. 91 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), affid sub nom. Chris-Craft Indus. v.
Bangor Punta Corp., 426 F.2d 569 (2d Cir. 1970) (en banc). Chris-Craft then sought
damages and was successful. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit ordered the
district court to compute the damages and enjoin Bangor Punta from voting the illegally
acquired Piper shares. Chris-Craft Indus. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973). On remand, Chris-Craft was' awarded $1,673,988 plus
prejudgment interest, and the injunction was enforced. Chris-Craft Indus. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 384 F. Supp. 507 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). Chris-Craft then appealed the damages
award, and the award was increased substantially. Chris-Craft Indus. v. Piper Aircraft
Corp., 516 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1975).
154
Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 425 U.S. 910 (1976), graning ceil. to 516 F.2d 172
(2d Cir. 1975).
155 Chief Justice Burger was joined by Justices Stewart, White, Marshall, Powell, and
Rehnquist. Justice Blackmun concurred in a separate opinion. Justice Stevens, joined by
Justice Brennan, dissented.
156 Piper, 430 U.S. at 42 n.28. The Court also held that Chris-Craft did not have
standing to sue for damages under rule lOb-6, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-6 (1976), because
Chris-Craft had alleged injury resulting from a lost opportunity to gain control of Piper
and not injury resulting from market tampering at which rule 10b-6 is aimed. Piper, 430
U.S. at 42-46.
Justice Blackmun agreed with the dissent that Chris-Craft had an implied private
action for damages under § 14(e), but concurred with the majority opinion on tie
grounds that Chris-Craft had not shown that its injury was caused by the defendants'
misconduct. See id. at 48 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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independent claim to injunctive relief prior to trial, arid the injunction, therefore, had only been granted as an ancillary remedy
to accompany the damages award. 57
The Court characterized its holding in Piper as a limited
one 1 8 and expressly left open the remaining standing issues under section 14(e)-the standing of target shareholders and the
target corporation seeking damages or injunctions, 159 as well as
the tender offeror's standing to sue ,for injunctive relief. 60
Moreover, the Court never confronted the broader question of
whether private rights of action could ever be implied under the
Williams Act. 6 ' Hence, private suits brought under sections
13(d), 13(e), 14(d), and 14(f) were not specifically foreclosed.
The Piper opinion was delivered in two parts, both of which
independently sustained the Court's holding. In the first part, the
Court restated and then applied the reasoning in Borak-a case
the Court necessarily found germane since it was. the Court's first
foray into implying private actions under the federal securities
laws. The Court maintained that Borak required .a two-step inquiry
in determining whether a private action should be implied. First,
what was the legislative purpose of the statutory provision at issue? And then, was the implication of a private remedy on behalf
of the plaintiff necessary to accomplish that purpose? 112 After
examining the legislative history of the Williams Act, including
numerous statements made during the Act's consideration in Congress, the Court concluded that the "sole purpose" of the Act was
the protection of target shareholders. The Court reasoned, there-

157

Piper, 430 U.S. at 47. In dissent, Justice Stevens indicated that he was not con-

vinced that Chris-Craft had made a binding election to waive its right to injunctive relief.

See id. at 70-72 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
158 Id. at 42 n.28.
159 Id. at 42 n.28, 39 n.25.
160 Id. at 47 n.33.
161 But see id. at 55 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("No one seriously questions the premise
that Congress implicitly created a private right of action when it enacted § 14(e) in
1968."). It is not clear that the majority 'opinion would agree with Justice Stevens'
statement.
A complete analysis of the implication question could involve a three-step inquiry.

First, does the statutory provision involved support implied private actions at all? Second,
if so, what parties have standing to assert the private action? And third, what remedies
may those parties pursue? See Sta-Rite Indus. v. Nortek, Inc., 494 F. Supp. 358, 360(E.D. Wis. 1980) (suggesting that some courts, including the Supreme Court, frequently
have gone "to the altar" without considering "how they got into the church"); see also
Schneider, supra note 115, at 898-99 (arguing that courts should use the Cort test only to

answer the first question).
162 See Piper, 430 U.S. at 24-26.
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fore, that implying a cause of action for damages in favor of a defeated tender offeror was not necessary because tender offerors
were not members of the class intended to be protected by the
Act. 63 The SEC, as amicus curiae, and Chris-Craft had argued
that congressional concern with providing evenhanded protection
to all participants in the takeover process was one of the purposes of the Act and, therefore, provided a sufficient basis for conferring standing on a tender offeror.'6 4 The Court rejected this
argument, contending that Congress' policy of neutrality in takeover regulation was merely "one characteristic of legislation directed toward a different purpose-the protection of investors" 16 5-and that this policy hardly suggested "an intent to confer highly important, new rights upon the class of participants
166
whose activities prompted the legislation in the first instance."
Moreover, a denial of standing to a tender offeror under the Act,
the Court stressed, was not at odds with Borak's grant of standing
under section 14(a). The Court explained that the intended beneficiaries of section 14(a) were shareholders- the very class of persons seeking relief in Borak-and that Borak did not involve the
standing of a defeated
insurgent group in a proxy battle for cor167
porate control.

In the second part of the opinion, the Court applied the four
factors that Cort had deemed relevant in determining whether a
private remedy should be implied on behalf of a particular plaintiff. This analysis, the Court concluded, confirmed its holding that
Chris-Craft did not have standing to sue for damages under section 14(e). 6 ' In considering the first and second factors, the
Court observed that its prior examination of the Williams Act
clearly demonstrated that Chris-Craft was not an especial beneficiary of the statute, and that there was no evidence that Congress
intended to imply a damages remedy in favor of a defeated ten-

163

Id. at 26-35.

164 Id. at 29. The Court also rejected the argument-which was pressed strenuously
by Justice Stevens in dissent-that Chris-Craft was suing not only as a defeated tender
offeror but also as a Piper shareholder.. _d. at 56-59 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The Court
reasoned that Chris-Craft's status.as a Piper shareholder was nominal since Chris-Craft
was not truly in the position of one who was confronted with the decision of whether
to tender its stock and that therefore Chris-Craft could be considered only an offeror
for purposes of judging its standing to bring a damages suit under § 14(e). Id. at 35-36.
165 Id. at 29.
166 Id. at 30.
167 Id. at 33 & n.22.
168 Id. at 37.
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der offeror.169 Then, turning to the third factor, the Court asserted that an award of damages to Chris-Craft against Bangor
Punta would not be consistent with the statute's purpose-the
protection of target shareholders-since the defrauded Piper
shareholders who became Bangor Punta shareholders when they
accepted the Bangor Punta exchange tender offer would be
harmed if a judgment were entered against Bangor Punta.' °
The Court further argued that the threat of damage suits against
offerors, rather than protecting target shareholders by deterring
violations, might prejudice the shareholders by precluding some
offers from ever being made."' The Court did hint, however,
that injunctive actions might be allowed to correct egregious violations of the statute (which the Court believed occurred infrequently), as long as the actions were instituted at an early stage of
the takeover contest. 7 2 With respect to the fourth factor,, the
Court focused on the Second Circuit's statement that Chris-Craft's
complaint gave rise to a common-law tort claim for interference
with a prospective commercial advantage and therefore found that
it was appropriate to relegate Chris-Craft to state law to .pursue
its claim.17
2.

An Analysis of Piper

Piper was a trail marker in the Supreme Court's retreat from
expansive notions of standing under the federal securities laws,
and it marked the trail in two important respects. First, Piper laid
the groundwork for the ascendancy of Cort over Borak in resolving future standing questions in the securities field. Second, the

169 Id. at 37-39. Chris-Craft argued that Congress intended tender offerors
standing under § 14(e) because § 14(e), unlike § 10(b), does not contain the
language, "in connection with the purchase or sale of any securities." The Court
this argument, claiming that the omission of the purchaser-seller requirement in

to have
limiting
rejected
§ 14(e)

was only intended to extend anti-fraud protection to nontendering shareholders. Id. at

38-39.
170 Id. at 39.
171 I& at 39-40. The Court expressed serious reservations whether "deterrence" was a
meaningful goal of § 14(e). Id. at 40 n.26.
172 Id. at 40 n.26; see id. at 41-42. Given that Chris-Craft had initially sought, but was
denied, an injunction, the Court's suggestion is somewhat ironic. See supra note 153. The
Court's suggestion also makes one wonder what the Court was thinking when it decided
Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49 (1975). See supra note 18. In Rondeau, the
putative target's standing to sue for a permanent injunction under § 13(d) was not questioned by the acquirer-defendant and, therefore, was not addressed by the Court. Id. at
62.
173 Piper, 430 U.S. at 40-41.
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Court in Piper refused, for the first time, a request to imply a
private action under one of the major federal securities statutes.
Even though Borak served as the foundation of the Piper decision and the Cort test was used merely as a confirmation, the
Piper opinion was purposely designed so that the Court could rely
exclusively on Cort in future cases. Post-Piper Supreme Court decisions corroborate the notion that the Court had this objective in
mind, the objective was accomplished in a most adroit way. By
construing the Borak standard for implying private actions so that
it was not dissimilar from the Cort test, the Court was able to
demonstrate that Borak and Cort could produce the same result.
By making this demonstration at least once, the Court could justify, in subsequent cases, consigning Borak to history. There is
some question as to whether such action would be necessary if
the tests in Borak and Cort were, in fact, functionally equivalent.
But the Court apparently felt that Borak had been read too broadly by the lower courts and that it was best to put Borak to rest.'7 4

174

Following closely on the heels of Piper were two securities cases in which the

Court reaffirmed its reluctance to imply private rights of action. In Touche Ross & Co.
v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979), the Court refused to imply a private remedy under §
17(a) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 7 8 q(a) (1988), and in relying heavily on Cort's
second factor (legislative intent) stated:
To the extent our analysis in today's decision differs from that of the Court's in
Borak, it suffices to say that in a series of cases since Borak we have adhered to a stricter standard for the implication of private causes of action, and we follow that stricter
standard today.
Redington, 442 U.S. at 578. In Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S.
11 (1979), the Court denied an implied remedy under § 206 of the Investment Advisors
Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (1988), the general antifraud provision of that statute.
The Court, however, did recognize an implied equitable right of rescission under the
voidability provision in § 215 of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-15 (1988).
Implied private actions for damages are not dead. In Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner
& Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353 (1982), the Court recognized an implied action
for damages under the Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-26 (1988), analogizing
the Act to the federal securities laws. The Court, however, did acknowledge a shift in its
approach to implying private actions:
Our approach to the task of determining whether Congress intended to
authorize a private cause of action has changed significantly, much as the quality and quantity of federal legislation has undergone significant change. When
federal statutes were less comprehensive, the Court applied a relatively simple
test to determine the availability of an implied private remedy . . . . Under this
approach, federal courts, following a common-law tradition, regarded the denial
of a remedy as the exception rather than the rule . ...
In 1975 [in Coil] the Court unanimously decided to modify its approach
to whether a federal statute includes a private right of action.
Id. at 374-77 (footnote omitted). Cort is not dead either. In Daily Income Fund, Inc. v.
Fox, 464 U.S. 523 (1984), the Court, utilizing Cort, denied an implied right of action to
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Ironically, in paying its last respects to the Borak test, the
Court gave Borak a gloss that may have been originally intended,
and moreover, the Court perhaps was correct in indicating that
Borak can be reconciled with Cort. Except for the divergent views
expressed in Borak and Cort regarding the impact of state law on
federal implied private actions,'7 5 Borak and Cort were not in
competition with each other. The analytical focus of the test in
Cort was certainly statutory purpose. Although a major thrust of
Borak was that private enforcement of the SEC's rules provided a
necessary supplement to SEC action, the Court never claimed that
the SEC's inability to pursue all proxy violations was a sufficient
justification for granting every party interested in a proxy contest
a right to sue.176 Rather, Borak implied a private action in favor
of a shareholder under the proxy rules because shareholder enforcement served one of the purposes of section 14(a). Thus,
fairly read, Borak, like Cort, focused on statutory purpose as the
ultimate touchstone.
(a) Statutory Objectives as Evidence of Legislative Intent.-Even if
the Court's harmonization of Borak with Cort was strained, Piper's
reliance on statutory purpose was nonetheless sound. Because the
legislative history of the Williams Act contains no explicit indication whether Congress intended- a court to read a private action
into the Act, discerning the statute's goals could reveal what Congress implicitly intended. Presumably, Congress intended a court
to create a private remedy if a statutory purpose were likely to be
frustrated absent private enforcement. In reviewing the legislative
materials to divine the Act's purposes, the Court was cast adrift,
however, by adopting a narrow view of what constituted a statutory purpose. As a consequence, 'the Court's analysis was fundamentally flawed.
In the main, the holding in Piper hinged on the Court's conclusion that the legislative history of the Williams Act evinced
only one statutory purpose-the protection of target shareholders
through full and fair disclosure of information-and that
Congress' desire to attain neutrality in the regulation of tender
offers was a statutory policy and not a statutory Purpose.177 In

an investment company under § 36(b) of the Investment Company Act of 1940, 15
U.S.C. § 80a-35(b) (1988). Id. at 541.
175 See infra text preceding note 191.
176 See Piper, 430 U.S. at 41.
177 But f. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 633 (1982) (plurality opinion) ("There
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Borak, the Court asserted that the protection of investors was
"among [section 14(a)'s] chief purposes,"'178 and therefore it
would be odd if the protection of target shareholders were the
sole purpose of the Williams Act.1 9 Thus, whether neutrality is
called a purpose or a policy would seem to be largely a matter of
semantics, but for the Piper Court it was a distinction of no small
significance. According to the Court, reliable inferences about the
legislative intent could be drawn from a statutory purpose, but a
statutory policy was nonprobative. By taking this stance as to what
was relevant, the Court failed to come to grips with the legislative
history pertaining to Congress' concern with neutrality-legislative
history that sheds significant light on whether Congress intended
a court to infer a private action from the statute. 8 °
As explained in Part I of the Article, when Congress passed
the Williams Act, it had a strong commitment to maintaining
neutrality between tender offerors and target corporations. This
commitment permeates the legislative history and the statutory
provisions themselves.' 8 ' As the legislative history makes abundantly clear, neutrality was achieved by two regulatory techniques
that were designed to serve target shareholders, the intended

is no question that . .
Congress intended to protect investors. But it is also crystal
clear that a major aspect of the effort to protect the investor was to avoid favoring either management or the takeover bidder." (citations omitted)); Data Probe Acquisition
Corp. v. Datatab, Inc., 568 F. Supp. 1538, 1545 (S.D.N.Y.) (stating in a section of the
opinion entitled "Dual Purposes of the Williams Act," that "[the Court's decision in
MITE] reveals that important aspects of the legislative history of the Williams Act had
not been fully examined in [Piper]"), rev'd, 722 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465
U.S. 1052 (1984); Note, Fear of the Hostile Takeover Having Tamed and Reined the Beasts,
State Regulation Would Kill Them As Well, 14 J. CORP. L. 133, 152 (1988) ("[Post-Piper)
cases and commentary led to the conclusion that the goal of neutrality carries equal
weight with the goal of shareholder protection."); see also supra note 53.
178 Borak, 377 U.S. at 432.
179 Even in Coil, 442 U.S. at 78, the Court concluded that the plaintiff is "one of
the class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted" (first factor), when there is
generally a "pervasive legislative scheme governing the relationship between the plaintiff
class and the defendant class in a particular regard." Id. at 82. A tender offeror would
clearly seem to meet this test; the Court, however, never mentioned it. This aspect of
the first factor in Cort would have certainly militated in favor of Chris-Craft's standing to
sue under § 14(e).
180 The Court did review portions of the legislative materials that had a bearing on
Congress' concern with neutrality, but the materials it chose were not representative. See
Pitt, supra note 121, at 141, 166 (maintaining that the Court reviewed "carefully selected"
and "isolated" portions of the legislative history); see also Karjala, Federalism, Full Disclosure, and the National Markets -in the Intespretation of Federal Securities Laws, 80 Nw. U.L.
REV. 1473, 1495 (1986) ("The legislative history of the Williams Act is rich and amenable
to more than one interpretation.").
181 See supra note 51; see also supra text accompanying notes 42-53, 79-82, 89-109.
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beneficiaries of the statute, in two interrelated ways. First, Congress imposed disclosure obligations on both offerors and targets
for the protection of target shareholders. With balanced disclosure,
target shareholders would be able to make an informed choice
because they would have the necessary information from both
sides of the contest. Second, Congress regulated the conduct of
both offerors and targets for the benefit of target shareholders.
With evenhanded regulation, target shareholders would not be
deprived of the opportunity to make a choice in the first place
because potential offerors would not be discouraged from making
a bid. Thus, for Congress, neutrality meant not only enhanced
disclosure protections for target shareholders but also preservation
of the tender offer as a viable means for target shareholders to
displace management and receive a premium for their shares.
The critical inquiry, therefore, is whether a denial of standing
to a tender offeror seeking money damages frustrates Congress'
commitment to preserving the viability of the tender offer process. The Court in Piper contended that if standing were granted,
the constant threat of damage suits would deter some offers from
ever being made. 182 Much more likely is the prospect that
would-be offerors will be discouraged from making bids if they
are powerless to compensate themselves for injury suffered as a
result of the foul play of their opponents. 8 ' Furthermore, after
Piper, offerors cannot even be assured of an implied injunctive

182 Piper, 430 U.S. at 38-39; see supra note 171. The -opinion reflects an overall abhorrence of massive damages awards in tender offer litigation, particularly when the
award does not redound to the benefit of the target shareholders. Piper, 430 U.S. at 39.
In this regard, it is noteworthy that when the amount of damages had not yet been
determined, the Court denied Bangor Punta's petition for a writ of certiorari. Piper v.
Chris-Craft Indus., 414 U.S. 910, denying cert. to 480 F.2d 341 (2d Cir. 1973); see supra
note 153.
Also, the Court correctly pointed out that some Piper shareholders would be
harmed by an award of damages to Chris-Craft against Bangor Punta. See supra text
accompanying note 170. Injury to tendering shareholders would only occur, however, in
an exchange tender offer. In a cash tender offer-the primary focus of Congress' attention when it embarked on tender offer legislation-tendering shareholders would not be
harmed by a damages award against the successful contestant because they have tendered
for cash not securities. (At the time of the Bangor Punta exchange offer (1969), none of
the Williams Act provisions, except § 14(e), applied to exchange offers. See supra note
55.) Furthermore, as Justice Stevens indicated in dissent, the judiciary should be able to
structure a remedy to avoid harm to tendering shareholders in an exchange offer. Piper,
430 U.S. at 69 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
183 Although it is not clear why Chris-Craft withdrew from the contest for control of
Piper when it did, see Piper, 430 U.S. at 9 n.7, it would seem that Chris-Craft realized
that shifting the battle to the courtroom was a more profitable course to follow. See Pitt,
supra note 121, at 136.

NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66:241

action to correct or remedy the wrongdoings of their opponents.
Although the Court did suggest that injunctive relief may be available to redress violations of section 14(e), it emphasized the likely
conditions of availability-the violations would have to be flagrant
and detected at an early stage of the contest-and it never stipulated that an offeror would be, the proper party to seek such relief.'84 And at least conceptually, there is good reason to conclude that the Court did not intend to extend even this narrowly
circumscribed right to offerors. A Congress that did not focus on
implied actions at all surely did not differentiate between damages
and injunctions. Therefore, since the Court held that Congress
did not intend to confer standing upon an offeror to maintain a
damages action, it seems that the Court would have also concluded that Congress did not intend an offeror to have standing to
pursue injunctive relief. In light of these considerations, a denial
of standing to a tender offeror seeking damages, in the long run,
may impair the vigor of the tender offer process, depriving target
shareholders of the benefit Congress intended-the opportunity
to make a choice. If this view proves to be accurate, Congress'
commitment to neutrality furnishes an independent basis for allowing a tender offeror to sue for damages under section 14(e).
Congress' commitment to neutrality, however, provides a
more compelling basis for resolving the standing issue in Piper. If
target shareholders are the only intended beneficiaries of the
Williams Act, they should have standing to sue individually and
derivatively to redress violations of that Act. Given the obvious
parallel between proxy and tender offer regulation, this proposi8 5 which was undeniably left
tion is dictated by Borah's holding,"
intact in Piper."' If a target shareholder can sue derivatively,
then a target corporation should be able to assert remedies on
behalf of its shareholders as a group. Further, once a target is
given standing under the Act, it ineluctably follows that a tender

184 Piper, 430 U.S. at 40 & n.26, 41-42. Furthermore, even though the issue was not
raised in the petitions for certiorari, the Court took the initiative in vacating the district
court's entry of the injunction barring Bangor Punta from voting its Piper stock. Justice
Stevens felt the Court had been officious in this regard. He contended in dissent that
"[t]he injunction was an independent remedy premised on the violations of law found by
the lower courts. Setting aside the damages recovery provides an additional reason for
permitting the injunction to remain in effect ....
Id. at 70 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
185 See supra text accompanying note 132.
186 Subsequent to its Piper decision, the Court clarified that Borak has been
grandfathered. See Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 577 (1979) ("[W]e do
not now question the actual holding of Borak . . . ").
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offeror should have similar standing, or the neutral balance Congress sought to effect will be tipped in favor of target management." 7 The Piper Court presumably realized that this concatenation of implications existed, and that is why the Court refused
to intimate its views on the first two links in the chain (the standing of target shareholders and the target company) and
downplayed Congress' concern with neutrality.
(b) Contemporary Legal Context as Evidence of 'Legislative
Intent.-Drawing inferences from statutory purposes is not the only
way of determining legislative intent. As the second factor in Cort
recognizes, there may be other evidence indicating that Congress
intended to create or deny an implied remedy. The Court, however, gave short shrift to this factor. Having found that target shareholders were the sole beneficiaries of the statute, the Court concluded, in effect, that Congress must have intended to deny a
damages remedy to tender offerors. A more probing analysis
would have revealed that the contemporary legal context in which
Congress passed the Williams Act strongly suggests that Congress
intended all tender offer participants to have standing to sue for
damages and injunctions to redress violations of the Act. 88 As
indicated above, prior to the adoption of the Williams Act, the
lower courts, following Borak's lead, had construed the proxy
rules to permit implied damages and injunctive actions brought at
the behest of all parties involved in a proxy contest-sharehold-

187 But cf The Supreme Cour4 1976 Term-Leading Cases, 91 HARv. L. REV. 70, 79 n.35
(1977) (suggesting that the congressional policy of neutrality should mean that neither
tender offerors nor target corporations have standing to sue and that the Court will
have to overrule that part of Borak which permitted shareholders to sue derivatively under § 14(a) if neutrality is to be maintained).
188 See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979) (utilizing the Cort fictors and the "contemporary legal context" to find that a private right of action was implicit in § 901(a) of Title IX of the Education Amfiendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. §
1681(a) (1988); Howing Co. v. Nationwide Corp., 826 F.2d 1740,(6th Cir. 1987) (employing the'same approach to create a private right of action for damages under § 13(e) of
the Williams Act).
In one major respect, the Williams Act has a greater claim to implied private actions than either § 14(a) or § 10(b). In 1934, Congress may not have enacted §§ 14(a)
and 10(b) with the understanding that the judiciary would allow-private parties to sue
under these provisions. See 2 .L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 942 (2d ed. 1961); cf
Kitch, A Federal Vision of the Securities Laws, 70 VA. L. REV. 857, 863, 866 (1984) (contending that "Kardon . . . was a fluke" and that "Borak was an indefensible construction
of the statute"). In 1968, however, Congress probably'did pass the Williams Act believing
that the judiciary would permit implied private suits under the Act since the courts had
permitted such suits under §§ 14(a) and 10(b).
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ers, management, and outsiders seeking control.'89 By consciously choosing to pattern the Williams Act after the proxy provisions,
Congress presumably was aware of this decisional law and intended the Williams Act to be interpreted in conformity with it. Furthermore, by the time of the 1970 amendments to the Williams
Act, the lower courts had already assumed that shareholders, targets, and tender offerors had standing to sue under the Act.
Congress' failure to repudiate this case law in the 1970 amendments indicates implicit approval. 9 '
(c) State Law as Evidence of Legislative Intent.- The Supreme
Court has never flatly acknowledged that there was a significant
point of divergence between Borak and Cort on the relevance of
state law in determining whether Congress intended to create a
federal implied remedy. As described above, Borak contended that
state law was generally inapposite; Cort (by dint of the fourth
factor in its test) maintained that the existence of a state-law remedy for a cause of action-to the extent that the action was traditionally relegated to state law, in an area of basic concern to the
states-indicated that Congress may not have intended to create a
similar federal remedy.1 91 The opinion in Cort did assert, however, that had its fourth factor been used in Borak, the holding
would not have been altered. The Court explained: "In Borak, the
statute involved was clearly an intrusion of federal law into the
internal affairs of corporations; to the extent that state law differed or impeded suit, the congressional intent could be compro'9 2
mised in state-created causes of action."'

189 See supra text accompanying notes 134-38.
190 See Conard, supra note 141, at 215-16 & n.150 (finding it curious that the "major" amendments to the securities laws, such as the amendments to the Williams Act,
were not considered when the Court rejected implied private actions in securities cases).
191 The fourth factor in Cort, like the other factors, is not dispositive of the question
whether Congress intended to provide a similar federal remedy but merely one indicator
of what Congress may have intended. See Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 478
(1977); see also Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 575 (1979) ("[T]he Court
[in Coil] did not decide that each of [the four factors] is entitled to equal weight.").
192 Coil, 422 U.S. at 85. Either side in a proxy contest may choose to challenge an
election on several grounds. Some of these grounds involve solely questions of state law:
forged proxies, improperly signed proxies, proxies given by shareholders who are not
holders of record, or proxies revoked by subsequent proxies. Other grounds implicate
solely questions of federal law: oral or written solicitation without furnishing a proxy
statement (in violation of rule 14a-3(a), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-3(a) (1990)) or solicitation by
an opposition group of more than 10 persons without filing a proxy statement with the
SEC (see rule 14a-2(b)(1), id. § 240.14a-2(b)(1)). And one ground involves questions of
both federal and state law: solicitation on the basis of misleading information in viola-
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This sound explanation draws attention to the serious shortcomings in Piper's analysis of a comparable issue. It wil be recalled that the Piper Court concluded, without discussion, that
because Chris-Craft had a colorable claim under state law for
interference with a prospective advantage, deference to state law
was appropriate. 93 Had the Court evaluated, as Cort requires,
the state interest involved, the Court would have reached a different conclusion. At the time the Williams Act was adopted, misconduct in connection with tender offers was not specifically governed by state law, and tender offer regulation was not a major
concern of the states.19 4 Furthermore, the state common law of
deceit has not prevented the federal courts from implying private
actions under rule 10b-5 on behalf of defrauded buyers and sellers of securities.' 95 More important, if state remedies are inadequate to redress federal proxy violations, they should also be inadequate to redress federal tender offer violations, After all, the
Williams Act, like proxy regulation, is an intentional and, permissible intrusion by Congress into state corporation law.' 96 In short,
Congress intended federal law to remedy violations of the Williams Act, and it viewed available state law remedies as merely
supplemental.
The Piper Court was forced, of course, to give summary treatment to the fourth factor in the Cort test, since a complete analysis would have cast doubt on its earlier conclusion that Chris-Craft
was not entitled to sue. But the summary treatment was not just
expedient. It enabled the Court to espouse an even greater deference to state law than Cort.'9 7 And the deference to state law in
Piper epitomizes the Burger Court's view of the proper relationship between federal and state law in remedying violations of
the federal securities laws-a view that is diametrically opposite
from that taken by the Warren Court in Borak.

tion of rule 14a-9, id. § 240.14a-9. See L. Loss, supra note 3, at 949-50.
193 See supra text accompanying note 173.
194 See Pitt, supra note 121, at 171-72; see also supra note 38.
195 See supra text accompanying note 125.
196 See, e.g., supra text following notes 88 & 95; supra text accompanying note 109.
197 See Anderson, The Meaning of Federalism: Inteipreting the Secuitlies Exchange Act of
1934, 70 VA. L.- REV. 813, 829 (1984) (maintaining that the Burger Court had a "preference for state law over federal law" and that "[u]sing notions of federalism to construct
a particular view of congressional intent provide[d] a way of giving effect to such a preference while disguising it as a kind of neutral principle of statutory interpretation").
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(d) Some Concluding Remarks on Piper.-For a decision that
.purports to be a studious attempt to reconstruct the intent of the
Williams Act Congress, Piper missed the mark considerably. Indeed, the preceding analysis of the Piper case has adduced three
indicants of legislative intent-Congress' commitment to neutrality
in the regulation of tender offers, the contemporary legal context
in which the Williams Act was adopted, and Congress' deliberate
decision to intrude into state corporation law by passing tender
offer legislation-which all point to the conclusion that Congress
intended tender offerors to be able to sue for damages under
section 14(e). And what is more, this evidence of legislative intent
supports an even broader conclusion: Congress intended all tender offer participants-target shareholders, target corporations,
and tender offerors-to have standing to sue for all necessary
relief, whether it be damages or equitable remedies, to redress
violations of all provisions of the Williams Act.
In light of this conclusion, the best explanation for the holding in Piper is that the Court wanted to give Congress an unmistakable message: be explicit when federal remedies are intended,
or the Court is going to bow to state law. 9 ' There is nothing
inherently troublesome about instructing Congress how to accomplish its task more effectively, but when the instruction eviscerates
what Congress has done while it was not so well schooled, then it
is unfair. When Congress passed the Williams Act, it had every
reason to believe that the courts would imply private actions under the statute and work out the nuances of each cause of action.199 The courts, including the Supreme Court, had done so

198 Two years later, the Court was much more explicit in this regard. See Cannon v.
University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 717 (1979) ("When Congress intends private litigants to have a cause of action to support their statutory rights, the far better course is
for it to specify as much when it creates those rights."); see also id. at 718 (Rehnquist, J.,
concurring) ("[T]his Court in the future should be extremely reluctant to imply a cause
of action absent . . . specificity on the part of the Legislative Branch.").
199 Professor Conard has cogently evaluated the implication issue as follows:
There is not much merit in the argument that if Congress had wanted
fraud victims to have rights of action, it would have given them express rights.
Congress did grant express rights of action where it could feasibly define the
offense and prescribe appropriate elements of proof, measures of damages, and
periods of limitations. But the general fraud prohibitions comprise transactions
that the legislators had not yet visualized . . . . If there were legislators or
draftsmen who thought about the advisability of prescribing private actions for
some of the unspecified frauds covered by these prohibitions, they would probably have chosen to rely on courts to entertain private actions appropriate to the

TENDER OFFERS

before without any express congressional directive. 20 0 Why
would they stop now? The Williams Act Congress, however, did
give the courts two meaningful signals. By incorporating the Williams Act into the Exchange Act-legislation that was predicated
on principles of deterrence and compensation 20l-Congress signalled that the Williams Act had these same roots. Also, by
crafting the Williams Act to provide evenhanded regulatory protection for all tender offer participants, Congress signalled that the
Courts should fashion evenhanded remedial protection. And the
courts read and heeded these signals for almost a decade.
D. Standing to Sue Under the Williams Act After Piper
Piper certainly gave the courts a much different signal: standing to sue under the Williams Act was no longer to be routinely
granted. And as Senator Williams declared shortly after the Piper
decision was handed down: "[Piper] may have substantially
changed the contours of litigation under the tender offer statutes
in a manner never intended or envisioned by the Congress."20 2 But
because a substantial majority of the courts have read Piper narrowly, the decision has not turned out to be as ominous as Senator Williams predicted. In general, target shareholders have been
granted standing to sue for both damages and injunctions.0 3
various oifenses, in the manner that had been- approved by the Supreme Court
before the securities laws were adopted.
Conard, supra note 141, at 220.
200 The Court in Cannon, 441 U.S. 677 (1979), did recognize that the legislative
history of a statute which does not expressly create. or deny a remedy will usually be
silent or ambiguous. See id. at 694.
201 See Pitt, supra note 121, at 162-63.
202 Williams, Introduction to ARANOW, EINHORN & BERLSTEIN, supra note 139, at xviii
(1977) (emphasis added).
203 See, e.g., Polaroid Corp. v. Disney, 862 F.2d 987 (3d Cir. 1988) (suggesting that
an injunctive action may be available under rule 14d-10, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-10 (1990));
Field v. Trump, 850 F.2d 938 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1012 (1989); Howing
Co. v. Nationwide Corp., 826 F.2d 1470 (6th Cir.) (damages action under § 13(e)), cert.
denied, 468 U.S. 1059 (1987); Pryor v. United States Steel Corp., 794 F.2d 52 (2d Cir.)
(damages action under § 14(d)), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 954 (1986); Paine v. McCabe, 797
F.2d 713 (9th Cir. 1986) (damages action under § 14(e); Schlesinger Inv. Partnership v.
Fluor Corp., 671 F.2d 739 (2d Cir. 1982) (same); Osofsky v. Zipf, 645 F.2d 107 (2d Cir.
1981) (same); Caleb & Co. v. E.I. duPont Nemours & Co., 615 F. Supp. 96 (S.D.N.Y.
1985) (same); Bolton v. Gramlich, 540 F. Supp. 822 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (ruling that tender
offerors, as shareholders, can sue derivatively under § 14(e) for damages and, injunctive
relief); American Bakeries Co. v. Pro-Met Trading Co., [1981 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) 1 97,925 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 27, 1.981) (suggesting that an injunctive action
may be available under § 13(d)). Tendering shareholders may not need § 14(e) because
they are sellers within rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1990).
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Since Piper ruled that the Act was passed for the "special benefit"
of the target shareholders, the courts have reasoned that target
shareholders should have a private right of action. 0 4 Next, the
courts have indicated that suits brought by target companies for
damages are no longer permissible because they destroy the neutrality Congress sought to achieve. 0 5 And finally, although there
are some maverick cases denying targets and offerors the right to
sue for injunctive relief,2" 6 it seems to be generally accepted
that such relief is available. 20 7 The courts have realized that targets and offerors, more than anyone else, have the necessary incentive and the best resources to correct violations of the Act.
When target corporations or tender offerors are denied
standing to sue under the Williams Act, they have no choice but
to lean on applicable state common-law remedies. Defeated tender
offerors may have a claim, as in Piper, for interference with a
204

Compare Kalmanovitz v. G. Heileman Brewing Co., 769 F.2d 152, 159, 160 (3d

Cir. 1985) (indicating that the proposition advanced by the text "arguably may be correct" but holding that after Piper (see supra note 164) "a plaintiff who occupies the dual
roles of a very substantial tender offeror and merely a nominal target shareholder may
be considered to be only an offeror for purposes of judging standing") with Shamrock
Holdings, Inc. v. Polaroid Corp., 709 F. Supp. 1311, 1317 n.7 (D. Del. 1989) (large target shareholder has standing to sue even though it is also the offeror).
205 See, e.g., Wellman v. Dickinson, 475 F. Supp. 783, 816 (S.D.N.Y.) (1979) (dictum)
("[I]t now seems clear that a target company . . . lacks standing to bring a damage action . . . for violations of Sections 14(d) and 14(e) of the Williams Act."), aFfd, 682 F.2d
355 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1069 (1983). In general, the courts have refused
to imply a right of action for damages on behalf of target companies (or their shareholders) under § 13(d) both before and after Piper. See, e.g., Myers v. American Leisure
Time Enters., 402 F. Supp. 213 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (derivative and class action), aff'd without
opinion, 538 F.2d 312 (2d Cir. 1976); Kirsch Co. v. Bliss & Laughlin Indus., 495 F.
Supp. 488 (W.D. Mich. 1980) (dictum).
206 See, e.g., Liberty Nat'l Ins. Holding Co. v. Charter Co., 734 F.2d 545 (11th Cir.
1984) (ruling that there was no private right of action for injunctive relief (divestment of
shares) in favor of a target company under §§ 13(d), 14(d), 'or 14(e)); Kalmanovitz v. C.
Heileman Brewing Co., 769 F.2d 152 (3d Cir. 1985) (ruling that there was no private
right of action for injunctive relief in favor of a tender offeror under §§ 13(e), 14(d), or
14(e)).
207 See, e.g., Florida Commercial Banks v. Culverhouse, 772 F.2d 1513 (11th Cir.
1985) (ruling that its earlier decision in Liberty National (see supra note 206) did not
preclude a target company from seeking corrective relief under §§ 13(d), 14(d), or
14(e)); Indiana Nat'! Corp. v. Rich, 712 F.2d 1180 (7th Cir. 1983) (ruling that a target
company has standing to sue for injunctive relief under § 13(d)); Buffalo Forge Co. v.
Ampco-Pittsburg Corp., 638 F.2d 568 (2d. Cir. 1981) (assuming, without discussion, that
a target company has standing to sue for injunctive relief under § 14(d)); Prudent Real
Estate Trust v. Johncamp Realty, 599 F.2d 1140 (2d Cir. 1979) (ruling that a target company has standing to sue for injunctive relief under § 14(e)); Mobil Corp. v. Marathon
Oil Corp., 669 F.2d. 366 (6th Cir. 1981) (ruling that a tender offeror has standing to
sue for injunctive relief under § 14(e)), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 982 (1982); Humana, Inc. v.
American Medicorp, Inc., 445 F. Supp. 613 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (same).
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prospective advantage, and target corporations may plausibly be
able to pursue an action in deceit on behalf of defrauded shareholders. 218 These two common-law tort actions are usually perceived, however, to be ineffectual or. inadequate, 0 9 and as a re2 10
sult, they have been seldom used in tender offer litigation.
Asserting a claim under one of the state takeover statutes, which
may even have an antifraud provision that parallels section
14(e), 1 is not a viable alternative, because these statutes do not
support private3 actions2 12 or liability runs only in favor of target
21
shareholders.
What has been said thus far displays the patent inconsistency
that exists today, at least on the books, in the remedial aspects of
proxy and tender offer regulation. When a claim for damages is
at issue, both sides of a proxy contest have standing to sue under
federal law, whereas tender offerors and target corporations are
relegated to state law to pursue their claims. Although the Supreme Court in Piper expressly declined to indicate whether an
insurgent group in a proxy contest has standing to sue for damages, it seems that the Court would have denied standing to both

208 See Comment, An Implied Private Right of Action Under the Williams Act: Tradition
vs. Economic Reality, 77 Nw. U.L. REV. 316, 346 (1982). Also, target shareholders may
have a state-law cause of action against target management for interference with a prospective advantage, see infra note 210, or breach of fiduciary duty on the grounds that
management defended against a tender offer solely to retain control, see ARANOW,
EINHORN & BERLSTEIN, supra note 139, at 116; McIntyre, Shareholders" Recourse Under
Federal Securities Laws Against Management for Opposing Advantageous Tender Offers, 34 Bus.
LAW. 1283, 1289-90 (1979).
209 See Pitt, supra note 121, at 119 n.7. Chris-Craft sued Piper and Bangor Punta in
state court for interference with a prospective advantage, and the suit was ultimately
settled when Chris-Craft agreed to sell its Piper shares to Bangor Punta at $70 a share.
See Note, Corporate Takeover Statutes and the Defeated Offeror. The Aftermath of Piper, 9 U.
TOL. L. REV. 95, 104 n.35 (1977).
210 See Lowenstein, Tender Offer Litigation and State Law, 63 N.C.L. REV. 493, 495-97
(1985) (citing cases in which a defeated offeror or target shareholder has sought damages or injunctive relief for interference with a prospective advantage and maintaining that
relief is possible but only after significant difficulties are overcome). See generally Walker,
Restitutionaty Relief in the Absence of Standing to Challenge Violations of Rule 10b-5 and Section 14(e), 23 LoY. L. REV. 893 (1977) (suggesting that the common-law remedy of restitution may be the panacea for parties who are denied standing to sue under
§ 14(e)).
211 See Note, Securities Law: Implied' Causes of Action Under Section 14(e) of the Williams
Act, 66 MINN. L. REv. 865, 868 n.16 (1982) (listing 27 state takeover statutes (as of
1981) that contain antifraud provisions patterned after § 14(e)).
212 Cf Philbosian v. First Fin. Sec. Corp., 550 F. Supp. 210 (D. Colo. 1982) (holding
that there is no private right of action under the general anti-fraud provision of the
Colorado securities statute, COLO. REV. STAT. § 11-51-123 (1987)).
213 See, e.g., MASS. GEN. L. ch. 110C, § 9 (Law. Co-op. 1985).
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insurgents and the corporation had the question been raised. The
standing of proxy contestants has not arisen in the post-Piper era,
mainly because most contests for corporate control have been
waged via tender offers. There have been lower court decisions
construing the proxy rules, however, and this case law reflects a
manifest unwillingness to retreat from the expansive interpretations of the proxy rules that had characterized the pre-Piper
era. 21 4 Furthermore, courts continue to cite Borak in proxy cases, and they correctly assert that the Supreme Court has never restricted the class of potential plantiffs that can sue under section
14(a).2 15 While the inconsistency in proxy and tender offer regulation must await a definitive pronouncement by the Court, it is
not unlikely that the lower courts will retain two-way standing in
proxy contests in future cases. And more proxy contest litigation
is bound to surface, since in the past few years the market for
corporate control has seen a rejuvenation of proxy contests as a
takeover technique, and these contests are being waged with increasing frequency in connection with tender offers.216 In this
context, incongruous standing rules will prove to be most blatant.
The developments in this area are worth watching.
III.

THE SUBSTANTIVE COVERAGE OF THE WILLIAMS ACT

A.

The Scope of Section 14(e) Before Schreiber

As the number and size of tender offers increased in the
years after the Williams Act was adopted,1 7 the tactics employed by tender offerors and target companies to promote and
218
defeat tender offers became more sophisticated and complex.
One of the most significant legal developments that accompanied
this trend was the proliferation of lawsuits instituted by offerors
under section 14(e) of the Williams Act to enjoin the defensive
arrangements of targets.219 The courts that were called upon to
214 See, e.g., Cowin v. Bresler, 741 F.2d 410 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Lynch v. Fulks, [1981
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
97,831 (D. Kan. Dec. 12, 1980). Contra
Bolton v. Gramlick, 540 F. Supp. 822 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). See generally 2 T. HAZEN, supra
note 56, § 13.1, at 56 (arguing that while the Supreme Court is becoming more restrictive in applying the Cort test, the lower courts in securities cases seem to be taking a
contrary approach).

215

See, e.g., Cowin v. Bresler, 741 F.2d 410, 426 (D.C. Cir. 1984).

216 See L. LOss, supra note 3, at 499 n.5.
217 See MERRILL LYNCH BUSINESS BROKERAGE & VALUATION (W.T. Grimm & Co.),
1988 MERGERSTAT REVIEW 7, 85 (1989), 1989 MERGERSTAT REVIEW 7, 75 (1990).
218 See generally I A. FLEISCHER, TENDER OFFERS: DEFENSES, RESPONSES, AND PLAN-

NING 391-612 (2d ed. 1983) (case studies).
219 Although bidders usually prefer to avoid litigation, they sometimes are forced to
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rule in these cases assumed that the offerors had standing to sue
for such relief-both before and after Piper2 °-and initially the
courts were receptive to the underlying claims as well.22 ' In general, the initial decisions held that the directors' adoption of a defensive measure for no justifiable business purpose was a breach
of the directors' fiduciary duty owed to the target shareholders
under state law and that this fiduciary misconduct constituted a
violation of section 14(e)'s second prong outlawing "fraudulent,
deceptive, or manipulative acts or practices in connection with
any tender offer. ' 222 The defenses that foundered* in these law-

use the courts when the target's defensive measures are particularly potent. See id. at
297-98. Target litigation, however, is common. Indeed, almost whenever a hostile tender
offer is launched, the target dashes to the courthouse, intent on charging the offeror
with every impropriety that counsel can muster. See, e.g., ARANoW, EINHoRN &
BERLSTEIN, supra note 139, at 199-202; see also supra note 94. See generally Rosenzweig,
Target Litigation, 85 MICH. L. REV. 110 (1986) (arguing that target managers sue bidders
in order to thwart hostile take6vers and that they often succeed). Judge Friendly described the inevitable stream of litigation from a hostile tender offer in this way:
Drawing Excalibur from a scabbard where it would doubtless have remained
sheathed in the face of a friendly [tender] offer, the target company typically
hopes to obtain a temporary injunction which may frustrate the acquisition since
the offering company may well decline the expensive gambit of a trial or, if it
persists, the long lapse of time could so change conditions that the offer will
fail even if, after a full trial and appeal, it should be determined that no . . .
violation has been shown.
Missouri Portland Cement Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 498 F.2d 851, 854 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 883 (1974).
220 See, e.g., Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., 669 F.2d 366, 370-73 (6th Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 455 U.S. 982 (1982); Data Probe Acquisition Corp. v. Datatab, Inc., 568 F.
Supp. 1538, 1544 n.1 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd on other grounds, 722 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 465 U.S. 1052 (1984); Buffalo Forge Co. v. Ogden Corp., 555 F. Supp. 892, af/'d,
717 F.2d 757 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1018 (1983); Applied Digital Data Sys. v.
Milgo Elec. Corp., 425 F. Supp. 1145 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Royal Indus. v. Monogram Indus.,
[1976-1977 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 95,863 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 29,
1976); Orbanco, Inc. v. Security Bank, 371 F. Supp. 125 (D. Or. 1974).
221 Applied Digital Data Sys. v. Milgo Elec. Corp., 425 F. Supp. 1145 (S.D.N.Y.
1977); Royal Indus. v. Monogram Indus., [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 1 95,863 (C. D. Cal. Nov. 29, 1976); Orbanco, Inc. v. Security Bank, 371 F.
Supp. 125 (D. Or. 1974).
222 By requiring a valid business purpose for target management's adoption of certain defensive measures, all of these initial decisions effectively imposed a federal standard of fiduciary duty under § 14(e). The opinions, however, differed on whether a
breach of that fiduciary duty constituted a "fraudulent" act, a "deceptive" act, or a "manipulative" act within the meaning. of § 14(e). See Applied Digital Data Sys. v. Milgo
Elec. Corp., 425 F. Supp. 1145, 1158 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (holding that the breach of fiduciary duty owed to the shareholders was a "fraudulent scheme"); Royal Indus. v. Monogram Indus., [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 95,863, at 91,136
(C.D. Cal. Nov. 29, 1976) (holding that if a "target makes a defensive acquisition
whose . . . primary purpose is to block a tender offer, the [target company] or its man-
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suits included a stock option granted to an officer of the target, 223

the issuance

of a large block

of stock to

a "white

knight,"2 4 and the acquisition of a corporation to create an antitrust obstacle for the hostile bidder.2 25
In 1977, in the same Term Piper was decided, the Supreme
226
Court handed down an opinion in Santa Fe Industries v. Green
that called into question the continued vitality of these initial
decisions interpreting section 14(e). In Santa Fe, the Supreme
Court held that a "short-form," "squeeze-out" merger227 at an
unfair cash price was not a "manipulative or deceptive device"
within the meaning of section 10(b) of the Exchange Act because
there had been no misrepresentation or nondisclosure regarding
the price.2 28 The opinion of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in the Santa Fe litigation, which was reversed, by the
Supreme Court, had unequivocally held that a claim could be
stated under section 10(b) without any allegation of misrepresentation or nondisclosure and that section 10(b) reached situations
in which majority shareholders breached their fiduciary duty to
deal fairly with minority shareholders by consummating a securities transaction that lacked a valid business purpose. 229 The Supreme Court maintained that the Second Circuit's interpretation
of section 10(b) was unwarranted since it would "federalize the
substantial portion of the law of corporations that deals with
transactions in securities" without any indication that Congresg

agement violates Section 14(e) . .. and their fiduciary duties under Delaware law");
Orbanco Inc. v. Security Bank, 371 F. Supp. 125, 128-29 (D. Or. 1974) (holding that the
defensive measure was "a"manipulative act").
223 Orbanco, Inc. v. Security Bank, 371 F. Supp. 125, 128-29 (D. Or. 1974).
224 Applied Digital Data Sys. v. Milgo Elec. Corp., 425 F. Supp. 1145, 1157-58
(S.D.N.Y. 1977).
225 Royal Indus. v. Monogram Indus., [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH)
95,863, at 91,136-37 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 29, 1976).
226 430 U.S. 462 (1977). Justice White delivered the opinion in Sante Fe, and he was
joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart, Marshall, Powell, and Rehnquist. Justices Blackmun and Stevens concurred in separate opinions. Justice Brennan dissented.
227 The "short-form" merger in Santa Fe was governed by Delaware law, and it is
defined by statute as a merger of a 90%-owned subsidiary into its parent corporation.
The merger does not require the approval of the shareholders of either corporation, and
the minority shareholders of the subsidiary may receive cash for their shares. See DEL.
CODE ANN. tit.8, § 253 (1983 & Supp. 1988). A "squeeze-out" merger is any merger in
which a controlling corporation uses its control to absorb a controlled corporation. In
such a merger, the minority shareholders of the controlled corporation are forced to sell
their shares for cash.
228 Sante Fe, 430 U.S. at 474-77.
229 Green v. Santa Fe Indus., 533 F.2d 1283, 1289-91 (2d Cir. 1976), rev'd, 430 U.S.
462 (1977).
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intended such a result."' Relying on Piper, the Court concluded
sharethat "it [was] entirely appropriate to relegate [the minority
21
law."
state
by
created
[was].
remedy
whatever
to
holders]
After Santa Fe, a controversy mounted in the courts of appeals over the intended scope of section 14(e). Specifically, the
Courts of Appeals for the Sixth and Second Circuits disagreed on
whether section 14(e)'s prohibition against manipulative conduct
covered defensive measures frequently employed by targets-"lockup" and "leg-up" arrangements 2 1 2 with a "white knight"-when
the arrangements involved no misrepresentation and were fully
disclosed.23 3 On the one hand, the Sixth Circuit held that "ma-

230 Santa Fe, 430 U.S. at 479.
231 Id.at 478 (quoting Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 84 (1975), and Piper v. Chris-Craft
Indus., 430 U.S. 1, 40 (1977)). At the time of the merger in Santa Fe, it was assumed
that an appraisal remedy was the exclusive remedy available under Delaware law for
minority shareholders that were dissatisfied with a "short-form," "cash-out" merger. See id.
at 465-66; Stauffer v. Standard Brands Inc., 41 Del. Ch. 7, 187 A.2d 78 (1962). Shortly
after Santa Fe, however, the Supreme Court of Delaware in Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380
A.2d 969 (Del. 1977), held that minority shareholders could sue to enjoin a "short-form"
merger if the merger lacked a valid business purpose. In 1985, the Supreme Court of
Delaware in Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983), overruled Singer and
eliminated the requirement of a valid business purpose; as a result, an appraisal remedy
may be the sole remedy in Delaware for minority shareholders who complain that they
received an unfair cash price in a "short-form" merger. For an excellent survey of the
pre-Santa Fe tensions that existed between federal and state law in setting standards of
conduct for corporate management, see Symposium on Federal and State Roles in Establishing Standards of Conduct for Corporate Management, 31 BUS. LAW. 861 (1976).
Some "squeeze-out" mergers may be subject to rule 13e-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-3
(1990), if the merger is a "going private" transaction by a public company. See supra
note 106. The evolution of rule 13e-3 is noteworthy. In 1975, pursuant to its rulemaking
power under §§ 10(b) and 13(e), the SEC proposed for comment alternate versions of a
rule that would have authorized the SEC to prohibit "going private" transactions that
were unfair. See Notice Rulemaking Proceeding Regarding "Going Private" Transactions,
Exchange Act Release No. 11,231, [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. F. Rep. (CCH)
1 80,104 (Feb. 6, 1976). One version required that the consideration offered to shareholders in a "going private" transaction be "no lower than the consideration recommended jointly by two qualified independent persons." Id. at 85,092. The other version required that a "going private" transaction have a valid business purpose. Id. at 85,093.
After Santa Fe, the SEC backed down from these attempts to regulate the substantive
fairness of "going private" transactions, and the final version of rule 13e-3, adopted in
1979, purports to require only "disclosure." Schedule 13E-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-100
(item 8(a)) (1990), requires a statement whether the company that is "going private"
reasonably believes that the transaction is "fair or unfair" to the shareholders.
232 See infra text accompanying note 317; see also itfra note 325 and accompanying
text.

233 Data Probe Acquisition Corp. v. Datatab, Inc., 722 F.2d I (2d Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 465 U.S. 1052 (1984); Buffalo Forge Co. v. Ogden Corp., 717 F.2d 757 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1018 (1983); Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., 669 F.2d 366 (6th
Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 982 (1982). The litigation in 'all of these cases was instituted by offerors seeking to enjoin the "lock-up" arrangements.
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nipulative acts" under section 14(e) did not require misrepresentation or nondisclosure, reasoning that "to find compliance with
section 14(e) solely by the full disclosure of manipulative acts as a
fait accompli would be to read the 'manipulative acts and practices'
language completely out of the Williams Act.12 4 On the other
hand, the Second Circuit concluded that Santa Fe was controlling
and held, in two separate decisions, that misrepresentation or
nondisclosure was a necessary element of manipulative conduct
under section 14(e).23 5 The Supreme Court denied certiorari in
all- three cases. 2 6 Then, when'the Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit took the side of the Second Circuit in a case not
involving defensive tactics, the Supreme Court granted certiorari
to resolve the conflict over the intended meaning of the term
"manipulative" in section 14(e). 2 7 The case reached the Su2

preme Court as Schreiber v. Burlington Northern, Inc. 11
While the controversy was mounting in the courts, legal commentators were also in
disagreement. Some argued that §§ 10(b) and 14(e) should not be construed in pari
materia and that "manipulative acts" under § 14(e) do not require misrepresentation or
nondisclosure. Further, they contended that certain fully and fairly disclosed defensive
tactics should be proscribed by § 14(e). See, e.g., Junewicz, The Appropriate Limits of Section 14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1171 (1984); Lowenstein,
Section 14(e) of the Williams Act and the Rule 10b-5 Comparisons, 71 GEO. L.J. 1311 (1983);
Weiss, Defensive Responses to Tender Offers and the Williams Act's Prohibition Against Manipulation, 35 VAND. L. REv. 1087 (1982); Note, Target Defensive Tactics as Manipulative Under
Section 14(e), 84 COL. L. REV. 228 (1984). Others took the opposite viewpoint. See, e.g.,
Prentice, Target Board Abuse of Defensive Tactics: Can. Federal Law Be Mobilized to Overcome
the Business Judgment Rule?, 8 J. CORP. L. 337 (1983); Note, Lock-Up Options: Toward a
State Law Standard, 96 HARV. L. REv. 1068 (1983).
234 Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., 669 F.2d 366, 377 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
455 U.S. 982 (1982). The court argued that the challenged arrangements created an
artificial price ceiling in the tender offer market for the target's stock, and that they
were therefore "manipulative acts" in connection with a tender offer in violation of §
14(e). Id. at 375.
235 Data Probe Acquisition Corp. v. Datatab, Inc., 722 F.2d 1, 4 (2d Cir. 1983) (contending that the "gravamen of the claim [was] breach of management's fiduciary duty to
shareholders, a matter traditionally committed to state law"), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1052
(1984); Buffalo Forge Co. v. Ogden Corp., 717 F.2d 757, 760 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 1018 (1983).
236 Data Probe Acquisition Corp. v. Datatab, Inc., 464 U.S. 1052 (1984), denying cert.
to 722 F.2d I (2d Cir. 1983); Buffalo Forge Co.v. Ogden Corp., 464 U.S. 1018, denying
cert. to 717 F.2d 757 (2d Cir. 1983); Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., 455 U.S. 982
(1982), denying cert. to 699 F.2d 366 (6th Cir. 1981).
237 Schreiber v. Burlington N., Inc., 469 U.S. 815, granting cert. to 731 F.2d 163 (3d
Cir. 1984). After the Third Circuit's decision in Schreiber, but before the Supreme
Court's grant of certiorari, the Court of Appeals for the Eight Circuit in Feldbaum v.
Avon Prod., 741 F.2d 234 (8th Cir. 1984), adopted the view taken by the Second and
Third Circuits. The litigation in Feldbaum was instituted by a target shareholder seeking
damages on account of a "lock-up" option that target management had granted a friendly bidder in order to preclude competition from a third party.
238 472 U.S. 1 (1985). The Court's choice of Schreiber as the case to resolve the con-
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B.
1.

The Schreiber Case

Denial of Substantive Protections to Target Shareholders

The opinion in Schreiber, rendered in 1985, was the Supreme
Court's second occasion to interpret the tender offer provisions
of the Williams Act. Schreiber concerned the successful takeover of
the El Paso Company (El Paso) by Burlington Northern, Inc.
(Burlington)." 9 On December 21, 1982, Burlington launched a
hostile cash tender offer for ,amajority (25,100,000 shares) of El
Paso's common stock at $24 per share. The offer was to expire
twenty business days later, on January 19, 1983. Burlington, however, reserved the right to cancel the offer if any of several specified developments occurred. 2 ' El Paso shareholders had the
right to withdraw shares tendered until January 12, 1983, and if
the offer was oversubscribed, shares tendered by December 30,
1982, would be purchased on a prorated basis. 24 ' Burlington's
offer provided no price or other protections in the event, of a
second-step acquisition of the shares not obtained in the tender
offer.
On advice from its investment banker, El Paso initially opposed the Burlington offer. El Paso shareholders were informed
that management recommended rejection of the offer on the
grounds that the $24 per share offering price was inadequate and
that the minority shareholders remaining after the completion of
the offer might be adversely affected by a second-step "squeezeout" merger. Also, El Paso management authorized a variety of
defensive measures and searched for better alternatives to the
Burlington offer. Nonetheless, the Burlington offer was fully subscribed by the expiration of the proration period. Furthermore, El
Paso ultimately realized that $24 was the highest price obtainable
for its shares. Accordingly, El Paso management told Burlington's

troversy over the intended scope of § 14(e) is revealing. The Court obviously preferred a
case that did not involve defensive tactics, and by choosing a case that. was brought by a
target shareholder suing for damages, the Court was -able to avoid (as it had in Piper)
the question whether offerors had standing to sue for injunctive relief under § 14(e).
239 A summary of Burlington's takeover of El Paso is set forth in id. at 2-4 and in I
A. FLEISCHER, supra note 218, at 499-502.
240 The major conditions of El Paso's offer are set forth in Brill v. Burlington N.,
Inc., 590 F. Supp. 893, 895 n.3 (D. Del. 1984).
241 At the time of Burlington's tender offer, rule 14d-7, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-7
(1982), permitted target shareholders fo withdraw shares tendered during the first 15
business days of an offer, and the proration period was 10 calendar days. See supra

notes 83-84 and accompanying text.
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representatives that it was interested in discussing an acquisition
by Burlington which would be more favorable to El Paso shareholders than Burlington's outstanding offer. Negotiations ensued
and an accord was eventually reached. Among other things,
Burlington agreed to (1) withdraw the December tender offer
pursuant to the "out" clause in its offer and initiate a new tender
offer for 21,000,000 shares at $24 per share, (2) purchase
4,166,667 shares of newly authorized El Paso shares for $24 per
share, and (3) provide that a majority of the continuing El Paso
directors and a majority of the non-Burlington El Paso shareholders would have to approve any second-step acquisition of the balance of the El Paso shares.
In accordance with this agreement, Burlington terminated its
tender offer on January 10, 1983, and the following day it commenced the new offer. The El Paso shareholders who had tendered to Burlington in the December offer retendered in the
January offer. Also, the El Paso directors and other El Paso shareholders who had retained their shares during the December offer
tendered in the January offer, and as a result, the January offer
was substantially oversubscribed. Burlington eventually purchased,
on a prorated basis, 21,000,000 of the over 40,000,000 shares tendered. Consequently, the El Paso shareholders who tendered in
both offers had fewer shares accepted for payment in the January
offer than would have been accepted in the December offer because the proration pool was larger.
Barbara Schreiber, who was one of these shareholders,
brought an action for damages on behalf of herself and other
shareholders similarly situated against Burlington, El Paso, and El
Paso's board of directors. In the suit, she alleged that Burlington's
cancellation of the December tender offer and substitution of the
January offer, after negotiations with El Paso, was a manipulative
distortion of the market for El Paso shares in violation of the
prohibition against "manipulative acts" in section 14(e) of the
Williams Act.14' The District Court for the District of Delaware
dismissed the suit, holding that the alleged misconduct was not

242 Schreiber, 472 U.S. at 4. Schreiber also alleged that Burlington violated § 14(e)'s
prohibition of "deceptive acts" in connection with a tender offer by failing in the January offer to disclose that "golden parachutes" had been offered to four members of El
Paso's management. Id. A "golden parachute" is a special employment agreement between a corporation and its top managers affording financial assurances in the event of
a change of corporate ownership.
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manipulative because there was no deception. 243 The Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court reasoned that the Williams Act was primarily a
disclosure statute and that Burlington's "arguable breach of contract" was not manipulative conduct because it was fully disclosed.24 4
The Supreme Court affirmed the Third Circuit's decision, 7-0,
in an opinion written by Chief Justice Burger.2 45 The Court
held that "manipulative acts" under section 14(e) require misrepresentation or nondisclosure of the misconduct alleged. 24 6 Accordingly, the Court found that the defendants had not violated
section 14(e) because they had made no misrepresentations and
their actions were fully disclosed. 24' The Court's holding was
based on the language, purpose, and legislative history of section
14(e).
At the outset, the Court turned to the language of the phrase
"fraudulent, deceptive or manipulative acts or practices" in section
14(e) and opined that since section 10(b) contained the similar
phrase "manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance," sections
10(b) and 14(e) should be construed in pan materia.248 The
Court, therefore, borrowed the definition of the word "manipulative" that it had adopted under section 10(b) in Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfeldet 49 in 1976. Quoting directly from Hochfelder, the Court
stated that the word "manipulative" was "virtually a term of art
when used in connection with the securities markets" and that it
connoted "conduct designed to deceive or defraud investors by controlling or artificially affecting the pi-ice of securities."'25
From
this definition, the Court somehow deduced that misrepresentation or nondisclosure was a requisite element of all "manipulative
acts" under section 14(e). Presumably, the Court reasoned sub si-

243 Schreiber v. Burlington N., Ind., 568 F. Supp. 197, 202-03 (D. Del. 1983).
244 Schreiber v. Burlington N., Inc., 731 F.2d 163, 165-66 (3d Cir. 1984).
245 Chief Justice Burger was joined by Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, Blackmun,
Rehnquist, and Stevens. Justices Powell and O'Connor took no part in the decision of
the case.
246 Schrieber, 472 U.S. at 12. The Court also held that the allegedly deceptive "golden
parachute" agreements did not cause injury to the plaintiff since these agreements were
arranged in connection with the January offer and the plaintiff sought redress only in
connection with the December offer. Id. at 13.

247 Id.at 12-13.
248 Id. at 5-8.
249 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
250 Schreiber, 472 U.S. at 6 (quoting Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 199) (emphasis added by
the Schreiber Court).
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lentio that investors could not be deceived or defrauded by conduct that artifically influenced the price of securities-and thus it
could not be reasonably inferred that the conduct was designed
to deceive or defraud-unless the conduct involved some form of
misrepresentation or unless the conduct was not disclosed.
The Court pointed out that interpreting the term "manipulative" in section 14(e) to signify market or price manipulation comported with the usage of the term at common law and with the
traditional dictionary definition of the word "manipulation"-"management with use of unfair, scheming, or underhanded methods." 25 ' The Court also noted that its interpreta-

tion was consistent with its holding in Santa Fe that the term
"manipulative" in section 10(b) did not cover corporate misman252
agement unless there was misrepresentation or nondisclosure.
And finally, the Court rejected the plaintiff's argument that the
use of the disjunctive "or" in section 14(e) indicated that acts
could be manipulative even if they were not fraudulent or deceptive. The Court contended that words in a list should be given a
similar meaning and that all three types of misconduct listed in
253
section 14(e) involved misrepresentation or nondisclosure.
The Court found that its conclusion regarding the meaning
of the term "manipulative" as used in section 14(e) was confirmed
by the provision's purpose and legislative history. As in Piper, the
Court emphasized that the purpose of the Williams Act- was to
protect target shareholders by requiring disclosure of information. 21' The Court maintained that section 14(e) merely supplemented the specific disclosure provisions of the Act and that the
substantive safeguards of sections 13(e) and 14(d)-which the
Court characterized as narrow-were designed to facilitate disclosure by giving shareholders sufficient time to consider the information that had to be disclosed.25 5 In the Court's view, the neutral setting created by the Williams Act was disclosure-oriented
also because it served to ensure that each side of a takeover contest would have an equal opportunity to disclose its case.256

251

Id. at 7.

252 Id. at 7-8 & n.6.
253 Id. at 7-8.
254 Id. at 8-9.
255 Id at 9-11.
256 Id at 9. In footnote eight of the opinion (see id. at 9 n.8), the Court made two
observations about § 13(e) to buttress its conclusion that the Williams Act and § 14(e)
were concerned with disclosure. The two observations, however, were somewhat inconsistent, and they did not unequivocally support the proposition advanced. First, the
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Then, after observing that the legislative history regarding section
14(e) was sparse, the Court contended that there was no, evidence
in the legislative documents suggesting that section 14(e) was directed at any purpose other than disclosure or that the prohibition in section 14(e) against manipulative conduct was 2meant
to
7
encompass fully disclosed "artificial" or "unfair" conduct.
2.

An Analysis of Schreiber

The opinion in Schreiber did double duty for the Court. It
legitimized under federal law not only the specific conduct of the
offeror and the target in the Schreiber litigation, but also a variety
258
of defensive tactics employed by targets in' other takeovers.
The Court was able to decide two cases in one by framing the
issue broadly-whether misrepresentation or nondisclosure is an
essential ingredient of section 14(e) manipulative conduct. Furthermore, the Court's affirmative holding on this issue made the
disposition of both cases relatively straightforward since the
defendants' activities were, and defensive tactics usually are, fully
and fairly disclosed. That Schreiber was meant to extend to defenCourt attempted to demonstrate that the Williams Act was disclosure-oriented by showing that § 13(e) was a disclosure provision. The CouYt indicated that Congress "impose[d] specific disclosure duties" in § 13(e) to address the concern that issuer repurchases could be used to distort the market for corporate control. But § 13(e) does not
impose any duties. It gives the SEC the power to adopt rules that define-and prescribe
means reasonably designed to prevent-fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative practices in
connection with a company's purchases of its own securities. Then, § 13(e) indicates that
these rules may require that the company make appropriate disclosures to its
shareholders. See supra note 101. There is no indication in § 13(e), however, that the
SEC's power is limited to adopting disclosure requirements. See supra note 109 and accompanying text. Second, the Court purported to underscore that § 14(e) was devoid of
substantive content by pointing out that it would have been unnecessary for Congress to
grant the SEC the power to regulate issuer repurchases if
§ 14(e) was meant to forbid "artificial" or "unfair" purchases by a company of its own
stock during the course of a third-party tender offer. But § 13(e) governs all issuer repurchases, whether or not a third-party offer is outstanding, whereas § 14(e) is addressed
only to the tender offer context. Therefore, the scope of § 13(e) is different from that
of § 14(e). Furthermore, if § 13(e) gives the SEC "broad. regulatory power" to regulate
the substantive aspects of issuer repurchases, as the footnote suggests that it does, §
14(e) should also have some substantive significance since §§ 13(e) and 14(e) contain
virtually identical language. See Fiflis, Of Lollipops and Law-A Proposal for a National
Policy Concerning Tender Offer Defenses, 19 U.C. DAVIs L. REV. 303, 324-25 (1986).
257 Schreiber, 472 U.S. at 11-12. The Court believed that judges should not impose
their own notions of "artificiality" or "fairness." Id. at 9 n.8, 12.
258 El Paso's agreement to sell 4,166,667 shares to Burlington, see id. at 3, is similar
to a "leg-up" agreement. See Bloomenthal, RICO, Pali Delicto, Deception, and the Supreme
Court, 7 Sec. & Fed. Corp. L. Rep. (Clark Boardman) 49, 54 (July-Aug. 1985); infra note
325 and accompanying text.
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sive tactics, however, could have been easily missed. 25 9 Only a
footnote in the opinion explained that the Court had granted certiorari to resolve the appellate-court controversy over defensive
tactics. 210 Moreover, the conduct in Schreiber-a bidder's
withdrawal of a hostile offer followed by a friendly offer after a
rapprochement between the bidder and target-did not squarely
pose the same legal issues that arise when a target adopts defensive measures to thwart a hostile offer. In this regard, there is
some question whether Schreiber was even the appropriate case to
resolve the controversy. An opinion that placed a number of defensive maneuvers outside the reach of federal law should have
been rendered only after briefs and arguments directly on point
were presented by parties that had a genuine stake in the outcome.

26 1

If the Court in Schreiber had not set out to resolve the controversy over defensive tactics, the opinion could have reached
the same result without grappling with the question whether misrepresentation or nondisclosure is a requisite element of manipulative conduct under section 14(e). Foremost, the Court could
have held that the defendants' activities were not manipulative
because they were not "artificial. '262 According to the Court, for
conduct to be manipulative, the price of securities must be influenced by artificial means, 263 that is, by means unrelated to the
natural forces of supply and demand. 264 The Court could have
easily ruled sua sponte that while the defendants' conduct may
have affected the price of El Paso stock, it did not do so artificially. There was no evidence in the record indicating that the
defendants' activities distorted the price of El Paso stock.2 65
Moreover, to say that there was a distortion would be tantamount
to characterizing all withdrawals and renegotiations of tender
offers as artificial practices.
In addition, if the Court had deigned to evaluate the substantive fairness of the defendants' activities and had not backed
down from its observation that one of the dictionary definitions

259
260
261
262
263
264

See Bloomenthal, supra note 258, at 53.
Schreiber, 472 U.S. at 5 n.3.
See Bloomenthal, supra note 258, at 53-54; ift/ra note 338.
See supra note 257 and accompanying text.
See supra text accompanying note 250.
Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., 669 F.2d 366, 374 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied,

455 U.S. 982 (1982).
265 See Bloomenthal, supra note 258, at 54.
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of the word "manipulation" was "management with use of unfair
methods," the Court could have concluded that the defendants'
activities were not manipulative because they were not "unfair."
Throughout the transactions at issue, the directors of El Paso
acted fairly and in the best interests of the entire body of.El Paso
shareholders. At first, the directors opposed the Burlington offer
and "shopped" the company to obtain a better offer. Then, after
these efforts were unsuccessful, the board negotiated an improved
offer with Burlington. Although this offer benefitted the shareholder-directors (because it enabled them to tender their shares)
and harmed the shareholders who had tendered in the first offer
(because their proration position was lost), the directors' actions
in negotiating this offer served an overriding interest of the corporation and protected all shareholders as a group. First, the
directors were able to obtain procedural "back-end" protections
that eliminated the offensive aspects of Burlington's initial offer.
Second, by insisting that the substituted offer be structured as a
new offer, the directors afforded the shareholders who had not
tendered in the first offer (presumably because of the board's
opposition) an opportunity to tender into the improved offer. 6
Burlington also treated the El Paso shareholders fairly. The shareholders who had tendered in the first offer had no vested right to
have their shares accepted for payment since Burlington's offer
clearly stipulated that it ould be revoked if certain bona fide
conditions occurred. Such a stipulation is common in tender offers and is not prohibited by federal or state law. Because several
of the conditions contained in Burlington's offer did occur,
Burlington's termination of the offer was not unfair to the-share267
holders who had already deposited their shares.
The true vice of Schreiber, however, was not that the Court
took on the controversy over defensive tender offer- tactics unnecessarily, but that it resolved the controversy incorrectly by misinterpreting section 14(e). The Court was on firm ground in ruling
that market manipulation is barred by section 14(e) and that market manipulation requires some form of misrepresentation or

266 See Gilbert v. El Paso Co., 575 A.2d 1131, 1148 (Del. 1990) (holding that the El
Paso directors did not breach their fiduciary duty of care and loyalty owed to El Paso
and its shareholders under Delaware law).
267 See Gilbert v. El Paso Co., 490 A.2d 1050 (Del. Ch. 1984) (holding that
Burlington's revocation of the December offer did not constitute a breach of a contractual or fiduciary obligation owed to the El Paso shareholders under state law), aft'd, 575
A.2d 1131 (Del. 1990); infra text accompanying notes 354-58.
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nondisclosure. But, the Court's conclusion that misrepresentation
or nondisclosure is a necessary element of all manipulative conduct proscribed by section 14(e) was erroneous. Congress intended section 14(e) to prohibit another species of manipulation-one
.that is not grounded in misrepresentation or a failure to disclose.
Although this prohibition does not cover the defendants' activities
in Schreiber, it does encompass many of the defensive tactics employed by targets.
(a) The Prohibition in Section 14(e) Against Market Manipulation.-Before the passage of the Exchange Act in 1934, conduct
that artificially raised or depressed the price of securities in the
trading markets was considered unlawful at common law when
the purpose of the conduct was to mislead investors as to the
true value of the securities.2 6 This conduct, called market or
price manipulation,26 9 generally consisted of the dissemination
of fictitious reports about a company's earnings 27 0 or artificial
acts of stimulative trading in a company's securities. 271 For example, wash sales (transactions in which the market operator
bought and then sold the same stock at the same price) and
matched orders (transactions in which the operator entered a buy
order knowing that a confederate was simultaneously entering a
sell order for the same stock at the same price) were usually condemned as manipulative under the common law.272 These

268 See generally Berle, Liability for Stock Market Manipulation, 31 COLUM L. REV. 264
(1931). Before the Exchange Act, the major market manipulators were groups (pools) of
speculators known as either "bears" or "bulls." Bears sold stock that they had borrowed
and then drove down the price by covertly selling large quantities of the stock (a "bear
raid") so that they could cover their short position at the artificially depressed price.
Bulls, on the other hand, made secret purchases of a single stock so as to raise its price
and then sold the stock to the public at a profit. Bulls also made profits by obtaining
control over a large part of the supply of stock (a "corner") that bears needed in order
to cover their short position. By doing this, bulls were able to force bears to buy the
stock from them at an inflated price. See Moore & Wiseman, Market Manipulation and
the Exchange Act, 2 U. CHI. L. REV. 46, 51 n.27 (1934); Poser, Stock Market Manipulation
and Corporate Control Transactions, 40 U. MIAMI L. REV. 671, 692 (1986); Comment, Market Manipulation and the Securities Exchange Act, 46 YALE L.J. 624, 626-28 (1937).
269 The word "manipulation" derives from the Latin word for "hand," manus, and
has been aptly described as "the laying of hands on the scales." L. Loss, supra note 3,
at 845.
270 See Harris v. United States, 48 F.2d 771 (9th Cir. 1931); see also Note, Regulation
of Stock Market Manipulation, 56 YALE L.J. 509, 512 (1947).
271 See United States v. Brown, 5 F. Supp. 81 (S.D.N.Y. 1933), af/'d, 79 F.2d 321 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 650 (1935); Comment, supra note 268, at 626-28.
272 See Harris v. United States, 48 F.2d 771 (9th Cir. 1931); Comment, supra note
268, at 627; Note, supra note 270, at 513. A sale and an immediate repurchase of a
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practices misinformed the public by falsifying an appearance of
market activity and by creating a price not reflective of supply
and demand.
The legislative history of the Exchange, Act indicates that
Congress intended to incorporate the common-law concept of
manipulation into the federal legislation and expand upon it so as
to beef up the attack against market manipulators.2 73 This objective was accomplished, in part, by section 9,274 which is entitled
"Prohibition Against Manipulation of Security Prices." The text of
section 9 never uses the words "manipulation" or "manipulative '2 75 but outlaws a series of deceptive practices, most of
which constituted manipulation at -common law.2 76 In addition
to wash sales and matched orders, 7 these practices include manipulation of the market by rigged prices,2 78 rumors,2 7 9 false
28 2
280
paid touts, 21 and stabilization.
or misleading statements,
security for the purpose of obtaining a higher cost basis in the security for tax purposes
has never been considered an illegal manipulative practice. Ukewise, a broker's crossing
of buy and sell orders at the same price has never been regarded as manipulative per
se. See L. LOSS, supra note 3, at 851 n.22.
273 Berle, supra note 268, at 393 (indicating that the Exchange Act created remedies
and compliance mechanisms for common law manipulation); Poser, supra note 268, at
690 (indicating that "one of the purposes of the Exchange Act was to make illegal certain stock-market practices that were then 'regarded as manipulative but were not illegal
[under the common law]").
274 15 U.S.C. § 78i (1988).
275 When referring to § 9, the House report, however, uses the phrase "manipulative
practices". See H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 10-11 (1934). Also, § 2 of the
Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78b (1988), entitled "Necessity for Regulation as Provided in
This Tide," speaks in terms of the "manipulation . . . of security prices."
276 See Poser, supra note 268, at 690-705. Section 9(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78i(e) (1988),
provides an express private remedy for investors injured by the conduct forbidden by
§ 9.
277 15 U.S.C. § 78i(a)(1) (1988). Section 9(a)(1) provides that wash sales or matched
orders are unlawful only if their purpose is to create "a false or misleading appearance
of active trading . . . or a false or misleading appearance with respect to the mirket for
any . . . security."

278 Id. § 78i(a)(2). Section 9(a)(2) makes it unlawful "[t]o effect . . . a series of transactions . . . creating actual or apparent active trading in [a] security or raising or depressing the price of [a] security, for the purpose of inducing the purchase or sale of
[the] security by others."
279 Id. § 78i(a)(3). Section 9(a)(3) makes it unlawful "to induce the purchase or sale
of [a] security . . . by the circulation or dissemination in the ordinary course of business
of information to the effect that the price of [the] security will or is likely to rise because of market operations conducted for the purpose of raising or depressing the price
of [the] security."
280 Id. § 78i(a)(4). The false or misleading statement must be made for "the purpose
of inducing the purchase or sale of [a] security."
281 Id. § 78i(a)(5). Section 9(a)(5) makes it unlawful to engage in the acts proscribed
by § 9(a)(3) (see supra note 277) for a consideration.
282 Id. § 7 8i(a)(6). Section 9(a)(6) makes it unlawful "to effect . . . a series of
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Since section 9 applies only when the proscribed activities
occur with respect to securities listed on a national securities exchange,283 Congress rounded out its attack on market manipulation in sections 10(b),284 15(c)(1), and 15(c)(2).2 85 Section 10(b)
makes it unlawful for any person to use, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security, any "manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance" in contravention of rules that the SEC may
adopt.28 6 Sections 15(c)(1) and 15(c)(2) prohibit "manipulative,"
"deceptive," and "fraudulent," conduct by broker-dealers in the
over-the-counter market. 27 Although it has been generally ac-

transactions for the purchase and/or sale of [a] security . . . for the purpose of pegging, fixing, or stabilizing the price of such security" in contravention of rules that the
SEC may adopt. Stabilization, which is the generic term, involves holding the price of a
security at a constant or predetermined level by purchasing and/or selling the security.
Stabilization has been described as "a relatively benign form of manipulation." L. Loss,
supra note 3, at 849. The SEC has adopted several rules governing stabilization during a
public distribution-rules 10b-6, 10b-7, and 10b-8, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-6 to -8 (1990).
Rule 10b-6 prohibits a person connected with a public distribution from purchasing
and/or selling the security which is the subject of the distribution unless the transaction
is made in compliance with rules 10b-7 and 10b-8. These rules were adopted primarily
under § 10(b) because § 9(a) is limited to registered securities. See L. Loss, supi-a note
3, at 862 n.82. The SEC has also addressed stabilization in the tender offer context. See
2 T. HAZEN, supra note 56, § 12.1, at 5. Rule 10b-13, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-13 (1990),
prohibits a person who makes a tender offer for an equity security from buying such
security outside the offer. In adopting rule 10b-13, the SEC stated that buying "alongside
the offer" was a manipulative practice because it could "further the tender offer by raising the market price to the point where ordinary investors sell in the market, to
arbitrageurs, who in turn tender." Adoption of Rule 10b-13, Exchange Act Release No.
8712, [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 77,745, at 83,708 (Oct. 8,
1969). Rule 10b-13 was not adopted under § 9(a)(6) but under §§ 10(b), 13(e), and
14(e). Id. at 83,709. Last, the SEC has adopted rule 10b-18, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-18
(1990), which is designed, in part, to provide a safe harbor for an issuer seeking to
stabilize the price of its common stock by repurchase programs. Rule 10b-18 does not
cover repurchases subject to rules 13e-1 or 13e-4. Id. § 240.10b-18(a)(3)(iv),(v). Rule 10b18 was adopted under §§ 9(a)(6), 10(b), and 13(e). Adoption of Safe Harbor for Purchases by an Issuer, Exchange Act Release No. 19,244, [1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH)
83,276, at 85,486 (Nov. 17, 1982).
283 15 U.S.C. § 78i(a) (1988).
284 Id. § 78j(b).
285 Section 15(c)(1) was added to the Exchange Act in 1936. Act of May 27, 1936,
ch. 462, sec. 3, § 15(c), 49 Stat. 1375, 1378 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §
78o(c)(1) (1988)). Section 15(c)(2) was added in 1938. Maloney Act, ch. 677, sec. 2, §
15(c)(2), 52 Stat. 1070, 1075 (1938) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78o(c)(2)
(1988)).
286 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1988).
287

Id. §

7

8o(c)(1)-(2). Section 15(c)(1)

makes it unlawful for any broker-dealer "to

effect any transaction, or to induce or attempt to induce the purchase or sale of, any
security . . .by means of any manipulative, deceptive, or other fraudulent device or contrivance" and gives the SEC rulemaking power to "define such devices and contrivances
as are manipulative, deceptive, or otherwise fraudulent." Section 15(c)(2) makes it unlaw-
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cepted that sections 10(b) and 15(c) were meant to cover the
market manipulation outlawed by section 9,288 neither section
10(b) nor section 15(c) delineates the intended relationship
among the words "manipulative," "deceptive," and "fraudulent" or
the type of conduct- that each word connotes. Thus, when Congress borrowed the same three words for section 14(e) of the
Williams 289
Act in 1968, it chose words that did not have an exact
meaning.
Schreiber concluded that Congress used the word "manipulative" in section 14(e) in its technical sense to refer to market
manipulation. 29" The legislative history of the Williams Act does
not explicitly confirm this conclusion, but the legislative documents do reflect congressional solicitude about the manipulation
of prices during the course of a tender offer. Senator Williams
himself declared: "Efforts are often made to influence the price of
the securities involved." 21 And Senator Williams was right. In
one takeover battle, for example, a target's defensive merger partner made open-market purchases and secret off-market sales of
the target's stock in order to make the market price of the
target's stock exceed the tender offer price and deter target shareholders from tendering their shares to the hostile offeror. 2 2 It

ful for any broker-dealer "to effect any transaction in,, or to induce or attempt to induce
the purchase or sale of, any security . . . in connection with which such broker or dealer engages in any fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative act or practice, or makes any
fictitious quotation" and gives the SEC rulemaking power to "define, and prescribe
means reasonably designed to prevent, such acts and practices as are fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative and such quotations as are fictitious."
288 See SEC v. Resch-Cassin & Co., 362 .F. Supp. 964, 975 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); L. Loss,
supra note 3, at 850, 857-59. The House report that accompanied § 10(b) indicated that
the control of manipulative practices would ensure "markets where prices may be established by the free and honest balancing of investment demand and supply." H.R. REP.
No. 1383, supra note 275, at 10. Also, the Senate report that accompanied 'an earlier
version of § 10(b) referred to the prohibition of "devices . . . employed for the purpose
of artificially raising or depressing security prices." S. REP. No. 702, 73d Cong., 2d Sess.
7 (1934).
289 Cf L. Loss, supra note 3, at 860 n.75.
290 See supra text accompanying note 250.
291 116 CONG. REc. 3024 (1970) (statement of Sen. Williams). Senator Williams made
this statement during Congress' consideration of the 1970 amendments to the Williams
Act.
292 See Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 822 (1970). The takeover battle in Crane occurred prior to the adoption
of the Williams Act. Id. at 790-802. The court held that the defendant's conduct violated
§§ 9(a)(2) and 10(b). With respect to its holding under § 10(b), the court found that
the defendant was an "insider" of the target company and that the failure to disclose its
manipulation was a deceptive act in violation of § 10(b). Id. 793-99. When an exchange
tender offer is involved, efforts are often made to increase the price of the offeror's
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seems fair to assume, therefore, that Congress intended the word
"manipulative" to take on at least its technical meaning in section
14(e). Hence, it is hard to cavil with Schreiber's observation that
section 14(e) bars market manipulation.
It is also difficult to quibble with Schreiber's conclusion that
market manipulation requires misrepresentation or nondisclosure. 293 As discussed above, market manipulation at common
law and under the Exchange Act has always involved deception,
by either false words or fictitious acts. 294 The nondisclosure
component of the Court's formulation brings manipulation by
fictitious deeds within conventional theories of fraud by requiring
proof that the deeds have not been disclosed.29 5 This aspect of
the Court's concept of market manipulation was not novel. Prior
to Schreiber, the SEC and the courts had frequently held that
when manipulation occurs as a result of stimulative trading, a
failure to disclose that the market price has been artificially inflated by the trading is deceptive.2 96 Of course, requiring proof of
nondisclosure in this situation is not particularly consequential
since, as the Court in Schreiber recognized, "nondisclosure is usual297
ly essential to the success of a manipulative scheme."

stock in order to encourage target shareholders to tender. See, e.g., Davis v. Pennzoil
Co., 437 Pa. 194, 207-08, 264 A.2d 597, 603 (1970).
293 See supra text accompanying note 246.
294 See supra text accompanying notes 268-70; see 'also Schreiber, 472 U.S. at 7 n.4.
The object of all market manipulation is to misrepresent the price of a security to the
public, and the means used to accomplish this object is misrepresentation (false words)
or nondisclosure of fictitious acts. The Schreiber Court's holding that manipulation under
§ 14(e) requires misrepresentation or nondisclosure refers to the means used and not the
object sought.
295 The Court's formulation would seem to govern all the general anti-manipulation
provisions of the Exchange Act-§§ 10(b), 14(e), and 15(c)-but not § 9, which is specific as to the elements that must be proven in order to establish a violation. For example, a party suing under § 9(a)(2) should not have to prove nondisclosure of the manipulation; proof that a false market appearance was created by trading should suffice. See
L. Loss, supra note 3, at 530 n.137.
296 See, e.g., In r Barrett & Co., 9 S.E.C. 319, 328-39 (1941); SEC v. Management
Dynamics, 515 F.2d 801, 810 (2d Cir. 1975); see also L. Loss, supra note 3, at 858 &
n.67 (citing cases).
297 Schreiber, 472 U.S. at 7 (quoting Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 477
(1977), citing 3 L. Loss, supra note 188, at 1565). In his treatise, Professor Loss actually
stated that "non-disclosure of a manipulation is usually, jf not invariably, essential to its
success." L. Loss, supra note 3, at 1565 (emphasis added).
Since Congress' ban on market manipulation in §§ 10(b) and 14(e) is universal and
since a manipulative scheme that is fully and fairly disclosed should not be capable of
manipulating the price of securities, it would seem to be a matter of semantics whether
one says that liability for market manipulation under §§ 10(b) or 14(e) is predicated on
a failure to disclose the manipulation or on the manipulative activity itself. The Schreiber

1990]

TENDER OFFERS

(b) The Prohibition in Section 14(e) Against the Manipulation of
Target Shareholders.-Despite its accurate formulation of market
manipulation, the Schreiber Court was wrong in concluding that
misrepresentation or nondisclosure is an essential ingredient of all
manipulative conduct barred by section 14(e). 29 There is material evidence in the legislative record-which the Schreiber Court
failed to take into account-indicating that section 14(e) was in-

tended to embrace another form of manipulation. This type of
manipulation, unlike market manipulation, does not require misrepresentation or nondisclosure. In testimony regarding the role
that the SEC should play in the regulation of tender offers, the
Chairman of the SEC stated:
[T]here is involved a form of industrial warfare in which the
stakes are high, and two or more groups are attempting to
manipulate the public security holder to their own advantage ....
[The SEC's] responsibility should be limited to re...
quiring appropriate disclosures, to guarding against deceptive
and unfair devices designed to coerce or prevent action, and it
should be provided with adequate tools to deal effectively with
the various techniques that have been developed, and are continuing to be devised to seek or prevent takeover bids ....

Finally, authority must be accorded to deal with the violations

Court preferred the former rhetoric and, as a consequence, opined that §§. 10(b) and
14(e) impose on every market manipulator an absolute duty to disclose the manipulation.
Some legal commentators, however, have argued (both before and after Schreiber) that
the use of the word "usually" in Santa Fe is significant and that not all manipulative
schemes require nondisclosure. See, e.g., Fiflis, supra note 256, at 315-16 (arguing that
"bear raids" and "corners" (see supra note 268) do not require deceit); Junewicz, supra
note 233, at 1184-85 (arguing that three types of manipulation proscribed by §
9-rumors, paid touts, and stabilization-do not require nondisclosure). Although it, is
curious that the Court in Santa Fe used the word "usually" rather than "always," a
scheme to manipulate security prices will not work if it is publicly disclosed. And the
examples provided by the commentators cited above are not exceptions to this rule.
"Bear raids" and "corners" are forms of price rigging that will not be successful if they
are publicly disclosed. Likewise, when market operators or paid touts spread rumors
about certain market operations in a security, the price of the security will not be affected if the motives or consequences of the manipulator's actions are fully disclosed. Finally, stabilizing purchases will not be successful in pegging the price of a security if the
public is aware of the nature of the purchases. Stabilizing, purchases are disclosed on the
ticker tape, but they are not distinguished from n6nstabilizing purchases. See L. Loss,
supra note 3, at 860.
298 But see Poser, supra note 268 (concluding that the Schreiber Court was correct in
holding that misrepresentation or nondisclosure is a necessary element of all forms of
manipulative conduct forbidden by § 14(e)).
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of these precepts-all designed to give investors the fairest
possible opportunity to make his own investment decisions.'

Although there are few certitudes, it is reasonable to infer from
these unrefuted statements that Congress intended the "manipulative acts" proscribed by section 14(e) to include unfair,
nondeceptive conduct designed to coerce or prevent the investment decisions of targ&t shareholders."' 0
This interpretation of the word "manipulative" is consistent
with the word's meaning in everyday speech and with the traditional dictionary definition referenced by the Court.30 In common parlance, we speak of the* manipulation of persons,0 2 and
especially when they are powerless to prevent it, persons can be
manipulated without being deceived. 0 3 And while the manipulation of persons was not deemed wrongful at common law, the
federal securities laws were not intended to be coextensive with
common law doctrines; rather they were enacted to rectify deficiencies in the common law by proscribing a wider range of con-'
duct.3 0 4 Furthermore, construing the word "manipulative" in section 14(e) in accordance with its vernacular usage to signify the
manipulation of target shareholders does not in any way subvert'
the word's use in section 14(e) as a technical term to connote
market manipulation. Congress was mindful that two meanings
existed, and it simply intended the word "manipulative" to take
on both meanings in section 14(e)." 5

299 House Hearings, supra note 56, at 11 (statement of Manuel F. Cohen, Chairman,
SEC).
300 Although these statements were made by the Chairman of the SEC, it seems
appropriate to assume that they express Congress' intention since at no point subsequent
to these hearings did Congress question the precepts that the statements embody. Furthermore, even though the statements do not refer to specific sections of the bills under
consideration, it seems safe to conclude that the sections of the bills directed at "requiring appropriate disclosures" became § 14(d) of the Act and that the sections of the bills
directed at preventing "deceptive and unfair practices" became § 14(e). See Data Probe
Acquisition Corp. v. Datatab, Inc., 568 F. Supp. 1538, 1545-51 (S.D.N.Y.) (contending
that Congress intended § 14(e)'s prohibition against "manipulative acts" to extend to
practices that fall short of classic market manipulation if they unduly interfere with the
tender offer process), rev'd, 722 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1052 (1984).
301 See supra text accompanying note 251.
302 Section 14(e) outlaws deceit, fraud, and manipulation, and since it is persons
who are deceived and defrauded, it seems eminently reasonable to conclude that it is
also persons who are manipulated.
303 See Fiflis, supra note 256, at 314-15.
304 See Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 389 (1983).
305 Of course, it is plausible that Congress used the word "manipulative" in § 14(e)
only in its vernacular sense, realizing that market manipulation would be proscribed as a
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Interpreting the word "manipulative" in section 14(e) in this
manner comports with the intendesd scope of the word "manipulative" in section 10(b)'s prohibition of conduct deemed by the SEC
to be a "manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance." In
1934, a spokesman for the drafters of the provision that was to
become section 10(b) indicated that the provision could be paraphrased as "[t]hou shalt not devise any other cunning devices." He
then explained that the provision was- "a catch-all clause to prevent manipulative devices."306 It is difficult to believe that a legislative spokesman would use the words "cunning" and "manipulative" synonymously and refer to the provision as a catchall clause
if market manipulation was the only manipulative device that
Congress intended the provision to address.-As a catchall clause
of a statute that sought,, as one, of its two stated purposes, "to
prevent inequitable and unfair practices," section 10(b) surely
contemplated the formulation of some standard of substantive
fairness for transactions in securities. 0 7
The conclusion that "manipulative acts" under section 14(e)
include unfair practices designed to coerce- or prevent the
decisionmaking of target shareholders is fortified by a consideration of the type of substantive conduct that Congress chose to
regulate in section 14(d). As discussed in Part I of the Article, the
substantive regulatory scheme of section 14(d), as it existed in
1968, required offerors to allow target shareholders who had tendered to withdraw their shares during the first seven calendar
days of the offer. Section 14(d) also required offerors to purchase
pro rata any shares deposited during the first ten calendar days
of the offer.' 8 Congress prescribed these specific substantive requirements to curb two unfair practices that bidders had employed prior to the adoption of the Williams Act: launching offers
of unduly short duration and accepting shares on a first-come,
first-served basis. 0' Congress maintained that these two practic§ 14(e) "deceptive" act.
306 Stock Exchange Regulation: Hearings on H.R. 7852 and H.R. 8720 Before the House
Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 115 (1934) (statement of
Thomas G. Corcoran). The Supreme Court referred to this legislative history in Ernst &
Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 202-03 (1976).
307 See Securities Exchange Act, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (1934) (indicating that the
statute is "la]n Act [t]o provide for the regulation of securities exchanges and of overthe-counter markets operating in interstate and foreign commerce and through the mails,
to prevent inequitable and unfair practices on such exchanges and markets and for other purposes").
308 See supra text accompanying notes 83-84.
309 See supra note 84; ef. supra text preceding note 96. In 1968, § 14(d)(5) (statutory
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es warranted regulation because they pressured or coerced target
shareholders to tender their shares.3 1 The term "manipulative"
naturally comes to mind when describing these practices, and no
doubt Congress viewed these practices as examples of manipulative conduct.
Section 14(d)'s specific substantive regulation of unfair, coercive practices was necessarily limited to practices that Congress
understood in 1968. Congress realized, however, that in the future bidders or targets might devise other unfair practices or
targets to distort or abort the investment decisions of target
shareholders and that some legislative action was necessary- to
prevent and guard against these unborn practices. 3 Since section 14(e) supplements section 14(d), 12 it seems entirely appropriate to assume that both the prohibition against "manipulative
acts" in section 14(e) and the 1970 amendment to section 14(e)
giving the SEC rulemaking power to define and prescribe means
reasonably designed to prevent "manipulative acts " "' were directed primarily at this concern.
Finally, the objectives of the Williams Act confirm this
Article's conclusion regarding the substantive coverage of section
14(e). Indeed, the two objectives of the Act314 demand that the
antimanipulation language in section 14(e) be construed to reach
unfair conduct that coerces or prevents the investment decisions
of target shareholders. In the first place, Congress' goal of protecting target shareholders by ensuring that they receive full and

withdrawal rights) implicitly created a minimum offering period of seven calendar days
for any-or-all offers, and § 14(d)(6) (statutory pro rata rights), by requiring a bidder to
purchase pro rata any shares deposited during the first 10 calendar days in partial offers, effectively established a minimum offering period of 10 calendar days for partial
offers. See Notice of Proposed Rule 13e-4, Exchange Act Release No. 14,234, [1977-1978
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 81,380, at 88,785 (Dec. 7, 1977); E.
ARANOW & H. EINHORN, supra note 3, at 50-52; Note, SEC Tender Offer Timing Rules:
Upsetting a Congressionally Selected Balance, 68 CORNELL L. REv. 914, 915 (1983). In 1979,
the SEC chose to attack directly the problem created by offers of short duration by
adopting rule 14e-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-1 (1990), which requires all offers to remain
open for at least 20 business days. See supra text preceding note 96.
310 Section 14(d)(7), which ensures that all tendering shareholders receive any increase in price, is not aimed at curbing coercive practices of bidders; rather, it is simply
a provision designed to achieve equal treatment of target shareholders.
311 See supra text preceding note 299 (statement of Manuel F. Cohen, Chairman,
SEC).
312 The Schreiber Court stated that § 14(e) "supplements the more precise disclosure
provisions found elsewhere in the Williams Act." Schreiber, 472 U.S. at 10-11.
313 See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
314 See supra text accompanying note 53.
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true information is substantially impaired if section 14(e) does not
ban the use of unfair practices that deny target shareholders the
opportunity to act freely, or the opportunity to act at all, on the
information that is disclosed. 15 And second, the neutral regulatory balance that Congress so assiduously sought to attain in crafting the Act is effectively dismantled if section 14(e) is endowed
with. no substantive content. As suggested above, section 14(d) is
a lopsided provision as far as the regulation of substantive conduct is- concerned. It imposes specific requirements on bidders to
ensure that target shareholders are not unfairly pressured into accepting offers, without imposing comparable strictures on the
conduct of target companies in defense. 16 Therefore, if section
14(e) does not rectify thii imbalance by guaranteeing the substantive fairness of the conduct of target management, the scales are
markedly tipped in favor of targets.
In the years after the passage of the Williams Act, target
companies did in fact devise defensive tender offer tactics that
Congress had not envisioned in 1968. Many of these tactics are
quintessential "manipulative acts" under section 14(e) because they
unfairly deprive target shareholders of an opportunity to make a
choice. For example, "lock-up" options and agreements that give a,
"white knight" the right to buy the target's unissued or treasury
shares or its "crown jewels,1 17 are manipulative per se since
their purpose is to deter competition from a hostile bidder and
coerce target shareholders to tender into an offer made by the
"white knight." 18 Likewise, other measures taken by a target's
board of directors that are designed to forestall a hostile offer-such as "poison pills," 319 "shark repellent" amendments to a
315 See Kajala, supra note 180, at 1501 (arguing that "it makes little sense for detailed information to be delivered if the shareholders are denied the opportunity to act
upon it"); Levine, Lykos & Chafetz, Application of the Federal Securities Laws to Defensive
Tactics in Control Contests, in TENDER OFFERS: DEVELOPMENTS AND COMMENTARIES 193,
205 (M. Steinberg ed. 1985) -(arguing that "there is no value in requiring that information be provided shareholders if the opportunity to use such information to make an
investment decision is precluded").316 See supra text accompanying notes 308-09.
317 "Crown jewels" are the target's most valuable assets.
318 "Lock-up" options may be granted to a "white knight" to preclude a hostile offer
from ever being launched or to defeat a hostile offer that is already outstanding.
319 In general, the term "poison pill" refers to a shareholder rights plan under which
an actual or putative target company distributes "rights" to its shareholders. A rights
plan usually contains both "flip-in" and "flip-over" provisions. The "flip-in" provision entites the target shareholders to purchase common stock of the target (at a price which
is usually one-half of the market price) if any person acquires target stock in excess of a
certain percentage of the outstanding stock or if any person makes a tender offer for
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target's bylaws that institute staggered boards or supermajority
voting requirements,3 20 sales of shares to a "white squire, ' 2 '
and acquisitions of other companies to create antitrust or regulatory roadblocks for tender offerors322-are, in general, presumptively manipulative. 23 Of course, because section 14(e) requires

the stock of the target in excess of a certain percentage. The "flip-over" provision entites the target shareholders to purchase stock of the tender offeror (at a price which is
usually one-half of the market price) if the offeror merges the target into itself in a second-step "squeeze-out" merger. The board of directors usually reserves the power to redeem the "rights."
320 A "shark repellent" amendment instituting a staggered board might provide, for
example, that only one-third of the board may be elected each year, and as a result a
hostile offeror that acquired a majority of the target's shares might have to wait for a
least three years to elect a majority of the directors. A "shark repellent" amendment
instituting supermajority voting requirements might provide, for example, that 80% of
the corporation's shareholders must approve a merger, and consequently, a hostile offeror intending to consummate a second-step "squeeze-out" merger might be unable to
obtain the required shareholder approval for the merger.
Under the corporation law of many states, the board of directors has the power to
adopt amendments to the bylaws, but there may be legal restrictions on implementing
these amendments when they require a supermajority vote of shareholders. Nonetheless,
the boards of many companies may conclude that the imperfect protection of such shark
repellent amendments is adequate to defend against an outstanding hostile offer. See 1
R. WINTER, M. STUMPF & G. HAWKINS, SHARK REPELLENTS AND GOLDEN PARACHUTES: A
HANDBOOK FOR THE PRACTITIONER § 1.4, at 11 (Supp. 1988).
321 A "white squire" is a person believed to be friendly to target management, and
the term is used in takeover jargon in contrast to a "white knight," who acquires the
target company by way of tender offer or merger.
322 See Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir. 1981) (the target acquired stores in direct competition with the tender offeror and then filed an antitrust
action to enjoin the proposed tender offer); Sidak, Antitrust Preliminary Injunctions in Hostile Tender Offers, 30 U. KAN. L. REV. 491 (1982). The target's acquisition of a company
that is in a regulated industry will create regulatory obstacles for the tender offeror because the acquisition of the target by the offeror will require the approval of a regulatory agency which will delay and perhaps even preclude the acquisition by the offeror.
323 Target companies often purchase their own securities to defeat a third-party tender offer. See supra note 105 and accompanying text. Although aware of this practice,
Congress neither explicitly outlawed nor permitted it. SEC v. Carter Hawley Hale Stores,
760 F.2d 945, 949 (9th Cir. 1985). But cf. S. REP. No. 550, supra note 5, at 5 (indicating
that Congress did not believe that issuer repurchase programs were undertaken for a
legitimate purpose if they were used by management "to preserve or strengthen control
by counteracting tender offers" or "to increase the price of the company's shares"). Publicly announced defensive open market repurchase programs, however, unfairly coerce
target shareholders to reject the hostile bid and sell in the market to the target. See
Bradley & Rosenzweig, Defensive Stock Repurchases, 99 HARV. L. REv. 1378, 1393-99, 140106 (1986). Accordingly, these defensive repurchase programs should be banned by §
14(e) as a manipulative practice in connection with a tender offer. Congress' delegation
of rulemaking power to the SEC in § 13(e) to regulate a corporation's purchase of its
own securities does not preclude the application of § 14(e) to defensive repurchases. Cf
Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra, at 1403-04 (arguing that the SEC's disclosure-oriented approach in rule 13e-l, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-1 (1990), to regulating defensive repurchases is
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that the prohibited acts occur "in connection with" a tender offer,
the section would cover a manipulative defensive measure324only if
it takes effect, or is adopted, during an outstanding offer.
Some defensive tactics are not "manipulative acts" within the
meaning of section 14(e). Defensive merger proposals, for example, are generally not manipulative because they provide target
shareholders with an additional choice. Also, "leg-up" stock options granted by a target's board to a tender offer contestant in
order to encourage competitive bidding in an auction for the
target's shares32 5 are not manipulative since they enhance the
prospects of target shareholders.12' Although the line between
manipulative and nonmanipulative defensive tactics may not always be bright, the test that Congress envisioned is plain: action
taken by a target's board in connection with a tender offer is
manipulative conduct in violation of section 14(e) if it inhibits the
fair exercise of the target shareholders' right to make a choice.
C.

The Validity of Defensive Tactics After Schreiber

By cutting back the substantive coverage of the Williams Act,
Schreiber continued the erosion of the Act that Piper had started.
In Piper, the Burger Court trimmed both the class of parties that
could sue under the Act and the remedies that were available

inadequate and that the SEC should prescribe means for preventing the substantial pressure that publicly announced defensive open market repurchases exert on target shareholders).
324 For example, a "shark repellent" bylaw provision that is adopted by a putative
target company before a tender offer is launched would not be covered by § 14(e). It
should be noted, however, that the SEC believes that § 14(e) applies whenever a bidder
takes "substantial steps" to commence a tender offer. See rule 14e-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e3 (1990). A "flip-over" provision of a "poison pill" (see supra note 319) that is adopted
before a tender offer is commenced (and which necessarily takes effect after the offer is
terminated) may be covered by § 14(e) if it can be shown that the offeror requested the
target's board to redeem the "poison pill" and the board refused. The failure of the
board to redeem is a "manipulative" act within the meaning of § 14(e).
325 A "leg-up" stock option refers to an option to purchase target shares equal to
15% to 20% of the number of shares outstanding. This type of option provides a sufficient incentive to attract a bidder because it not only. gives the bidder a "leg up" but
also it allows the bidder to purchase a sizable block of stock which can usually be sold
at a profit to cover costs in the event that the offer does not succeed. A "lock-up" option, howeyer, might give a "white knight" the right to purchase target shares equal to
100% to 200% of the number of shares outstanding, thereby assuring the "white knight"
enough votes to block a second-step "squeeze-out" merger by a hostile bidder.
326 If "leg-up" stock options had existed in 1968, the Williams Act Congress would
certainly have found them acceptable. The legislative history clearly indicates that Congress did not want to deny shareholders the opportunities that result from competitive
bidding for the targees stock. See supra note 48.
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when suit was permissible; then in Schreiber, the Burger Court
severely limited the grounds for suit. Most important, Schreiber
ruled out the possibility of challenging the validity of defensive
tactics under the Act. As a result of this vacuum created by
Schreiber at the federal level, parties aggrieved by the defensive
actions taken by a target company to resist a hostile offer have
been forced to turn exclusively to state law.
Both before and after Schreiber, the judiciary has been willing
to entertain suits questioning the legality of defensive measures
under state law.32 7 In general, these suits have been based on
allegations that the directors of the target company, in adopting
defensive strategies, breached their fiduciary duties of care or
loyalty owed to the corporation and its shareholders under state
corporation law. 328 Instituted by offeror-shareholders

or other

shareholders of the target company, these actions have sought to
enjoin the defenses or to impose
liability for damages upon the
29
directors who adopted them.
Prior to Schreiber, state-law litigation challenging the decisions
made by the board of directors of the target company in responding to a hostile offer was usually unsuccessful. After a nominal
scrutiny of the record, the courts held that the plaintiffs had not
produced sufficient evidence to overcome the protections and
presumption of the so-called business judgment rule.'33 Under

327 See D. BLOCK, N. BARTON & S. RADIN, THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE, app. A at
627-41 (3d ed. 1989) [hereinafter BLOCK, BARTON & RADIN] (citing all cases in which the
validity of defensive tactics have been challenged under state law).
328 See cases cited in id.; cf. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, 506
A.2d 173, 179 (Del. 1986) (indicating that the fiduciary duties of care and loyalty in
Delaware are "the bedrock of [the] law regarding corporate takeover issues"). The duty
of care "refers to the responsibility of a corporate fiduciary to exercise, in the performance of his tasks,

the care that a reasonably prudent person in a similar position

would use under similar circumstances." Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace, Inc., 744 F.2d
255, 264 (2d Cir. 1984). The duty of loyalty is "transgressed when a corporate fiduciary . . . uses his or her corporate office . . . to promote, advance or effectuate a transaction between the corporation and such person . . . and that transaction is not substan-

tively fair to the corporation." Solash v. Telex Corp., [1987-1988 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 93,608, at 97,727 (Del. Ch. 1988). The duties of care and loyalty
are based on common-law principles, but today most states impose these duties by statute. See BLOCK, BARTON & RADIN, supra note 327, at 2, app. C at 653-71 (selected state

statutes imposing a duty of care), app. E at 691-715 (selected state statutes imposing a
duty of loyalty). The governing law is the law of the state where the target company is
incorporated. See id. at 2 (citing cases).
329

See cases cited in BLOCK, BARTON & RADIN, supra note 327, at 627-41.

330 See, e.g., Jewel Cos. v. Pay Less Drug Stores Northwest, 741 F.2d 1555 (9th Cir.
1984); Gearhart Indus. v. Smith Int'l, Inc., 741 F.2d 707 (5th Cir. 1984); Buffalo Forge
Co. v. Ogden Corp., 717 F.2d 757 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1081 (1983); Panter v.
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this common-law rule, a court will not evaluate the wisdom or
fairness of a decision of the directors unless the plaintiff is able
to come forward with 'evidence demonstrating that the directors
did not follow a deliberative process in reaching the decision or
that the decision was made by a predominately interested board
with an interest in the decision adverse to the corporation.3 31 In
other words, the business judgment rule creates a presumption
that directors have acted with due care and undivided loyalty in
making a business decision, and, as such, the rule is a tool of judicial review. 3 2
As the efficacy of federal review of defensive measures was
waning, the judiciary began to recognize that the standard of
review under state law was too lax; and after Schreiber sounded
the death knell for federal review, judicial recognition of the inadequacy of state law intensified. In the main, the courts realized
that sometimes directors do not carefully evaluate all relevant
information in adopting a defensive strategy or that directors may
resist a hostile offer in order to entrench themselves in office.
Because of this omnipresent specter of ill-conceived or self-interested defensive tactics, the courts concluded that, the business
judgment rule, as it had been applied, afforded directors too
much latitude in devising strategies to resist unfriendly advances.
As a consequence, courts have modified the manner in which
they apply the business judgment rule in corporate control transactions.3 3 There is no general accord, however, on what modifi-

Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981);
Treadway Cos. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357 (2d Cir. 1980); Crouse-Hinds Co. v.
InterNorth, Inc., 634 F.2d 690 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 999 (1981). It should
be recalled, however, that in suits challenging the validity of defensive tactics under §
14(e) prior to Sante Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977), the federal courts
ruled-without mentioning the business judgment rule-that the directors' adoption of a
defensive tactic for no valid business purpose was a breach of fiduciary duty under state
law and that this fiduciary misconduct translated into a violation of § 14(e). See supra
text accompanying note 222.
331 See generally BLOCK, BARTON & RADIN, supra note 327, at 1-90 (discussing the
business judgment rule and its relationship to the duty of care and duty of loyalty). The
business judgment rule, which recognizes that courts have limited competence to assess
business decisions, is a nonstatutory equitable doctrine that is applied by the courts on a
case-by-case basis.
332 See id. at 2-3, 8-10.
333 See Brennan, New Cases on the Business Judgment Rule: Defending Defensive Tactics
Becomes More Difficult, 14 SEC. REG. LJ. 245 (1986); Veasey, Further Reflections on Court
Review of Judgments of Directors: Is the Judicial Process Under Control?, 40 Bus. LAw. 1373
(1985); Wander & LeCoque, Boardroom Jitters: Corporate Control Transactions and Today's
Business Judgment Rule, 42 BUs. LAw. 29 (1986); Note, Corporate Auctions and Directors'
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cations are appropriate."' Significantly, the Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit, applying New York law, and the Supreme
Court of Delaware are in disagreement over the proper approach. 3 5
The Second Circuit continues to adhere to the traditional
business judgment rule but has relaxed the plaintiffs burden in
rebutting the presumption of the rule. The court scrutinizes the
record more closely for evidence indicating that the directors
were not fully informed or that they were acting primarily in
their own interests. And if the court is satisfied that there is sufficient evidence suggesting fiduciary misconduct, the burden shifts
to the directors to justify the wisdom or fairness of their actions.
As a practical matter, directors have been hard-pressed to justify
their actions under this rigorous standard of review. Therefore,
whenever a court invokes this
standard, the plaintiff is usually
33 6
granted the requested relief.

Fiduciaiy Duties: A Third-Generation Business Judgment Rule, 87 MICH. L. REv. 276 (1988).
Legal commentators disagree on whether the common-law business judgment rule has
been strained by its application in the takeover context or whether it has been resilient.
Compare Brennan, supra (arguing that the business judgment rule is being used by default) with Veasey, supra (arguing that the business judgment rule consistently leads to
logical and enduring answers).
334 See Wander & LeCoque, supra note 333, at 31-38.
335 The Second Circuit and the Supreme Court of Delaware also differ on the standard of culpability-ordinary negligence or gross negligence-required for the grant of
equitable relief in suits alleging a breach of the duty of care. In Hanson Trust PLC v.
ML SCM Aquisition, Inc., 781 F.2d 264, 275 (2d Cir. 1986), the Second Circuit, applying
New York law, ruled that directorial conduct that "did not rise to the level of gross
negligence" still constituted a breach of the duty of care for purposes of injunctive relief. In contrast, in Moran v. Household Int'l Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1356 (Del. 1985)-a
suit also seeking injunctive relief-the Supreme Court of Delaware utilized gross negligence as the standard of culpability. Controversy regarding the standard of culpability
required for the imposition of liability for damages for a breach of the duty of care has
been partially mooted by the enactment in Delaware, New York, and 36 other states of
provisions authorizing the adoption by shareholders of charter provisions eliminating or
limiting the liability of directors (but not officers) for damages for breaches of the duty
of care. All of these statutory provisions have been enacted since 1985. See BLOCK,
BARTON & RADIN, supra note 327, at 40-48, app. D at 673-88 (citing all such statutes
and setting forth selected provisions); see also Veasey, Finkelstein & Bigler, Delaware Supports Directors with a Three-Legged Stool of Limited Liability, Indemnification, and Insurance, 42
Bus. LAW. 399 (1987).
336 See Hanson Trust, 781 F.2d at 272 (2d Cir. 1986) (granting a preliminary injunction after stating that "the district court erred in holding that [the plaintiff] failed to
make a prima facie showing of a breach of a fiduciary duty [of care]" and that "once
the burden shifted, the extensive evidence presented . . . clearly show[ed] that . . . the
[directors] did not sustain their burden justifying the fairness of the lock-up option");
Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace, Inc., 744 F.2d 255, 265 (2d Cir. 1984) (granting a preliminary injunction after stating that "once self-dealing . . . is demonstrated, the duty of
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Cognizant that there is a fundamental tension between the
lenient business judgment rule and the stringent wisdom-or-fairness test and that a choice of either standard in reviewing the
conduct of directors is frequently determinative of the outcome of
the litigation, the Delaware Supreme Court announced in 1985
that it would apply an intermediate form of review in suits challenging the directors' adoption of a defensive measure."' This
new standard places the initial burden on the directors to prove
(1) that they had "reasonable grounds for believing that a danger
to corporate policy and effectiveness existed,"' a burden that can
be sustained by a showing of good faith and reasonable investigation, and (2) that the defensive measure adopted by the board
was "reasonable in relation to the threat posed.""3 ' Once the
court is satisfied that the directors have fulfilled their basic duties
of care and loyalty under this test, the directors are entitled to
the normal protections of the business judgment rule.33 9 Al-

loyalty supersedes the duty of care, and the burden shifts to the directors to [prove the
fairness of "white squire" stock transactions]" and that "[ilnthis case, the evidence adduced was more than adequate to constitute a prima facie showing of self-interest" and
the directors "failed to demonstrate [that their actions were fair]"). California seems to
follow the approach taken by the Second Circuit. See Heckmann v. Ahmanson, 168 Cal.
App. 3d 119, 128, 214 Cal. Rptr. 177, 183 (1985) (ruling that evidence of an effort by
the board to retain control is sufficient to shift the burden to the directors to demonstrate the inherent fairness of the transaction).
337 See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985); see also
Gilson & Kraakman, Delaware'sIntermediate Standardfor Defensive Tactics: Is There Substance
to ProportionalityReview?, 44 BUs. LAW. 247, 248, 250 (1989) (stating that "[t]he evolutionary trajectory of [the] proportionality test is far from certain" but that Delaware adopted
the test because of "[a]n outpouring of academic commentary call[ing] for constraints on
defensive tactics" and because "it even appeared possible that Congress might act to
displace state law-especially Delaware law-that was unduly favorable to target management").
338 Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955. In litigation stemming from the Schreiber case, Gilbert v.
El Paso Co., 575 A.2d 1131 (Del. 1990), the Supreme Court of Delaware applied the
Unocal test. Delaware's Unocal test has been relied upon by courts construing the law of
other states. See, e.g., International Ins. Co. v. Johns, 874 F.2d 1447, 1458-59 (11th Cir.
1989) (Florida law); Amanda Acquisition Corp. v. Universal Foods Corp., 708 F. Supp.
984, 1009 (E.D. Wis.), aJJd on other grounds, 877 F.2d 496 (7th Cir. 1989) (Wisconsin
law); Torchmark Corp. v. Bixby, 708 F. Supp. 1070, 1081 (W.D. Mo. 1988) (Missouri
-law); Gelco Corp. v. Coniston Partners, 652.F. Supp. 829, 845 (D. Minn. 1986), affd on
other grounds, 811 F.2d 414 (8th Cir. 1987) (Minnesota law). But see A. Copeland Enters.
v. Guste, 706 F. Supp. 1283, 1290 n.15 (W.D. Tex. 1989) (distinguishing Unocal from
Texas law). Some states, such as Indiana and Ohio, have enacted legislation that specifically rejects the Unocal test, and therefore the ordinary business judgment rule is used in
the corporate control context. See IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-35-1(f) (West Supp. 1990);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.59(C)(1) (Anderson Supp. 1990).
339 Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1288 (Del. 1989). Once
the directors receive the benefit of the business judgment rule, the burden shifts to the
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though Delaware's refinement of the business judgment rule eliminates the blanket protection of defensive tactics that generally existed under prior Delaware law, 4 ' it does not foreclose the
adoption of defensive maneuvers that have a coercive or preclusive effect on shareholder choice. 4
plaintiffs who have the ultimate burden of persuasion to show a breach of fiduciary
duty. Moran v. Household Int'l, 500 A.2d 1346, 1356 (Del. 1985). If the directors do not
satisfy both prongs of the Unocal test, the directors lose the benefit of the business judgment rule, and they must demonstrate the fairness of the transaction. Macmillan, 559
A.2d at 1280. Since the plaintiff must only demonstrate a reasonable probability of success on the merits in suits seeking a preliminary injunction, a failure of the directors to
satisfy both prongs of the Unocal test usually means that the plaintiff will be able to
demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on the merits and that the injunction
will be granted. See AC Acquisitions Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103,
114-15 (Del. Ch. 1986).
340 See Macmillan, 559 A.2d at 1261 (granting preliminary injunctive relief invalidating
a "lock-up" option after having found a breach of the duties of care and loyalty);
Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986) (same).
341 See Paramount Communications v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1990) (denying a request to enjoin several preclusive defensive measures having found that the measures were a reasonable and proportionate response to a perceived threat); Moran v.
Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985) (denying a request to enjoin a "poison
pill" having found that its adoption was a reasonable and proportionate response to a
perceived threat, but indicating that if the directors subsequently refused a request to
redeem the "poison pill," their refusal would be subject to review under the same standard that was applied in evaluating the propriety of adoption). But see Dynamics Corp.
of Am. v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250 (7th Cir. 1986) (granting a preliminary injunction
against a "poison pill" under Indiana law, after indicating that Indiana would apply
Delaware's Unocal test [that is, until the Indiana legislature specifically rejected it, see
supra note 338]), revzd on other grounds, 481 U.S. 69 (1987).
In a line of cases decided after the Delaware Supreme Court's decision in Unocal,
the court fleshed out the director's Unocal duties in responding to a hostile offer. First,
directors may refuse to entertain an offer (the so-called "Just Say No" defense).
Macmillan, 559 A.2d at 1285. Second, in determining whether a hostile offer poses a
threat to corporate policy and effectiveness so that a defensive measure may be adopted,
the directors may take into account the coercion from a two-tier offer, an inadequate
price, shareholder confusion, loss of strategic benefits, and the uncertain aspects of the
offer. Time, 571 A.2d at 1152-53. Third, while there is no per se duty to maximize
shareholder value in the short term, once a break-up of the target company is inevitable,
the directors have a duty either to auction the company or to maximize short-term
shareholder value (the so-called "Revlon duties"). Revlon, 506 A.2d at 184-85. Last, once
the target is in a "Revlon mode," the directors may treat one or more of the bidders on
unequal terms as long as they properly perceive that shareholders' interests are enhanced
by this disparate treatment. Macmillan, 559 A.2d at 1288. For a discussion of the relationship among Time, Unocal, and Revlon, see generally Johnsoft & Millon, The Case Beyond Time, 45 Bus. LAW. 2105 (1990) (observing that Time may signal the demise of
Unocal and raises questions about the "normative basis" of Revlon). For a differing view,
see Note, Time and Time Again the Board is Paramount: The Evolution of the Unocal Standard and the Revlon Trigger Through Paramount v. Time, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 159
1990) (concluding that, after Time, Unocal and Revlon are alive and well but appropriately limited to a non-substantive, threshold test application for determining the applicability
of the business judgment rule).
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The courts' efforts in tailoring the business judgment rule to
the corporate control context have not been in vain, since most
of the commonly employed defensive tactics have been challenged
under state law in the postSchreiber era. Yet, except for the consistent validation of "leg-up" stock options,34 2 a consensus has
hot been reached on which defenses are legal and which are not.
For example, "lock-up" options, "poison pills," "shark repellent"
bylaw provisions, and "white squire" stock transactions have withstood judicial examination in some cases and have been enjoined
in others.3 43
D. The Validity of Offensive Strategies After Schreiber
The courts, the SEG, and commentators have recognized that
bidders often structure their tender offers so that target shareholders are 'unfairly coerced to tender their shares.34 4 And there
is no gainsaying that target companies adopt coercive and preclusive defensive tactics in many takeover battles primarily to counteract these structurally coercive offers. 45 The prototype of a
342 See, e.g., Buffalo Forge Co. v. Ogden Corp., 717 F.2d 757 (2d Cir.), affg 555 F.
Supp. 892 (W.D.N.Y.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1018 (1983); Hastings-Murtagh v. Texas Air
Corp., 649 F. Supp. 479 (S.D. Fla. 1986).
343 Defensive tactics have been declared valid in, Cottle v. Storer Communication,
849 F.2d 570 (11th Cir. 1988) ("lock-up" option); Treco, Inc. v. Land of Lincoln Say. &
Loan, 749 F.2d 374 (7th Cir. 1984) ("shark repellent", pre.Schreiber); Desert Partners v.
USG Corp., 686 F. Supp. 1289 (N.D. II. 1988) ("poison pill"); CRTF Corp. v. Federated
Dep't Stores, 683 F. Supp. 422 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) ("poison pill"); Shamrock Holdings v.
Polaroid Corp., 559 A.2d 278 (Del. Ch. 1989) ("white squire" transaction); Moran v.
Household Int'l, 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985) ("poison pill"). Defensive tactics have been
enjoined in, Dynamics, 794 F.2d 250 ("poison pill"); Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition, Inc., 781 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1986) ("lock-up" option); Norlin v. Rooney, Pace,
Inc., 744 F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1984) ("white squire" transaction, pre-Schreiber); Buckhorn, Inc. v.
Ropak Corp., 656 F. Supp. 209 (S.D. Ohio), a~fd mem., 815 F.2d 76 (6th Cir. 1987)
("white squire" transaction); R.D. Smith & Co. v. Preway Inc., 644 F. Supp. 868 (W.D.
Wis. 1986) ("poison pill"); Macmillan, 559 A.2d 1261 ("lock-up" option); Revlon, 506 A.2d
173 ("lock-up" option); Datapoint Corp. v. Plaza Sec. Co., 496 A.2d 1031 (Del. 1985)
("shark repellent"); Blasins Indus. v. Atlas Corp., [1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH)
93,965 (Del. Ch. July 25, 1988) ("shark repellent").
344 See, e.g., Paramount Communications v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1152 (Del.
1990); Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1357 (Del. 1985); Unocal Corp. v.
Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 956 (Del. 1985); City Capital Assocs. v. Interco, Inc.,
551 A.2d 787, 797 (Del. Ch.), appeal dismissed, 556 A.2d 1070 (Del. 1988); Eisenberg v.
Chicago Milwaukee Corp., 537 A.2d 1051, 1056 (Del. Ch. 1987); Notice of Possible Action Regarding Two-Tier Tender Offer Pricing and Non-Tender Offer Purchase Programs,
Exchange Act Release No. 21,079, [1984 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
83,637, at 86,916-18 (June 21, 1984); Bebchuk, The Pressure to Tender. An Analysis and a
Proposed Remedy, 12 DEL. J. CORP. L. 911, 911 n.1 (1987) (citing articles by practicing
lawyers, legal academics, and economists that discuss the problem); cf. infra note 454.
345 See Lipton, Corporate Governance in the Age of Finance Corporatism, 136 U. PA. L.
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structurally coercive offer is the front-end loaded, two-tier offer. 46 The terms of such an offer provide that target shareholders who do not tender into the front-end tender offer will be
squeezed out in the back-end merger at a lower price. Rational
target shareholders faced with this type of offer are pressured to
tender even if they believe that the tender offer price is inadequate. 47 Because of its coercive effect on shareholder
decisionmaking, should be barred by section 14(e) of the Williams
Act as a front-end loaded offer as a manipulative tender offer
practice. As was the case with defensive tactics, however, Schrieber
foreclosed this argument since the terms of a front-end loaded
offer are fully and fairly disclosed. 4' And unlike defensive tactics, a front-end loaded offer cannot be challenged under the
state law pertaining to misconduct by a corporate fiduciary, because at the time such an offer is made the bidder does not have
a fiduciary relationship (as a controlling shareholder) with the
target company or its shareholders. 349 Moreover, if the tender
offer is successful in producing control so that the back-end merger can be consummated, the lot of the minority shareholders who
are squeezed out in the merger is not a happy one. In light of
the Supreme Court's opinion in Santa Fe, the substantive fairness
of the merger cannot be questioned under the federal securities
laws. An appraisal remedy based on the market price of the
target's shares before the offer may be the minority shareholders'
exclusive remedy under state law."5 °

REV. 1, 28 (1987) (arguing that although defensive tactics limit the investment choices of
target shareholders and "may be undesirable in the abstract," they are nonetheless "legitimate responses to abusive takeover schemes").
346 Cf Bebchuk, Toward Undistorted Choice and Equal Treatment in Coporate Takeovers,
98 HARv. L. REv. 1695, 1717-35 (1985) (arguing that partial offers and any-or-all offers
without a squeeze-out commitment have the same coercive effect on shareholder choice
as front-end loaded, two-tier offers).
347 See Comment, Judicial Review of Antitakeover Devices Employed in the Noncoercive
Tender Offer Context: Making Sense of the Unocal Test, 138 U. PA. L. REv. 225, 228 n.20
(1989).
348 See Radol v. Thomas, 772 F.2d 244, 255 (6th Cir. 1985) (holding, in reliance on
Schreiber, that a front-end loaded, two-tier offer was not "manipulative" within the meaning of § 14(e)), cert. denied, 977 U.S. 903 (1986); see also Martin Marietta Corp. v. Bendix
Corp., 549 F. Supp. 623 (D. Md. 1982) (pre-Schreiber case holding, in reliance on Piper
and Santa Fe, that a front-end loaded, two-tier "Pac-Mah" defensive offer was not "manipulative" within the meaning of § 14(e)).
349 See Osofsky v. J. Ray McDermott & Co., 725 F.2d 1057, 1060 (2d Cir. 1984);
Gilbert v. El Paso Co., 490 A.2d 1050, 1055-56 (Del. Ch. 1984), affid, 575 A.2d 1131
(Del. 1990); Weiss, supra note 233, at 1108.
350 See supra text accompanying notes 227-31; Bebchuk, supra note 344, at 917-18;
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Bidders have also been able to facilitate the success of their
takeover attempts by revoking an initial tender offer and then
launching a second tender offer on different terms (as Burlington
did in its takeover of El Paso) 51 or "sweeping the street"
through privately negotiated or open market purchases.3 52 A
bidder's revocation of a tender offer is not a "manipulative" act
within the meaning of section 14(e). It does not unfairly coerce
or prevent the investment decisions of target shareholders, and as
Schreiber correctly held, it is not an artificial practice designed to
deceive target shareholders. But as the appellate court opinion in
the Schreiber litigation suggested, a withdrawal of a tender offer
may constitute a breach of contract that is actionable by target
shareholders who tendered into the offer before it was withdrawn. 5 3
The law governing the contractual rights and obligations of a
tender offeror and target shareholders is a blend of state contract
law and Williams Act corporation law and can be summarized as
follows: 5 4 A tender offer is usually an offer for a unilateral conLipton, supra note 345, at 18-19; cf supra note 231.
351 See supra text following note 239.
352 "Street sweeps" are possible in this situation because the market dynamics that
result from the announcement of the initial tender offer allow arbitrageurs and brokerdealers to assemble large blocks of the target's stock which the bidder then purchases
immediately after it revokes the tender offer. (While the offer, is still open, rule 10b-13,
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-13 (1990), prohibits the bidder from purchasing the target's stock
outside the offer. See supra note 282.) Hanson Trust used this strategy in its takeover of
SCM Corporation in 1985. Hanson Trust- PLC v. SCM Corp., 774 F.2d 47, 50-53 (2d
Cir. 1985). In Hanson Trust, the court ruled that Hanson Trust's acquisition of 25% of
SCM Corporation's stock through five private purchases from sophisticated professionals
and one open market purchase, within hours after it had revoked its earlier tender offer
for any or all of SCM Corporation's stock, did not amount to a new tender offer or a
continuation of the one it had withdrawn. Hence, the court held that Hanson Trust's
privately negotiated and open market purchases were not subject to the tender offer
provisions of the Williams Act. Id. at 57. Troubled by the decision in Hanson Trust, the
SEC published for comment a proposed rule that prohibits substantial "street sweeps" by
a bidder for 30 business days after a tender offer is revoked. See Proposed Rule Regarding Acquisitions of Substantial Amounts of Securitie During and Following a Tender Offer, Exchange Act Release No. 24,976, [1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1
84,160 (Oct. 1, 1987). The proposed rule has never been adopted. For a discussion of
the issue by legal commentators, see Andre, Unconventional Offers Under the Williams Act:
The Case forJudidal Restraint, 11 J. CORP. L. 499 (1986); Segre, Open-Market and Privately
Negotiated Purchase Programs and the Market for Coyporate Control, 42 Bus. LAW. 715
(1987); Tyson, The Williams Act After Hanson Trust v. SCM Corporation: Post-Tender Offer
Purchases by the Tender Offer, 61 TUL. L. REV. 1 (1986); Note, Proposed SEC Regulation of
Market Sweeps: Should Market Sweeps Be Governed by the Williams Act?, 56 FORDHAM L.
REV. 797 (1988); Note, Post-Tender Offer Purchases: Rebalancing the Scales, 65 TEX. L. REV.
185 (1986).
353 See 'supra text accompanying note 244.
354 Cf DeMott, Current Issues in Tender Offer Regulation: Lessons from the British, 58
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tract which target shareholders can accept by tendering their
shares. 355 Therefore, a mutually enforceable contract is formed
at the time of tender. Yet, by dint of their withdrawal rights under the Williams Act, target shareholders have an absolute right
to rescind this contract during the withdrawal period specified in
the Act or by SEC rule. 56 Although the bidder does not have a
corresponding right to undo the tender offer contract, the
bidder's obligation under the contract may be extinguished as a
matter of basic contract law if the offer provides that the dbligation to purchase tendered shares will be discharged upon the
happening of a future event (over which the bidder has no control) and that event does in fact take place."' 7 In practice, most

N.Y.U. L. REV. 945, 970 (1983) (pointing out that a tension exists between the traditional common law of contracts and the Williams Act provisions).
355 Lowenschuss v. Kane, 520 F.2d 255, 264 (2d Cir. 1975); Gilbert v. El Paso Co.,
490 A.2d 1050, 1054 (Del. Ch. 1984), aff'd, 575 A.2d 1131 (Del. 1990). But see
Lowenstein, supra note 210, at 498 & n.34 (suggesting that the contract between the
bidder and a tendering target shareholder is analogous to an "at-will" contract that may
be terminated by either party at any time without liability). It should also be noted that
section 14(d) of the Williams Act contemplates that a bidder, instead of making a tender
offer, may make" "a request or invitation for tenders." If the bidder proceeds in this
fashion, it is arguable that the bidder is not an "offeror" under basic contract law and
that the bidder must accept the tenders by target shareholders for a contract to be
formed. But see Lowenschuss, 520 F.2d at 265 n.9 (rejecting the suggestion of the district
court that a tender offer is an "offer for an offer").
356 See Proposed Tender Offer Rule and Schedule, Exchange Act Release No. 15,548,
supra note 56, at 81,228 n.87 (citing E. ARANOW & H. EINHORN, supra note 3, at 134).
The right of target shareholders to rescind the contract does not cause their acceptances
to be considered "illusory," and the bidder's duty to perform under the contract,
therefore, is not affected by the existence of this right.
357 See Lowenschuss v. Kane, 520 F.2d at 264-65; Gilbert, 490 A.2d at 1054, affid, 575
A.2d 1131 (Del. 1990). A bidder's obligation under the contract would be partially discharged, for example, if the offer provided that the bidder was not willing to purchase
more than a certain number of shares and more than that number was tendered. An
offer may also provide that the bidder's obligation under the contract will not mature if
a certain event (such as the deposit of a minimum number of shares) does not occur. If
the offer is made conditional but none of the conditions occur, the bidder presumably
may still withdraw the offer as to shareholders who have not yet tendered. If the bidder
intends to go through with the offer, however, it must keep the offer open for at least
20 business days. See rule 14e-l(a), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-l(a) (1990) (establishing the minimum offering period for third-party offers); rule 13e-4(f), 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-4(0(1)
(establishing the minimum offering period for issuer offers); supra text accompanying
notes 96 & 106-08. Rule 13e-4 acknowledges that offers may be "withdrawn," but rule
14e-1 curiously does not.
Prior to 1986, the SEC's approach to tender offer regulation was generally consistent with the preceding explanation. Significantly, the SEC took the position that if the
terms of an offer "permit[ted] the bidder to unilaterally terminate [the] offer," the bidder was allowed to decrease the consideration offered or the amount of securities sought
upon returning all tendered shares and commencing a new offer. Proposed Amendments
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tender offers contain such an "out" clause, and the bidder reserves the right to revoke the offer (as Burlington did) if any of
the "conditions out" occur.35 8
E. The Validity of the SEC's Tender Offer Rules After Schreiber
The Supreme Court in Schreiber stressed that all three species
of tender offer misconduct outlawed by section 14(e)-fraudulent,
deceptive, and manipulative practices-required some element of
misrepresentation or nondiscldsure.35 9 The Court was also insistent about the significance of the 1970 amendment to section
14(e), which gave the SEC authority to define practices forbidden
by section 14(e) and prescribe means reasonably designed to prevent them.3 60 The Court emphasized that this amendment suggested no change in the meaning of the words "fraudulent," "deceptive," or "manipulative" and, therefore, SEC prophylactic
rulemaking under section 14(e) was limited to guarding against
conduct that involved misrepresentation or nondisclosure.3 6 1
The Court was not as unequivocal about the scope of the SEC's
prophylactic rulemaking power under section 13(e) and actually
expressed facially conflicting thoughts regarding the legislative
purpose of the provision.
But since section 13(e) and section
14(e) contain virtually identical language, it seems appropriate, on
balance, to conclude that the Court believed that the SEC's

Regarding Equal Treatment of Target Shareholders, Exchange Act Release No. 22,198,
supra note 86, at 87,563 & n.16. In 1986, when withdrawal rights were extended to the
life of the offer, the SEC reversed its position and indicated that a bidder could decrease the consideration offered or the percentage of securities sought without commencing a new offer. Adoption of All-Holders and Best-Price Rule, Exchange Act Release No.
23,421, supra note 83, at 88,187; see also supra note 87. This position suggests that a
contract is not formed until the expiration of the tender offer; and if the formation of
the tender offer contract occurs at expiration, withdrawal rights add nothing to the
rights target shareholders already have under contract law. If a bidder decreases the
price of an offer and. shareholders do not have statutory withdrawal rights (because the
securities sought in the offer are not registered equity securities), are the shareholders
who tendered before the decrease in price still contractually bound to sell their shares?
358 See supra note 240 and accompanying text.
359 See supra note 253 and accompanying text.
360 See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
361 Schreiber, 472 U.S. at 11 n.11. The Court only stated that the 1970 amendment
to § 14(e) suggested no change in the meaning of the word "manipulative," but it seems
certain that the Court also believed that the amendment was meant to effect no change
in the meaning of the words "fraudulent" or "deceptive." Cf United States v. Chestman,
903 F.2d 75,'86 (2d Cir.) (Mahoney, J.), affid on rehearing, No. 89-1276, 1990 US App
LEXIS 18175 (2d Cir. 1990) (LEXIS, Genfed library, US App file) (en banc).
362 See supra note 256; supra text accompanying note 255.
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rulemaking power under section 13(e) was subject to the same
limitation as the SEC's rulemaking power under section 14(e). 3 '
As discussed in Part I of this Article, the SEC has promulgated numerous tender offer rules pursuant to its authority under
sections 14(e) and 13(e). These rules are somewhat disappointing
because they fail to define specifically the practices for which the
prophylactic measures are designed, and they never indicate which
species of misconduct is at issue. 64 Nonetheless, when the rules
are parsed, it becomes apparent that they seek to prevent not
only practices that involve misrepresentation or nondisclosure but
also practices that involve unfair coercion or unequal treatment of
target shareholders. As this Article has argued, Congress meant
section 14(e) to prohibit both deceptive conduct and
nondeceptive unfair conduct. Thus, the SEC's prophylactic rules
guarding against both types of conduct are consistent with
Congress' intent.3 65 But in light of Schreiber, the judiciary would

363 See Fiflis, supra note 256, at 324 ("[L]ower courts certainly should interpret section 13(e)'s language consistently with section 14(e)'s identical language.").
364 See Swanson, Federal Regulation of Issuer Tender Offers, 12 PAC. L.J. 659, 671
(1981) (suggesting that the current definitions in rule 13e-4 are circular and that the
SEC should have defined the words "fraudulent," "deceptive," and "manipulative" by
giving specific examples). Rule 13e-4, as proposed in 1977, did define five specific tender
offer practices that were "fraudulent," "deceptive," or "manipulative." See 42 Fed. Reg.
63,069 (Dec. 7, 1977). Two years later, the SEC eliminated these specific definitions in
the final version of the rule in order "to obviate concern as to whether the [SEC] had
intended to introduce unfamiliar concepts of fraud, deceit and manipulation" and defined the words "fraudulent," "deceptive," and "manipulative" in more general, traditional
terms as it had done in rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1990). Adoption of Rules Regarding Tender Offers by Issuers, Exchange Act Release No. 16,112, supra note 108, at
82,208. The requirements of the rule, however, remained basically unchanged. See 17
C.F.R. § 240.13e-4 (1990).
365 The legislative history of § 13(e) and the 1970 amendment to § 14(e) reveals that
the SEC made members of Congress aware of its belief that the grant of rulemaking
authority in §§ 13(e) and 14(e) included the authority to adopt rules designed to prevent unfair substantive conduct. First, the SEC indicated that § 13(e) could be used to
adopt rules providing shareholders in issuer offers with substantive protections paralleling
those afforded shareholders in tender offers governed by § 14(d). See Senate Hearings,
supra note 10, at 202 (Supplemental Memorandum of the SEC with Respect to Certain
Comments on S. 510); see also Note, SEC Takeover Regulation Under the Williams Act, 62
N.Y.U. L. REv. 580, 595 (1987). Second, the SEC provided Congress with a list of examples of fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative practices used in tender offers that the
SEC's rulemaking authority under § 14(e) would be able to prevent. While some of
these practices involved a failure to disclose, others involved unfair substantive conduct,
such as a bidder's failure to pay promptly for securities purchased or to return promptly
securities not purchased and a bidder's failure to have on hand the funds to pay for the
securities sought. See Additional Consumer Protection in Corporate Takeovers and Increasing
the Securities Act Exemptions for Small Businessmen: Hearings on S. 3431 Before the Subcomm.
on Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1970)
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most likely contend that while- the SEC may have followed
Congress' mandate when it adopted rules guarding against a failure to disclose, the SEC exceeded the scope of its rulemaking
authority in seeking to prevent unfair substantive conduct.
In addition to rule 13e-18 66 and the disclosure provisions of
rule 13e-4, 6 7 two other provisions stand out as examples of
rules that guard against a failure to disclose: rule 14e-2.6 and
rule 13e-4(f)(6)."8 9 Rule 14e-2 requires a company that is the
subject of a tender offer to inform its shareholders of its position
regarding the offer. Based on the theory that target management
has a duty to disclose its position,"' ° this rule is designed to
avert a fraudulent practice involving nondisclosure: target
management's silence as a breach of a duty to disclose. Rule 13e4(f)(6) prohibits a company from purchasing its shares for ten
business days after the company has terminated a tender offer for
its shares. The purpose of this restriction is to preclude the company from deceiving investors by artificially pegging the market
price of its stock at the inflated tender offer price. Thus, rul6
13e-4(f)(6) seeks to prevent price manipulation, which depends on
nondisclosure for its success. 3 71 Because these rules are predicated on traditional concepts of fraud and manipulation-concepts
that received the Court's imprimatur in Schreiber-they are valid.
The remainder of the SEC's rules adopted under sections
14(e) and 13(e) seek to prevent unfair practices. By way of summary of rules already touched on, consider the following: First,
rule 14e-13 72 (in the case of third-party offers) and rule 13e(Memorandum Prepared by Division of Corporate Finance); see also Junewicz, supra note
233, at 1179-80. Furthermore, the Schreiber Court itself suggested that Congress intended
to give the SEC the authority under § 14(e) to adopt rules regulating activities that were
not outlawed per se by § 14(e) as long as the activities .predictably gave rise to conduct
that was outlawed. Schreiber, 472 U.S. at 11 n.11, and some of the SEC's rules that seek
to prevent unfair substantive conduct are of this genre..
366 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-1 (1990); see supra notes 103-04 and accompanying text.
367 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-4(cXe) (1990); see supra note 108.
368 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-2 (1990); see supra text following note 95; supra text accompanying notes 98-100.
369 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-4(0(6) (1990).
370 In the release adopting rule 14e-2, the SEC did not unequivocally state that target management has a duty to disclose its position, but it intimated that such a duty
exists by noting the fiduciary nature of the relationship between management and shareholders and by pointing out that management's position "can have a determinative effect
on the outcome of a tender offer and thus is material to [shareholders]." Adoption of
Amendments to Tender Offer Rules, Exchange Act Release No. 16,384, supra note 58, at
82,599 & n.39.
371 See supra note 108.
372 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-l(a) (1990); see supra text following note 95; supra text ac-
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4(f)(1)37 (in the case of issuer offers) establish a minimum offering period.37 4 These rules are designed to guard against the
coercive effect that offers of short duration may have on
shareholder decisionmaking.37 5 Second, rule 13e-4(f)(2)-(4) gives
shareholders in issuer offers the same substantive protections that
section 14(d) affords shareholders in third-party offers, namely the
right to withdraw shares, to have shares purchased on a pro rata
basis, and to receive the benefit of any increase in price.3 7 6
These iubstantive protections are intended to guard against the
coercion engendered by offers that restrict the right of tendering
shareholders to withdraw their shares or that permit shares to be
purchased on a first-come, first-served basis, and to prevent bidders from unfairly discriminating among tendering shareholders.
Third, rule 14d-8 modifies section 14(d)-which requires proration
for ten calendar days in third party offers-by extending proration to the life of the offer."7 ' Aware that it lacked authority un,der section 14(d) to extend the statutory proration period, the
SEC relied on its prophylactic rulemaking power under section
14(e) in adopting rule 14d-8.37 Therefore, rule 14d-8 prohibits

companying note 96.
373 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-4(0(1) (1990).
374 The minimum offering period for third-party offers has been 20 business days
since the adoption of rule 14e-1 in 1979. In 1979, the SEC set the minimum offering
period for issuer offers at 15 business days but several months later extended the period
to 20 business days if the offer was in response to a third-party offer. Adoption of
Amendments to Tender Offer Rules, Exchange Act Release No. 16,384, supra note 58, at
82,595. Then in 1986, the SEC extended the minimum offering period for all issuer
offers to 20 business days. Adoption of Rules Amending Time Periods in Issuer Offers,
Exchange Act Release No. 22,788, [1985-1986 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
83,954, at 87,974-75 (Jan. 14, 1986).
375 The requirements of rule 13e-4 and rule 14e-1 that the offeror must pay the
consideration offered or return the tendered securities promptly after the termination or
withdrawal of the offer, 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13e-4(f)(5), 240.14e-1(c) (1990), are also examples of SEC measures designed to prevent unfair substantive conduct.
376 Id. § 240.13e-4(f)(2)-(4). Initially, the withdrawal and proration periods for issuer
offers were both 10 business days. See Adoption of Rules Regarding Tender Offers by
Issuers, Exchange Act Release No. 16,112, supra note 108, at 82,209. In 1986, the SEC
extended the withdrawal period to 15 business days and the proration period to the life
of the offer. Adoption of Rules Amending Time Periods in Issuer Offers, Exchange Act
Release No. 22,788, supra note 374, at 87,975-77. Several months later the SEC extended
the withdrawal period to the life of the offer. Adoption of All-Holders and Best-Price
Rule, Exchange Act Release No. 23,421, supra note 83, at 83,196-97.
377 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-8 (1990); see supra text accompanying note 84.
378 See supra note 84. The absence of express authority in § 14(d)(6) to extend the
proration period caused two of the five Commissioners, including the Chairman, to conclude that the SEC also lacked authority under § 14(e). See Adoption of Pro Rata Rule,
Exchange Act Release No. 19,336, supra note 84, at 85,652-54. Several commentators
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first-come, first-served offers as a means of preventing the coercion and unfairness that such offers may entail. Finally, rule 14d10 7 1 (in the case of third-party offers) and rule 13e-4(f)(8). 80
(in the case of issuer offers) are designed to prevent a bidder
from discriminating against certain shareholders by excluding
them from the offer or by offering and then paying them a lower
price. These provisions, unlike the others discussed above, were
adopted after Schreiber. Mindful of the absence of express
rulemaking authority under section 14(d) and the limitation that
Schreiber imposed on its rulemaking authority under section 14(e),
the SEC adopted rule 14d-10 under section 14(d) and section
14(e). sl In relying on both statutory provisions, the SEC was
obviously hedging against the possibility that it lacked authority
under one or the other of the provisions. Although section 14(d)
does contain protections designed to ensure the fair and equal
treatment of tendering shareholders, the SEC should not infer
from these protections the authority to adopt a rule that ensures
equality of treatment of all shareholders. Thus rule 14d-10 is best
analyzed as if it had been adopted exclusively pursuant to the
SEC's rulemaking authority under section 14(e). In adopting rule
13e-4(f)(8), the SEC did not have the option of relying on both
section 14(d) and section 13(e) since section 14(d) does not apply
to issuer offers. 8 Hence, rule 13e-4(f)(8) hinges on the SEC's
rulemaking power under section 13(e). 8 ' As prophylactic measures, rule 14d-10 and rule 13e-4(f)(8) ban discriminatory
offers as
a means of preventing unequal treatment of shareholders.
While the SEC's rules that shield against unfair tender offer
practices may facilitate disclosure, they are not designed to pre-

have agreed with the dissenting Commissioners. They argue that the legislative history of
§ 14(d)(6) indicates that Congress did not intend to give the SEC rulemaking power to
extend the proration period and that Congress did not change that intention when it
amended § 14(e) in 1970. See Note, supra note 309; Note, The Impact of Schreiber on the
SEC Tender Offer Timing Rules, 57 GEO. WASH. L REv. 77 (1988); Recent Development,
36 VAND. L. REv. 1313 (1983).
379 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-10 (1990); see supra text accompanying notes 86-88.
380 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-4(0(8) (1990).
381 See supra note 86.
382 See supra note 57.
383 In adopting rule 14d-10 and rule 13e-4(0(8), the SEC also relied on § 23(a) of
the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78w(a) (1988). Section 23(a) authorizes the SEC to adopt
rules "as may be necessary or appropriate to implement the provisions of [the Exchange
Act]." The SEC's reliance on § 23(a), however, is misplaced because the all-holders and
best-price requirements imposed by these rules are not implicit in § 14(d) or § 13(e). Cf.
Fiflis, supra note 256, at 327-29 (contending that § 23(a) does not provide the SEC with
sufficient authority to adopt an all-holders and best-price rule for issuer offers).
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vent conduct that involves a failure to disclose or conduct that
predictably gives rise to a failure to disclose. 8 4 Instead, they are
grounded on unconventional theories of fraud and manipulation-theories that the Court in Schreiber rejected. As a consequence, these rules are at risk of being invalidated by a court.385
IV.

THE CONSTrTUTIONALITY OF STATE TAKEOVER STATUTES

A.

State Takeover Legislation Before GTS

Despite the extreme care that Congress took when it drafted
the Williams Act to avoid tipping the scales in favor of either the
offeror or the target company, the balance has nonetheless been
upset on the state level by the enactment of an increasing number of state takeover statutes. The first such statute was enacted
in Virginia four months before the passage of the Williams
Act,"8 6 and by the end of the 1970s thirty-seven states had
passed takeover statutes as part of their blue sky laws.38 7 These
first-generation statutes, as they came to be called, differed considerably as to the jurisdictional basis that was required for the
statute to apply. For example, some based jurisdiction on the
target's incorporation in the state or on location of the target's
principal place of business in the state; others asserted jurisdiction
if a specified percentage of target shareholders were residents. of

384 The Court in Schreiber acknowledged that the 1970 amendment to § 14(e) gave
the SEC the authority to regulate nondeceptive activities as long as the regulation was
.reasonably designed" to prevent a failure to disclose. Schreiber, 472 U.S. at 11 n.11
(1985). The SEC's rules that shield against unfair tender offer practices do not satisfy
the Court's test. They regulate nondeceptive activities as a "reasonably designed" means
of preventing unfair substantive conduct but do not regulate practices involving misrepresentation or nondisclosure.
385 After the Court rendered its decision in Schreiber, legal commentators began to
recognize that the SEC's rules guarding against unfair tender offer practices may be
invalid. See 1 HAZEN, supra note 56, § 11.15, at 719 (rule 14e-1); Fiflis, supra note 256,
at 322-29 (rule 13e-4(f)(8) before it was adopted); Note, supra note 309, at 917-19 (rules
14d-8 and 14e-1). Congress has also expressed concern. See Corporate Takeoves (Part 2):
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications, Consumer Protection, and Finance of the
House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 404-07 (1985). Recently, a
three-judge panel of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed a defendant's
conviction for violation of rule 14e-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 (1990) (see supra note 100)
in United States v. Chestman, 903 F.2d 75 (2d Cir.), aff'd on rehearing, No. 89-1276, 1990
US App LEXIS 18175 (2d Cir. 1990) (LEXIS, Genfed library, US App file) (en banc).
One judge concluded, in reliance on Schreiber, that rule 14e-3 was invalid because it
sought to prevent nondeceptive conduct. Id. at 84 (Mahoney, J.).
386 See supra note 38.
387 See Sargent, On the Validity of State Takeover Regulation: State Responses to MITE
and Kidwell, 42 OHIO ST. LJ. 689, 690 n.7 (1981) (citing statutory provisions).
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the state or if residents of the state held a specified percentage of
target shares; and many of the statutes contained alternative bases
for asserting jurisdiction."' As a result, a bidder often had to
comply with the laws of several states.8 9
Although the disclosure and substantive requirements of the
state takeover statutes varied somewhat,3 9 ° the statutes all had
the same objective: protecting target management and local industry from unwanted takeover attempts.3 9 The statutes usually followed the federal regulatory model: they mandated disclosures
regarding the offer and accorded target shareholders withdrawal,
proration, and increased-price rights.39 2 The statutes, however,
generally went further than the federal provisions and required a
waiting period of ten, twenty, or thirty days between the filing of
the offer and the date on which the offer could commence. 393
In addition, some of the statutes departed from the federal
statute by permitting the state securities administrator to hold
3 94
hearings and pass on the substantive fairness of the offer.
The delay created by the precommencement waiting period and
the hearing provisions afforded target management greater protec-

388 See ARANow, EINHORN & BERLSTEIN, supra note 139, at 207-08; R. JENNINGS & H.
MARSH, supra' note 78, at 713.
389 See ARANoW, EINHORN & BERLSTEIN, supra note 139, at 208, 246 n.8 ("[A] tender
offer for . . . securities of an Ohio corporation that had its principal place of business
in Wisconsin, and a substantial portion of its assets in both Wisconsin and Indiana,
would be subject to .regulation under . . . the tender offer statutes of Ohio, Wisconsin,
and Indiana.").
390 One commentator who studied the first-generation statutes suggested that "[s]tate
takeover acts are similar to sriowflakes-if you think you have found identical ones, you
are probably not looking closely enough." Note, 7 J; CORP. L. 603, 603 (1982) (fo6tnote
omitted).
391 See L Loss, supra note 3, at 533; E. ARANOW & H. EINHORN, supra note 3, at
153 (stating that the impetus for the first-generation statutes was "[f]ears that established
local concerns might be taken over by outside interests which in turn would close down
plants and leave local residents jobless"); Langevoort, State Tender-Offer Legislation: Interests,
Effects, and Political Competency, 62 CORNELL L. REv. 213, 238-40 (1977) (arguing that
although the first-generation statutes purported to protect investors, they were really
designed to serve the interests of entrenched incumbent management). The first-generation statutes usually contained exemptions for offers supported by target management
and tender offers made by the target company for its own shares. See 1 T. HAZEN, supra
note 56, § 11.21, at 761.
392 See ARANOW, EINHORN & BERLSTEIN, supra note 139, at 210-17.
393 See 1 T. HAZEN, supra note 56, § 11.21, at 760. The first-generation statutes prohibited the offeror, but not target management, from communicating with the target
shareholders during the waiting period. See also ARANow, EINHORN, & BERLSTEIN, supra
note 139, at 218.
394 See ARANow, EINHORN & BERLSTEIN, supra note 139, at 215-16.
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tion than the federal statute, since it gave management more time
to arrange defensive measures. a
No evidence in the legislative history indicates that Congress
was aware of state tender offer legislation when it enacted the
Williams Act, 9 ' and thus Congress did not anticipate the veritable flood of state statutes that was to follow. Nonetheless, Congress provided for this eventuality, although perhaps unwittingly.
By incorporating the Williams Act into the Exchange Act, Congress made the "savings clause" of the Exchange Act, section
28(a), 9 7 applicable to the new federal tender offer statute and,
therefore, preserved the rights and remedies of existing state law
and left room for state regulation as long as it did not conflict
with the federal provisions.
Because the state takeover legislation posed serious obstacles
to the consummation of an unfriendly offer, hostile bidders routinely sought to enjoin state officials from enforcing the statutes.
The bidders argued that the statutes were unconstitutional under
the commerce and supremacy clauses of the United States Constitution. For the most part, these constitutional challenges were
successful, and the courts ruled that the state takeover legislation
both interfered impermissibly with
interstate commerce and was
98
3
preempted by the Williams Act.

In their struggles to avoid the strictures of the state statutes,
bidders usually found themselves closely aligned with the SEC,
which consistently objected to the statutes on constitutiorial
grounds also. The SEC contended that the state takeover statutes
had resulted in an inconsistent, overlapping pattern of regulation

395 See id. at 217-19; Langevoort, supra note 391, at 238.
396 Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 631 n.6 (plurality opinion). Also, Congress
was not aware of state tender offer legislation when it amended the Williams Act in
1970. Adoption of Amendments to Tender Offer Rules, Exchange Act Release No.
16,384, supra note 58, at 82,583 n.14.
397 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1988). Section 28(a), in pertinent part, states- that "[t]he
rights and remedies [of the Exchange Act] shall be in addition to any and all other
rights and remedies that may exist at law or in equity" and that the provisions of the
Exchange Act shall not affect "the jurisdiction of the securities commission (or any agency or officer performing like functions) of any State over any security or any person
insofar as it does not conflict with the provisions of [the Exchange Act or SEC rules
adopted thereunder]." See MITE, 457 U.S. at 631 (plurality opinion) ("Congress did not
explicitly prohibit States from regulating takeovers; it left the determination whether [a
state statute] conflicts with the Williams Act to the courts.").
398 The bellwether was Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir.
1978), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173
(1979) (Idaho statute). With a few exceptions, the subsequent decisions followed Kidwell.
See Sargent, supra note 387, at 629 & nn.17-20 (citing cases).
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and had tipped the balance of regulation in favor of target companies.3 99 To buttress its preemption argument, the SEC
adopted rule 14d-2(b) 0 0 in 1979, which created a direct conflict
between the federal regulatory scheme and most of the state statutes. 1 In contrast to the state legislation, which prohibited the
commencement of an offer for at least ten days after public announcement,
rule 14d-2(b) required commencement within five
40 2
days.
In 1982, in Edgar v. MITE Corp.,4 °3 the Supreme Court was
called upon to rule on the constitutionality of Illinois' first-generadon takeover statute. The Court found the statute to be invalid,
but since six opinions were filed in the case,40 4 the decision was
40 5
less than definitive. Three Justices thought the case was moot,
and the remaining six Justices disagreed on the proper resolution
of the constitutional issues involved. The majority opinion, which
mustered five votes, held that the Illinois statute was unconstitutional under the commerce clause because the burden the statute
imposed on interstate commerce through indirect regulation was
excessive in relation to the local putative benefits.40 ' The majority pointed out that the statute governed tender offers for target
companies that were neither domiciliaries nor residents of Illinois. 40 7 Four Justices, troubled that the statute applied even if
none of the target shareholders were residents of Illinois, asserted
that the statute violated the commerce clause because it directly

399 See, e.g., Brief for the SEC as Amicus Curiae at 15-62, Leroy v. Great W. United
Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979) (No. 78-759); Adoption of Amendments to Tender Offer
Rules, Exchange Act Release No. 16,384, supra note 58, at 82,596.
400 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-2(b) (1990).
401 See Adoption of Amendments to Tender Offer Rules, Exchange Act Release No.
16,384, supra note 58, at 82,583-84 ("[T]he. conflict between Rule 14d-2(b) and [the] state
statutes is so direct and substantial as to make it impossible to comply with both sets of
requirements as they presently exist."); see also supra note 68.
402 The SEC's plan worked. Decisions rendered after the adoption of rule 14d-2(b)
struck down state legislation under the supremacy clause on the ground that there was a
direct conflict between the Williams Act and the state legislation. See Sargent, supra note
387, at 696-97 (citing cases).
403 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
404 Justices White, Powell, Stevens, O'Connor, Marshall, and Rehnquist filed opinions.
405 See MITE, 457 U.S. at 655-64 (Marshall, J., joined by Brennan, J., dissenting); id.
at 664-67 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Powell also thought the case was moot but
joined in the majority opinion in view of the decision of five Justices to reach the merits. See id. at 646 (Powell, J., concurring in part).
406 See id.at 643-46 (opinion of White, J., joined by Burger, CJ., Powell, Stevens &

O'Connor, JJ.).
407

See id. at 645.
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regulated interstate commerce. 4°" Finally, three out of five Justices voting on the preemption issue concluded that the statute conflicted with the Williams Act and thus was void under the supremacy clause. 0 9
Since it cannot be assumed that the four Justices who did not
express their views on the preemption issue in MITE necessarily
disagreed with the views of the plurality, the plurality preemption
opinion is worth recounting. After pointing out that the SEC's
preemptive provision, rule 14d-2(b), was not effective at the time
of the tender offer involved in MTTE, the plurality indicated that
the resolution of the preemption issue turned on whether the
Illinois statute frustrated the purposes of the Williams Act in some
substantial way.4 10 Instead of accepting the conclusion in Piper
that investor protection was the sole purpose of the Act, the plurality reexamined the legislative history of the Act and subtly
eroded Piper's analysis by stating: "There is no question that ...
Congress intended to protect investors. But it is also crystal clear
to
that a major aspect of the effort to protect the investor was
41
avoid favoring either management or the takeover bidder." '
The opinion also recalled that Congress, in striving to attain
a neutral balance, both rejected a precommencement notification
provision and emphasized the importance of preventing target
companies from delaying the tender offer process.

412

The plural-

ity then identified several provisions of the Illinois statute that
upset the careful balance struck by Congress and thus tended to
frustrate the purposes of the federal statute. The opinion first discussed the provisions of the Illinois statute that required a twentyday precommencement waiting period and that allowed a state
official to call a hearing. The plurality maintained that these provisions upset the balance by giving target management additional

408 See id.at 641-43 (White, J., joined by Burger, CJ., Stevens & O'Connor, JJ.).
409 See id. at 630-40 (White, J., joined by Burger, CJ. & Blackmun, J.). Two Justices
disagreed with Justice White's preemption opinion. See id. at 646-47 (Powell, J., concurring in part); id. at 655 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
Four Justices did not address the preemption issue. See id. at 655 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part); id. at 664 (Marshall, J., joined by Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 667
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
410 Id. at 632.
411 Id. at 633 (citations omitted). Given the emphasis that Justice White gave to neutrality, it is somewhat surprising that Chief Justice Burger joined his opinion, for Chief
Justice Burger had downplayed the significance of neutrality in Piper. See supra text accompanying notes 64-66.
412 MITE, 457 U.S. at 635-39.
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time to combat the offer."' The opinion next turned to the
provisions of the Illinois law that permitted a state official to
prohibit an offer frbm going forward if the official found the
offer to be inequitable. The plurality also found these provisions
at odds with Congress' goals. Congress sought to preserve a neutral balance, the plurality argued, so that target shareholders
would be free to make their own investment decisions.4 14
Reading MITE broadly, the courts struck down virtually every
first-generation takeover statute that came before them. Some of
the statutes were thrown out on commerce clause grounds, others
fell under the MITE plurality's supremacy clause argument, and a
few were invalidated under both clauses. 41 5 But MITE did not
mark the demise of state takeover regulation, for in the five-year
period after the decision in MITE almost half of the states devised new takeover statutes. And although these second-generation
statutes still sought to deter hostile offers for local companies,
they were drafted with the intention of avoiding the constitutional
defects of the first-generation statutes. First, the second-generation
statutes were enacted as part of the states corporation codes so
they applied only to domestic corporations. Second, instead of
regulating the tender offer process itself, the statutes regulated

413 Id. at 634-39.
414 Id. at 639-40. Justice Powell, who disagreed with the plurality preemption opinion,
stated: "[Tihe Williams Act's neutrality policy does not necessarily imply a congressional
intent to prohibit state legislation designed to assure-at least in some circumstances-greater protection to interests that include but often are broader than those of incumbent management." 1d. at 646-47 (Powell, J., concurring in part). Justice Stevens, who
also disagreed with the plurality preemption opinion, agreed with Justice Powell on the
preemption issue and stated: "I am not persuaded . . . that Congress' decision to follow
a policy of neutrality in its own legislation is tantamount to a federal prohibition against
state legislation designed to provide special protection for incumbent management." Id.
at 655 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
.415 See L.P. Acquisition Co. v. Tyson, 772 F.2d 201 (6th Cir. 1985) (Michigan statute); Mesa Petroleum Co. v. Cities Serv. Co., 715 F.2d 1425 (10th Cir. 1983) (Oklahoma
statute); Televest, Inc. v. Bradshaw, 697 F.2d 576 (4th Cir. '1983) (Virginia statute); Martin Marietta Corp. v. Bendix Corp., 690 F.2d 558 (6th Cir. 1982) (Michigan statute); National City Lines v. LLC Corp., 687 F.2d 1122 (8th Cir. 1982) (Missouri statute); Newell
v. Connolly, 624 F. Supp. 126 (D. Mass. 1985) (Massachusetts statute); Esmark, Inc. v.
Strode, 639 S.W.2d 768 (Ky. 1982) (Kentucky statute); Sharon Steel Corp. v. Whaland,
124 N.H. 1, 466 A.2d 919 (1983) (New Hampshire statute). But see Cardiff Acquisitions
v. Hatch, 751 F.2d 906 (8th Cir. 1984) (revised first-generation Minnesota statute held
constitutional); Agency Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Connolly, 686 F.2d 1029 (1st Cir. 1982) (Massachusetts statute not preempted by the Williams Act, and case remanded for consideration of commerce clause issue). For a discussion of these cases, see Warren, Developments in State Takeover Regulation: MITE and Its Aftermath, 40 BUs. LAW. 671, "686-94
(1985).
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the internal affairs of target companies after the tender offer was
completed.4 16
In the post-MITE era, four major types of second-generation
statutes emerged-control share acquisition statutes, fair price statutes, cash-out statutes, and business combination statutes-and
some states adopted more than one kind.417
Control share acquisition statutes provide that the acquisition of a control block of voting shares in a target company must
be approved by a majority of the disinterested shareholders.4 1
A few of these statutes require approval of the acquisition itself,
whereas all the others require approval of the right to vote the
shares acquired. 419 Fair price statutes typically provide that a
successful bidder, who subsequently wants to effect a second-step
"business combination" with the target, must obtain supermajority
approval from the disinterested shareholders (as well as all shareholders) unless (1) the combination is approved by the target's
board before the bidder obtains control, or (2) the bidder pays a
"fair price" to those nontendering shareholders who are forced
into the second-step combination.4 20 Cash-out statutes require a
bidder who acquires a controlling interest in a target company
(whether or not the bidder intends a second-step acquisition) to

416 For a discussion of the second-generation takeover statutes, see generally Block,
Barton & Roth, State Takeover Statutes: The "Second Generation", 13 SEC. REG. LJ. 332
(1986); Hazen, State Anti-Takeover Legislation: The Second and Third Generations, 23 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 77 (1988); Pinto, Takeover Statutes: The Dormant Commerce Clause and State
Corporate Law, 41 U. MIAMI L. REV. 425 (1987); Profusek & Gompf, State Takeover Legislation After MITE.- Standing Pat, Blue Sky, or CorporationLaw Concepts?, 7 CORP. L. REV.
3 (1983); Sargent, Do the Second-Generation State Takeover Statutes Violate the Commerce
Clause?, 8 CORP. L. REV. 3 (1985).
417

See 3

R.

WINTER,

R.

ROSENBAUM,

M.

STUMPF &

L. PARKER, SHARK REPELLENTS

AND GOLDEN PARACHUTES: A HANDBOOK FOR THE PRACTITIONER (STATE TAKEOVER STAT-

UTES AND POISON PILLS) § 1.1, at 4-5; § 1.2, at 7-12 (Supp. 1989) [hereinafter WINTER,
ROSENBAUM, STUMPF & PARKER] (citing statutory provisions and effective dates). Most of
the second-generation statutes either (1) permit a corporation to opt out of the statute's
provisions by an amendment to the articles of incorporation or bylaws or by a specified
vote of the board of directors or (2) require the corporation to elect to be covered by
the statute through a c9mparable process.
418 Ohio was the first state to adopt a c6ntrol share acquisition statute, doing so less
than six months after the decision in MITE. For a discussion of the Ohio statute, see
Raup, Has Ohio Avoided the Wake of MITE? An Analysis of the Constitutionality of the Ohio
Control Share Acquisition Act, 46 OHIO ST. L. J. 203 (1985).
419 See 3 WINTER, ROSENBAUM, STUMPF & PARKER, supra note 417, § 2, at 15-26.5
(Supp. 1989). The control share acquisition statutes in Ohio and Hawaii are the only
ones that require shareholder approval of the acquisition itself. Id. at 19.
420 See id. § 4, at 41-49. Maryland was the first state to pass a fair price statute. For
a discussion of the Maryland statute, which was adopted in 1983, see Note, Second Generation State Takeover Legislation: Maryland Takes a New Tack, 83 MICH. L. REV. 433 (1984).
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pay a "fair value" to those nontendering shareholders who request
to be bought out."' Business combination statutes prohibit a
bidder who obtains a controlling interest in a target company
from engaging in a "business combination" with the target for a
two-to-five year period unless the target's board approves the combination before the bidder acquires control. Further, at the end
of this moratorium, the bidder may engage in the combination
only with the consent of a majority (or supermajority) of disinteror in some states upon paying all shareholders
ested shareholders
" 22
a "fair price. '
Initially, it appeared as if the second round of state takeover
legislation was as unconstitutional as the first round. Control
share acquisition statutes-the only ones challenged-were consistently struck down under the commerce clause or the supremacy
clause or under both clauses, and the rhetoric of lower federal
court decisions suggested that the other three types of secondgeneration statutes would also fail to survive constitutional scrutiny if an attack were mounted 23 In 1987, the Supreme Court
heard one of these cases on appeal; the case was CTS Corp. v.
Dynamics Corp. of America. 24

421 See 3 WINTER, ROSENBAUM, STUMPF & PARKER, supra note 417, § 5, at 51-54
(Supp. 1989). Pennsylvania was the first state to adopt a cash-out law. For a discussion
of the Pennsylvania statute, which was enacted in 1983, see Newlin & Gilmer, The Pennsylvania Shareholder Protection Act: A New State Approach to Deflecting Corporate Takeover
Bids, 40 BUs. LAw. 111 (1984).
422 See 3 WINTER, ROSENBAUM, STUMPF & PARKER, supra note 417, § 3.1-.2, at 28-40.7
(Supp. 1989). New York was the first state to adopt a business combination statute. For
a discussion of the New York statute, which was passed in 1985, see Miles, The Constitutionality of State Business Combination Legislation: New York's Section 912, 8 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1025 (1987).
423 See Fleet Aerospace Corp. v. Holderman, 796 F.2d 135 (6th Cir. 1986), vacated
and remanded sub nom. Ohio v. Fleet Aerospace Co., 481 U.S. 1026 (1987) (Ohio statute);
Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250 (7th Cir. 1986), rev'd, 481 U.S. 69
(1987) (Indiana statute); Gelco Corp. v. Coniston Partners, 652 F. Supp. 829 (D. Minn.
1986) (Minnesota statute); Terry v. Yamashita, 643 F. Supp. 161 (D. Hawaii 1986) (Hawaii statute), APL Limited Partnership v. Van Dusen Air, Inc., 622 F. Supp. 1216 (D.
Minn. 1985) (Minnesota statute); Icahn v. Blunt, -612 F. Supp. 1400 (W.D. Mo. 1985)
(Missouri statute).
424 481 U.S. 69 (1987). By the time of the Supreme Court's decision iu CTS, 21
states had adopted one or more takeover statutes that had taken effect: Hawaii, Indiana,
Minnesota, Missouri, Ohio (control share acquisition statutes); Connecticut, Georgia, Illinois, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Mississippi, Pennsylvania, Virginia, Washington, Wisconsin (fair price statutes); Maine, Pennsylvania, Utah (cash-out statutes); Indiana, Kentucky, Missouri, New Jersey, New York (business combination statute). See 3
WINTER, ROSENBAUM, STUMPF & 'PARKER, supra note 417, § 1.2, at 7-11 (1988) (citing
statutory provisions and effective dates).
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The CTS Case

1. Denial of Individual Autonomy to Target Shareholders
CTS, the Supreme Court's third visit to the tender offer provisions of the Williams Act, involved the application of Indiana's
control share acquisition statute425 to the efforts of Dynamics
Corporation of America (Dynamics) to acquire .a controlling interest in CTS Corporation (CTS), an Indiana corporation.4 2

6

At a

time when it owned 9.6% of the common stock of CTS, Dynamics
initiated a cash tender offer for additional CTS common shares.
This offer, if successful, would have brought Dynamics' ownership
interest in CTS to 27.5%. Several days before Dynamics commenced its offer, Indiana adopted a control share acquisition
statute, which applied to all "issuing public corporations." The
statute defined an "issuing public corporation" as every Indiana
corporation that had a substantial presence in Indiana and a substantial number of Indiana shareholders.4 27 For a transition period of approximately seventeen months, the board of directors of
such a corporation could opt into the provisions of the statute.4 28 Thereafter, the statute automatically applied unless the

company amended its articles of incorporation or bylaws to opt
out. 429 Before

Dynamics'

tender

offer expired,

the board

of

CTS, an "issuing public corporation," opted into the statute.
Under the Indiana statute, shares acquired in an "issuing
public corporation" that bring the acquiror to or above one of
three threshold levels of voting power (one-fifth, one-third, or
one-half) are called "control shares." And the statute strips all
"control shares" of voting rights unless a majority of the target
shareholders (excluding the acquiror and target management)
agree to restore the voting power. 43 0 The shareholders vote on

425 IND. CODE ANN. §§ 23-1-42-1 to -11 (West Supp. 1990).
426 A summary of Dynamics' attempted takeover of CTS is set forth in CTS, 481
U.S. at 75.
427 IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-42-4(a) (West Supp. 1990) (defining an "issuing public
corporation" as an Indiana corporation that has (1) 100 or more shareholders, (2) its
principal place of business, its principal office or substantial assets within Indiana, and
(3) either more than 10% of its shareholders resident in Indiana, more than 10% of its
shares owned by Indiana residents, or 10,000 shareholders resident in Indiana).
'428 Id. § 23-1-17-3(b).
429 Id. § 23-1-42-5.
430 Id. §§ 23-1-42-1, -3, -5, -9. Thus, only the 17.9% of CTS' common shares that
Dynamics sought in the tender offer were "control shares" whose voting power would be
determined by a vote of CTS' disinterested shareholders. See id. § 23-1-42-1 comment.
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* this matter at their next annual meeting or ait a special meeting
called at the request of a person who proposes to make or has
'
Once such a request is
made a "control share acquisition." 431
made, target management must schedule the special meeting within fifty calendar days.432 Hence, a bidder who wants an early
resolution of the issue will presumably request a special meeting
on the commencement date of the offer.433 If the shareholders
decline to restore voting rights to the "control shares," the target
may redeem the shares at their fair market value, but it is not obligated to do so."'
Seeking to prevent its shares from being sterilized once it
crossed the twenty percent threshold of voting power, Dynamics
sued to enjoin CTS' use of the statute. The district court granted
the requested injunctive relief and entered an order declaring that
the Indiana statute was preempted by the Williams Act and
impermissibly burdened interstate commerce.43 5 The Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court.4 3 6 The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction

for an appeal 43 7 and voted 6-3 to reverse the, Seventh Circuit's
decision. Writing for the Court, Justice Powell held that the Indiby the Williams Act and did not
ana statute was not preempted
4 38
violate the commerce clause.

431 Id. §§ 23-1-42-7, -9.
432 Id. § 23-1-42-7(b). The offeror must agree to pay for the expenses of the special
meeting. Id. § 23-1-42-7(a).
433 See CTS, 481 U.S. at 70 n.2. The Court made two observations about the statute
to demonstrate that tendering shareholders will usually be able to vote their shares at
the special meeting even though they may not be the owners of the shares on the date
of *the meeting. First, if the bidder requests a special meeting on the commencement
date of the offer, target management is most likely obligated to set the record date and
send the notice of the meeting during the first 20 business days of the offer. Second,
since tendered shares cannot be purchased under federal law until 20 business days after
the offer commences, the record date will be set before the offeror can purchase any
shares. Id.
434 IND. CODE. ANN. § 23-1-42-10(b) (West Supp. 1990).
435 Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. CTS Corp., 637 F. Supp. 389 (N.D. Ill.), aff'd, 794
F.2d 250 (7th Cir. 1986), rev'd, 481°U.S. 69 (1987).
436 Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250 (7th Cir. 1986), rev'd, 481

U.S. 69 (1979).
437 CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 479 U.S. 810, noting prob. juis. in 794
F.2d 250 (7th Cir 1986).
438 Justice Powell was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Brennan, Marshall, and O'Connor. Justice Scalia concurred in a separate opinion. Justice White filed a
dissenting opinion regarding both the commerce clause and preemption issues. He was
joined in his commerce clause reasoning by Justices Blackmun and Stevens.
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The Court began its opinion with an analysis of the preemption issue and reasoned that since compliance with both the Williams Act and the Indiana statute was possible, a preemptive conflict existed only if the state statute frustrated the purposes of the
federal statute." 9 The Court maintained that investor protection
was the primary purpose of the Williams Act and that the Indiana
statute advanced, not hampered, this purpose. The Court believed
that the Indiana statute was designed to protect target shareholders from the coercive aspects of some tender offers by allowing
target shareholders to act collectively. Citing the SEC's study of
two-tier tender offer pricing,44 ° the Court explained that target
shareholders often tender their shares-even when they think that
the offer is not in the best interests of the target company-to
guard against the possibility that they will be forced to sell their
shares at a lower price in a second-step transaction.4 41
The Court indicated that it was not bound by the plurality
view in MITE that neutrality was a purpose of the Williams Act,
since this view was not accepted by a majority of the Court.
Nonetheless, the Court opined that even under this broad interpretation of the purposes of the Act, the Indiana statute passed
constitutional muster because (unlike the Illinois statute considered in MITE) it did not favor target management over offerors. 442 First, the Court asserted that the Indiana statute did not

impose an absolute delay in consummating tender offers. The
Court argued that the Indiana statute neither required a bidder
to ke6p its offer open beyond the minimum twenty-business-day
offering period prescribed by federal law nor prevented a bidder
from purchasing tendered shares immediately after the close of
the offer.443
Second, the Court contended that if offerors feared an adverse shareholder vote regarding the enfranchisement of the tendered "control shares," they could condition their obligation to

439 CTS, 481 U.S. at 78-79. In his concurring opinion, Justice Scalia argued that a
state statute may be preempted by the Williams Act on the basis of a conflicting "provision" but not on the basis of a conflicting "purpose." Id. at 96 (Scalia, J., concurring in
part and in the judgment).
440 Notice of Possible Action Regarding Two-Tier Tender Offer Pricing and NonTender Offer Purchase Programs, Exchange Act Release No. 21,079, supra note 344.
441 CTS, 481 U.S. at 82-84. In dissent, Justice White argued that the Indiana statute,
which protected target shareholders as a group, was inconsistent with the Williams Act,
which protected target shareholders as individuals. Id. at 97-99 (White, J., dissenting).
442 Id. at 81.
443 Id. at 83-84.
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purchase these shares on voting rights being conferred within a
certain time period. Admitting that some delay would be introduced into the tender process if a bidder made, its offer conditional, the Court asserted that this delay was not unreasonable. In
support of its assertion, the Court noted that a provision in section 14(d) of the Williams Act granted target shareholders the
right to withdraw unpurchased shares after sixty calendar days
from the commencement of the offer. The Court construed this
provision as evidence that Congress considered sixty calendar days
to be the maximum offering period. Based on this interpretation,
the Court argued that the federal' timetable for tender offers was
actually longer than the one envisioned by the Indiana statute,
which ensured that it was possible for the shareholder vote to
occur within fifty calendar days following the commencement of
the offer.444
Finally, the Court maintained that invalidating the Indiana
statute on the grounds that it might introduce some delay into
the tender offer process would be tantamount to invalidating a
number of other state corporation laws of unquestioned validity.
As examples, the Court mentioned state' statutes authorizing 'staggered terms for directors and -cumulative voting, both of which
delay an offeror's ability to gain control of the board of directors.4 4 5

Next, the Court turned to an analysis of the commerce clause
issue and offered two threshold reasons why the Indiana statute
survived dormant commerce clause scrutiny. First, the statute did
not discriminate against interstate commerce because it applied
equally to both local and out-of-state offerors.44 6 And second,
the statute did not burden interstate commerce by creating an
impermissible risk of inconsistent regulation by different states,
since it applied only to target companies incorporated in Indi7
44

ana.

The Court never explicitly evaluated the indirect effects of
the Indiana statute on interstate commerce.4 48 Instead of balanc-

444 Id at 84-85.
445 Id.at 85-86.
446 Id. at 87-88.
447 Id. at 88-89. In dissent, Justice White argued that the Indiana statute "directly
regulat[ed]" the purchase and sale of shares of stock in interstate commerce and was
therefore unconstitutional. Id. at 99-101 (White, J., dissenting).
448 In his concurring opinion, Justice Scalia argued that such an evaluation was unnecessary, since a conclusion that the Indiana statute neither discriminated against interstate commerce nor created an impermissible risk of inconsistent regulation by different
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ing the putative local benefits of the state legislation against the
incidental burdens the legislation imposed on interstate commerce, as it had done in MITE, the Court asserted that a state
that creates a corporation is justified in enacting a law that defines the attributes of the corporation's shares and that protects
the corporation's shareholders, even if that law affects certain
aspects of interstate commerce. 4 9 The Court therefore concluded that even if the Indiana statute "decrease[d] the number of
successful tender offers for Indiana corporations, this would not
offend the [c]ommerce [c]lause."450

2.

An Analysis of CTS

The Supreme Court's ruling in CTS was not generally anticipated by bench or bar,451 but in light of the Court's earlier Williams Act opinions, the CTS ruling was not surprising. In Piper
and Schreiber, the Court had already sapped the Williams Act of
much of its remedial and substantive content by deferring to state
common law. It would have been odd, therefore, if the Court in
CTS had checkmated the states' legislative efforts at tender offer
regulation in deference to an exclusive right of the federal government to regulate takeovers under the supremacy or commerce
clause. Nonetheless, the Court in CTS took a giant step forward
in strengthening the hand of target managers intent on resisting
an unwanted takeover bid. Piper and Schreiber had not countenanced the defensive measures of target companies. Rather, these
two opinions had given the states virtually undivided power to
judge such mebsures. In contrast, by validating a state takeover
statute, CTS directly sanctioned a standardized, ready-made defensive tactic, a tactic that may be largely immune from the type of

states was sufficient. Id. at 94-96 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment). Since MITE, the Court seems to be moving away from making a diktinction
between the "direct" and "indirect" effects that state regulation has on interstate commerce. See, e.g., Arkansas Elec. Coop. Corp. v. Arkansas Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 461 U.S.
'375, 379 (1983); cf. Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Auth., 476
U.S. 573, 578-79 (1986). Legal commentators disagree on how the dormant commerce
clause should be applied, and four schools of thought have emerged. Only two of these
schools of thought require a balancing of interests. See Cox, The Constitutional "Dynamics"
of the Internal Affairs Rule-A Comment on CTS Corporation, 13 J. CORP. L. 317, 318 n.7
(1988).
449 CTS, 481 U.S. at 89-91.
450 Id. at 94.
451 See Oesterle, Delaware's Takeover Statute: Of Chills, Pills, Standstills, and Who Gets
Iced, 13 DEL. J. CORP. L. 879, 933 (contending that "no one, nary a lower federal court
nor a commentator, was even close to foreseeing the result in the CTS case").
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state-law challenges that are usually made when target directors
customize their own defensive measures.4 52
That the Indiana legislature intended its control share acquisition statute to function as a promanagement, antitakeover device
seems fairly obvious. The State of Indiana itself, which intervened
in the CTS litigation, conceded that the statute was designed in
part to protect local economic interests, 43 and, like other state
takeover legislation, the Indiana statute accomplishes this objective
by discouraging potential bidders from making tender offers for
local companies or by hindering the successful completion of such
offers. Despite this concession, the CTS Court chose to focus
exclusively on the protection that the statute purported to provide
target shareholders and refused to acknowledge that shareholder
protection was simply a guise for the statute's true purpose: economic protectionism. The Court's failure (or unwillingness) to
come to terms with the ulterior purpose and unavoidable effects
of the statute rendered its analysis both disingenuous and unpersuasive. Indeed, as the discussion below argues, the Indiana statute should have been declared unconstitutional under both the
supremacy clause and the commerce clause.
(a) The Preemptive Force of the Williams Act.-At its core, the
preemption analysis in CTS rested on the Supreme Court's conclusion that the Indiana control share acquisition statute advanced
the investor protection purpose of the Williams Act by addressing
the collective action problem that coercive offers present. To be
sure, in certain tender offers some target shareholders do tender

452 But see Samjens Partners I v. Burlington Indus., 663 F. Supp. 614 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)
(reviewing under state law a target board's decision to opt out of a control share acquisition statute for a friendly leveraged buyout-but not for a competing hostile offer-and
holding that the decision was protected by the business judgment rule). On the relationship between state takeover statutes and privately adopted defensive measures, see Booth,
State Takeover Statutes Revisted, 88 MICH. L. RE'V. 120, 121 (1989) [hereinafter State Takeover Statutes Revisted] (contending that a state's adoption of a takeover statute may be
interpreted by the judiciary as "a condemnation of other nonstandardized tactics");
Booth, The Promise of State Takeover Statutes, 86 MICH. L. REV. 1635, 1692 (198S) (referring to the Indiana statute as a "statutory poison pill"); Cox, supra note 448, at 326
(indicating that the second-generation state statutes are patterned on privately adopted
defensive tactics); Oesterle, supra note 451, at 885 (suggesting that the second-generation
state statutes are not as lethal as privately adopted defensive tactics).
453 See CTS, 481 U.S. at 100-01 (White, J., dissefiting); see also Butler, State Takeover
Legislation, the Market for Corporate Chartes, and the Scope of Federal Intervention: A Comment on Hitzeman, Indiana's Control Share Acquisition Statute, 27 AM. Bus. L.J. 291, 297
(1989) (pointing out that the Indiana statute was passed specifically to block the takeover
of Arvin Industries, an Indiana corporation, by the Belzberg family of Canada).
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their shares even though they believe that the price is inadequate.
These shareholders are pressured into tendering because they
know or anticipate that they will be bought out at an even lower
price in a second-step transaction if the offer is successful. By
enabling target shareholders to act collectively to reject such coercive offers, the Indiana statute, therefore, does protect investors.
The measure of protection, however, is negligible in the aggregate. By the time the Indiana statute was passed, the number of
two-tier and partial offers-where coercion is most likely to occur 4 5 4-had declined dramatically, and such offers continue to
represent a very small percentage of all tender offers. 45 5 Two

months after the Court handed down the CTS opinion, an SEC
Commissioner, in congressional testimony regarding the issue of
coercive tender offers, concluded that "the market appears to
have corrected any problem that may have existed. '456 Given the

waning frequency of two-tier and partial offers, protecting target
shareholders from the coercive aspects of tender offers could
hardly have- been the purpose of the Indiana statute. Therefore,
the Court's reliance on this purpose as the linchpin of its preemption analysis was naive.
Even if the Indiana legislation could be construed as a bona
fide attempt to protect target shareholders, the protection it provides conflicts with the investor protection that is implicit in the
Williams Act. The Indiana statute protects shareholders as a
group, whereas the Williams Act requires the disclosure of infor-

454 See Oesterle, supra note 451, at 900 n.89 (contending that two-tier and partial
offers are the primary vehicles for the most coercive offers but noting that "even any-orall tender offers have coercive potential"). But cf Coffee, The Uncertain Case for Takeover
Reform: An Essay on Stockholders, Stakeholders and Bust-Ups, 1988 WiS. L. REV. 435, 439
(contending that coercive tender offers are a "myth"); Fischel, supra note 53, at 63 (concluding that the alleged coercive effect of tender offers is not a problem).
455 See Johnson & Millon, Missing the Point About State Takeover Statutes, 87 MICH. L.
REv. 846, 846-87 (1989); Langevoort, The Supreme Court and the Politics of Corporate
Takeovers: A Comment on CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 101 HARv. L. REv.
96, 105 (1987).
456 Regulating Hostile Corporate Takeovers: Hearings on . 227, S. 678, S. 1264, S. 1323
and S. 1324 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking Housing and Urban Affairs, 100th Cong.,
1st Sess. 97 (1987) (statement of Charles C. Cox, Commissioner of the SEC). Furthermore, the empirical SEC study that the CTS Court cited shows that the premiums offered in any-or-all tender offers are only slightly larger than the sum of the premiums
offered in two-step transactions. See Notice of Possible Action Regarding Two-Tier Pricing
and Non-Tender Offer Purchase Programs, Exchange Act Release No. 21,079, supra note
344, at 86,925. One commentator has suggested that the states' adoption of takeover
statutes may be responsible for the demise of coercive offers. See Booth, State Takeover
Statutes Revisted, supra note 452, at 121.
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mation so that individual target shareholders can make their own
investment decisions." 7 By providing collective shareholder protection at the expense of individual shareholder autonomy, the
Indiana statute clashes with the federal statute and therefore falls
within the prohibitions of the supremacy clause.
The Indiana statute is also preempted by the Williams Act
because it upsets the neutral regulatory balance between the tender offeror and target management that was struck by Congress
when it adopted the Williams Act. The delay that the Indiana
statute builds into the tender offer process enhances target
management's ability to defeat a tender offer-to the detriment
of target shareholder welfare-and therefore tilts the regulatory
balance in favor of target management. That the Indiana statute
consistently serves as an engine of delay is readily apparent. No
rational bidder that is governed by the Indiana statute will obligate itself to purchase tendered shares until voting rights have
been restored to the shares. Accordingly, bidders will be forced to
make their offers conditional, as the Court suggested they may,
on the restoration of voting rights. Since the Indiana statute permits target management to delay shareholder consideration of the
enfranchisement issue for .up to fifty calendar days after the commencement of the offer, the practical impact of the statute is to
preclude bidders from consummating their offers until the expiration of this fifty-calendar-day period. Thus, a bidder that has
stipulated that its offer will be held open for the minimum twenty-business-day (twenty-eight-calendar-day) period required by federal law must wait an additional twenty-two calendar days before
accepting tendered shares for payment.
The Court argued that this. delay was not unreasonable because the Williams Act contemplates that shares will be accepted
for payment during the time period starting with the expiration
48
of the offer (when shareholder withdrawal rights terminate)

457 See supra note 441. It has been suggested by several commentators that if target
shareholders want protection from coercive bids, charter amendments either imposing
control share voting restrictions or requiring that a fair price be paid in any second-step
acquisition provide a less intrusive means of protection than state takeover statutes. See,

e.g., Langevoort, supra note 455, at 105; Macey, State Anti-Takeover Legislation and the National Economy, 1988 Wis. L. REv. 467, 469 (1988). Target management, however, seldom
pursues such harter amendments. See Fischel, supra note 53, at 66-67 ("It is possible
that firms lobby for anti-takeover statutes in those situations where shareholders would
refuse to approve a charter amendment with the same effect.").
458 The Court stated that a bidder cannot purchase shares until the offer expires. See
CTS, 481 U.S. at 74 n.2. Actually, shares can be purchased as soon as withdrawal rights
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and ending with the expiration of sixty calendar days after the
commencement of the offer (when shareholder withdrawal rights
are reinstituted)-a period that may span thirty-two calendar days.
The Court's reasoning is fallacious. Delay imposed by a state takeover statute is only unreasonable if it provides target management
with more time to defeat an offer than does the federal statute.
The regulatory scheme of the Williams Act is structured so that
target management can act to stymie an offer only during the
offering period-not during the post-offering period when bidders
are required to purchase tendered shares-since once the offering
period expires, target shareholder decisionmaking stops and efforts by target management to resist the offer would be unavailing. The Indiana statute compels bidders to make their offers
contingent on the occurrence of a post-offering-period event over
which target shareholders have collective control. Thus, the Indiana statute gives target management additional time to influence
the decisionmaking of target shareholders and to block the offer.459 Therefore, the delay created by the Indiana statute constitutes a delay beyond what the Williams Act provides. As a consequence, it disrupts the neutral balance necessary for the intended operation of the Act.460
(b) The Commerce Clause as an Independent Bar to State
Takeover Legislation.-The existence of a federal statute regulating
interstate tender offers does not obviate the need to evaluate
state takeover statutes under the commerce clause, and the resolution of the preemption issue is not determinative of the fate of a
state statute attacked on commerce clause grounds.4 6 ' Indeed,
the courts view the commerce clause as an independent force that

terminate. Under the current regulatory scheme, the distinction is irrelevant since withdrawal rights exist for the life of the offer. Prior to 1986-when withdrawal rights did
not exist for the life of the offer-the distinction did matter, and offerors were able to
accept shares for payment at an earlier point in time than is permitted under current
law. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-7(a)(2) (1980).
459 See Note, Second Generation State Takeover Statutes and Shareholder Wealth An Empirical Study, 97 YALE LJ. 1193, 1200 (1988).
460 See supra text accompanying note 445. The Court's analogy between the Indiana
takeover statute and other state statutes that produce delays in control shifts is inappropriate. The Indiana statute creates delay in consummating the tender offer itself, whereas
statutes authorizing staggered terms for directors or cumulative voting create delay in
obtaining control of the board of directors once the tender offer has been completed.
461 Cf Cox, supra note 468, at 337 n.116 (stating that "the presence of federal regulation within the subject matter the state purports to regulate may strengthen the commerce clause argument even when preemption would otherwise be inappropriate").
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is capable of barring state takeover regulation notwithstanding the
adoption of the Williams Act.46 2 Furthermore, the courts rou-

tinely scrutinize state takeover statutes under the commerce clause
even when they hold that. the statute is preempted by the Williams Act. Of course, in this situation the commerce clause analysis is academic, since the statute is unenforceable by reason of the
supremacy clause. Despite their independence, the preemption
and commerce clause analyses of state takeover legislation frequently shade into each other at the edges, and the Court's evaluation of the Indiana statute in CTS is a prime example.463
The commerce clause gives Congress virtually unlimited power to regulate interstate commerce. Further, it possesses a dormant power to prohibit certain state regulation of interstate commerce, and gives Congress the power both to authorize state regulation that would otherwise violate the commerce clause and to
prohibit state regulation that could otherwise be upheld under the
commerce clause. 464 Since the Williams Act does not alter what
the dormant commerce clause prohibits or permits, the validity of
state takeover legislation under the commerce clause, as the CTS
Court recognized, turns on dormant commerce clause scrutiny.
According to traditional dormant commerce clause doctrine,
state legislation that affects 'or regulates interstate commerce (such
as the Indiana statute) is invalid if it poses a threat of inconsistent
regulation of the same activity by different states or if it discriminates against out-of-state interests. 4 5 The CTS Court was correct
in concluding that the Indiana statute did not create a risk of
multiple and inconsistent regulation of interstate tendei" offers. If
each state followed the Indiana model and limited the reach of its
takeover legislation to tender offers for companies incorporated
in the state, no tender offer would be subject to the takeover
statute of more than one state.

462 See Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250, 263 (7th Cir. 1986),
rev'd on other grounds, 481 U.S. 69 (1987).
463 See Oesterle, supra note 451, at 947 (observing that the preemption and commerce clause issues in CTS "merge to a substantial degree").
464 See L TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw § 6-27, at 497, § 6-33, at 524-27
(2d ed. 1987).
465 See Langevoort, supra note 455, at 100. But see Regan, Siamese Essays: (I) CTS
Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America and Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine; (II) Extratenitorial State Legislation, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1865, 1869 (1987) (contending that the issue of
inconsistent regulation is really an issue of extraterritoriality, which does not implicate
the commerce clause).
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The Court's analysis of whether the Indiana statute was discriminatory vis-a-vis out-of-state parties, however, was deficient.
The Court reasoned that because the Indiana statute applied
equally to Indiana and out-of-state offerors, the statute would not
have a discriminatory effect on interstate commerce. If the Court
had been more robust in its analysis, it would have gone beyond
the facial impartiality of the statute and recognized that the dormant commerce clause prohibits state statutes with a discriminatoy
purpose466 and that the economically protectionist purpose of the
Indiana statute was discriminatory." 7 The Indiana statute is designed to preserve employment for Indiana residents and supply
contracts for Indiana companies by making the relocation of employment and assets outside Indiana more difficult. Therefore, the
Indiana legislation favors Indiana workers and suppliers at the expense of non-Indianans who would become workers and suppliers
if a successful bidder decided to move the target's operations to
another state where they could be performed more efficiently. 4 8
In sum, the economic protectionism of local interests that the
Indiana statute fosters is precisely the type of discrimination that
the dormant commerce clause was meant to prevent, and hence

466 See Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making Sense of the Dormant
Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1091, 1125-37 (1986) (arguing that dormant commerce clause scrutiny turns on whether the state statute has a discriminatory purpose).
467 The Supreme Court has consistently held that protectionist state regulation is
constitutionally impermissible. See, e.g., Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State
Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 579 (1986) (discriminating against interstate commerce in favor of in-state interests is unconstitutional); Lewis v. BT Inv. Managers Inc., 447 U.S. 27,
43-44 (1980) ("[Tlhe Commerce Clause prohibits a State from using its regulatory power
to protect its own citizens from outside competition."). In general, legal commentators
have recognized the protectionist nature of state takeover statutes. See, e.g., Langevoort,
supra note 455, at 107; Macey, supra note 457, at 478-79; Oesterle, supra note 451, at
937-38; cf Coffee, supra note 454, at 437-38 (recognizing that a state cannot embargo
the transfer of jobs or assets out of state and arguing that state takeover statutes therefore seek to accomplish indirectly what a state would be prohibited under the commerce
clause from doing directly). Two commentators have suggested that states concerned
about the local effects of plant closings and employee layoffs could enact legislation
having a milder impact on interstate commerce-plant closing legislation requiring advance notice of closings, severance pay, and job retraining. See Bamonte, The Dynamics of
State Protectionism: A Short Critique of the CTS Decision, 8 N. ILL. U.L. REV. 259, 263
(1988); Oesterle, supra note 451, at 939.
468 Justice Powell, who wrote the majority, opinion in CTS, apparently believes that a
protectionist purpose is permissible. He never said so in CTS, but his concurring opinion in MITE is revealing on this point. See Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 646 n.*
(1982) (Powell, J., concurring) ("When corporate headquarters are transferred out of a
city and State . . . , the State and locality from which the transfer is made inevitably
suffer significantly.").
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the Indiana statute is objectionable under the commerce clause. 469
C. State Takeover Legislation After CTS
The state legislatures could not miss the official announcement contained in the CTS opinion. Those states that had adopted control share acquisition statutes had been successful in eschewing the constitutional infirmities of the first-generation takeover statutes. As one might expect, after CTS there was a spate of
new control share acquisition laws, usually patterned after the
Indiana statute, and today twenty-five states have control share
acquisition statutes on the books. 4 70 The most recent one is the

Pennsylvania statute,4 71 which adds a novel twist to the Indiana
model. In brief, the Pennsylvania statute, provides that short-term
holders of target shares,47 2 like offerors and target managers,
are not entitled to vote their shares on the resolution regarding
the restoration of voting rights to the control shares. 47 This
new feature makes the Pennsylvania control share acquisition
statute the most potent one in the nation because it greatly decreases the likelihood of a shareholder vote favoring the offeror.
The Pennsylvania legislature obviously realized that once an offer
is launched large blocks of target shares are acquired by
arbitrageurs and that arbitrageurs, if given the right to vote on
the enfranchisement issue, will most likely vote in favor of the
offeror.

469 Two commentators have suggested that if the CTS Court had balanced the burdens imposed on interstate commerce by the Indiana statute against the statute's local
putative benefits, as the MITE Court had done in evaluating the Illinois statute, there
would have been little to weigh in the state's balance. See Bamonte, supra note 467, at
266; Cox, supra note 448, at 361.
470 See infra note 482.
471 Pennsylvania Takeover Act of 1990, Act No. 1990-36, § 6, 1990 Pa. Legis. Serv.
93, 101-09 (Purdon) (to be codified at 15 PA. CONS. STAT. §§, 2561-2567).
472 Id. at 103-04 (to be codified at 15 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2562). Under the statute, a
short-term holder is any shareholder who purchases target shares during the period commencing on the fourth business day prior to the first date on which public disclosure is
made of a proposed control share acquisition and ending on the record date of the
shareholder meeting at which shareholders will consider whether voting rights will be
restored to the control shares.
473 This aspect of Pennsylvania's control share acquisition statute appears to run
afoul of rule 19c-4, 17 C.F.R. § 240.196-4 (1990), which prohibits a national securities
exchange from listing (and NASD from authorizing for quotation) the equity securities of
any company that imposes a restriction on the voting power of its common stock based
on the length of time a shareholder has held the stock. Rule 19c-4, however, was recently declared invalid by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. See
Business Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
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To supplement the control share acquisition legislation, Penn-*
sylvania simultaneously adopted a controversial disgorgement statute which is entirely different from all other state takeover legislation. 4 This disgorgement statute allows a Pennsylvania corporation (or a shareholder suing on behalf of the corporation) to
recover certain profits realized by a "controlling person" upon the
sale of the corporation's equity securities to the corporation or a
third party. The profits are recoverable if the sale occurs within
eighteen months after the person became a "controlling person"
and the securities were acquired within twenty-four months before
or eighteen months after the person became a "controlling per'
son."475
A "controlling person" is defined as (1) any person who
has acquired, offered to acquire, or publicly disclosed an intention
to acquire at least twenty percent of the voting power of a Pennsylvania corporation or (2) any person who has publicly disclosed
that it "may seek" to acquire the power to direct the management
and policies of a Pennsylvania corporation. 6 The Pennsylvania
disgorgement provision is ostensibly designed to address the problem ofspeculators who seek to put a corporation "in play" by
initiating or announcing a takeover attempt (even though they
have no interest in acquiring control) so that they will be able to
make short-term profits on the sale of their shares once the price
has risen.477

474 Pennsylvania Takeover Act of 1990, Act No. 1990-36, § 6, 1990 Pa. Legis. Serv.
93, 109-14 (Purdon) (to be codified at 15 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 2571-2575). The
disgorgement statute is modeled on § 16(b) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b)

(1988).
475 Pennsylvania Takeover Act of 1990, Act No. 1990-36, § 6, 1990 Pa. Legis. Serv.
93, 113-14 (Purdon) (to be codified at 15 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 2574-2575).
476 Id. at 111-12 (to be codified at 15 PA. CONST. STAT. § 2573).
477 As part of its 1990 takeover legislation, Pennsylvania also enacted a stakeholder
provision that allows directors of Pennsylvania corporations, when taking action in response to a tender offer, to consider the effects the offer may have on constituencies
other than shareholders, such as employees, suppliers, customers, creditors, and the communities in which the corporation is located. The provision also adds the statement that
"directors . . . shall not be required . . . to regard any corporate interest or interests of
any particular group affected by such action as a dominant or controlling interest or fac-

tor." Id. § 4, 1990 Pa. Legis. Serv. at 97 (to be codified at 15 PA. CONS. STAT. §
1721(e)).

Pennsylvania corporations otherwise covered by the three new provisions are Permitted to opt out of each provision by a bylaw amendment adopted by the board of
directors within 90 days of the effective date of the statute. Id. §§ 4, 6, 1990 Pa. Legis.
Serv. at 99, 101, 109 (to be codified at 15 PA. CONST. STAT. §§ 1721(j), 2561(b),
2571(b)). Pennsylvania's 1990 takeover legislation did not turn out to be as popular as
the legislature thought it would be. By July 26, 1990 (90 days after the effective date of
the statute), approximately 40% of Pennsylvania corporations covered by the statute had
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On the day they were enacted, Pennsylvania's control share
acquisition and disgorgement statutes were challenged on constitutional grounds in federal district court."' A definitive judicial
opinion, however, has not yet been rendered." 9 The CTS
Court's receptiveness to state takeover legislation suggests that
both statutes will ultimately be sustained, but they should not be.
The Pennsylvania legislation, which is unquestionably biased in
favor of incumbent management (considerably more so than the
Indiana statute), upsets the careful balance between offerors and
target management established by the Williams Act and, therefore,
should be preempted. Moreover,- the disgorgement provision is
overbroad-it deters even bona fide bidders from making offers,
to the detriment of target shareholders. In addition, both provisions appear to have been prompted by a desire to make Pennsylvania corporations takeover proof. If so, such a motive is strong
evidence that the provisions have an economically protectionist
purpose, and as argued above, protectionist state legislation offends the commerce clause. Finally, the disgorgement provision
does not govern the internal affairs of Pennsylvania corporations
but instead impermissibly burdens interstate commerce by regulating the disposition of profits earned from interstate transactions,
even when the transactions have no contact with Pennsylvania.
Other states besides Pennsylvania have come to realize that in
the post-CTS era control share acquisition legislation based on the
Indiana model, although sound from a constitutional standpoint,
may not be a strong enough deterrent to hostile bids.4 s Yet,

opted out of at least one of the ihree provisions. See Philadelphia Inquirer, July 26,
1990, at A18, col. 1.
478 Armstrong World Indus. v. Adams, No. 90-2920 (E.D. Pa. filed Apr. 27, 1990);
First City Fin. Corp. v. Armstrong World Indus., No. 90-2922 (E.D. Pa. filed Apr. 27,
1990).
479 See First City Fin. Corp. v. Armstrong World Indus., No. 90-2922 (E.D. Pa. June
15, 1990) (order dismissing complaint with prejudice).
480 Ohio might be considered an exception. In 1990, Ohio amended its control
share acquisition statute (see supra note 418) by adding a provision similar to the novel
provision contained in Pennsylvania's new control share acquisition statute. Ohio's
amended statute, however, differs from the Pennsylvania statute in that a purchaser of
target shares is not treated as a short-term "interested" shareholder unless the shares are
purchased on or after the date of the first public disclosure of the control share acquisition. See Act. effective Apr. 11, 1990, No. 180, § 1, 1990 Ohio Legis. Bull. 242, 244
(Anderson) (to be codified at OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.01). Apparently, the Ohio
legislature was concerned that the Pennsylvania legislation might offend the due process
clause by its classification of pre-disclosure purchasers as short-term "interested" shareholders. See supra note 472. Ohio also added a disgorgement provision that resembles
the Pennsylvania statute, but it is not as broad. Significantly, the Ohio provision does
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these states have not chosen to strengthen the Indiana model or
search out entirely new forms of antitakeover measures as Pennsylvania has done.48 ' Instead, they have adopted or- modified existing fair price, cash-out, or business combination statutes, which
are generally considered to be more effective than the standard
control share acquisition statute.48 Presently, nine states have
fair price statutes, two states have cash-out laws, and twenty-eight
states have some type of business combination legislation. Several
states have enacted more than one of these statutes, and fair
price, cash-out, and business combination statutes have frequently
been coupled with a control share acquisition statute for good
measure. In all, thirty-eight states have at least one of these four
types of statutes in force,483 and California is the only major in-

not apply to a bidder who can establish either a bona fide intent to acquire control or
a nonmanipulative purpose. See Act effective Apr. 11, 1990, No. 180, § 1, 1990 Ohio
Legis.

Bull.

242,

256-57

(Anderson) (to be

codified at OHIO

REV.

CODE ANN.

§

1707.043). Although both of Ohio's provisions were enacted into law approximately two
weeks before the Pennsylvania legislation was adopted, the statutory concepts originated
in Pennsylvania.
481 Delaware, for example, considered but rejected the idea of adopting a control
share acquisition statute. See Stroufe & Gelband, Business Combination Statutes: A "Meaningful Opportunity"forSuccess?, 45 Bus. LAw. 891, 896-97 (1990).
482 See supra text accompanying notes 420-22. At the time Pennsylvania adopted the
control share acquisition and disgorgement provisions, it also had fair price, cash-out,
and business combination statutes in force. See 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 1728, 25412553, 2554-2556 (Purdon 1990). A bidder's preference for the four types of second-generation statutes would probably have the following order: control share acquisition statute, fair price statute, business combination statute, cash-out statute. See Oesterle, supra
note 451, at 881-82 & n. 20; Romano, The Political Economy of.State Takeover Statutes, 43
VA. L. REv. 111, 148-69 (1987). But see Langevoort, supra note 455, at 113 n. 75 (contending that fair price statutes are less burdensome than control share acquisition statutes).
483 As of September 1, 1990, the list is as follows: Arizona, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho,
Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina,
South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, and Wyoming (control share acquisition statutes); Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Louisiana, Mississippi, Penhsylvania, Washington, and Wisconsin (fair price statutes); Maine and Pennsylvania (cash-out statutes);
Arizona, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky,
Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, New Jersey,
New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South .Dakota, Tennessee,
Virginia, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming (business combination statutes). See WINTER, ROSENBAUM, STUMPF & PARKER, supra note 417, § 1.2, at 7-12 (citing statutory provisions in effect as of May 1, 1989); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, par. 11.75 (Smith-Hurd
1990); Act effective Apr. 11, 1990, § 1, 1990 Ohio Legis. Bull. 242, 249-52 (Anderson)
(to be codified at OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 1704.01-.07);

Pennsylvania Takeover Act of

1990, Act No. 1990-36, § 6, 1990 Pa. Legis. Serv. 93, 101-09 (Purdon) (to be codified at
15 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 2561-2567); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-5.2-1 to -8 (Supp. 1990); S.D.
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corporating state that does not.
The judiciary has not yet had the occasion to rule on the
validity of a fair price or cash-out statute. In contrast, a handful
of business combination statutes have been challenged by offerors
on constitutional grounds, and the lower federal courts,
intrepreting CTS broadly, have almost uniformly found the statutes to be valid." 4 The analytical approaches the courts have
taken vary, and as a result two lines of cases are beginning to
develop. The two lines of analysis are best exemplified by opinions of the District Court for the District of Delaware 5 and the
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, 8 6 upholding the Delaware and Wisconsin statutes8 7 respectively. The Wisconsin statute, enacted after CTS, is modeled on the business combination
statute pioneered in New York4 .. but differs from the New
York statute because .the moratorium on business combinations
CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 47-33-8 to -19 (Supp. 1990); WYO. STAT. §§ 17-18-101 to -104, 301 to -309 (Supp. 1990). It should be noted that business combination statutes in some
states (Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Kansas, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, Washington, and Wyoming) do not have a fair price component, and that
some states (Pennsylvania, Wisconsin) have adopted both a fair price statute and a business combination statute with a fair price component.
484 See, e.g., Amanda Acquisition Corp. v. Universal Foods Corp., 877 F.2d 496 (7th
Cir.) (Wisconsin statute), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 367 (1989); Vernitron Corp. v.
Kollmorgen Corp., No. 89-0241 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 15, 1989) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist
file) (New York statute); West Point-Pepperell, Inc. v. Farley, Inc., 711 F. Supp. 1088
(N.D. Ga. 1988) (Georgia statute); City Capital Assocs. v. Interco, Inc., 696 F. Supp.
1551 (D. Del.) (Delaware statute), affid on other grounds, 860 F.2d 60 (3d Cir. 1988); RP
Acquisition Corp. v. Staley Continental, Inc., 686 F. Supp. 476 (D. Del. 1988) (Delaware
statute); BNS Inc. v. Koppers Co., 683 F. Supp. 458 (D. Del. 1988) (Delaware statute).
But see RTE Corp. v. Mark IV Indus., No. 88-C-378 (E.D. Wis. May 6, 1988) (LEXIS,
Genfed library, Dist file) (invalidating the Wisconsin statute), vacated as moot, [1987-1988
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 93,789 (E.D. Wis. June 22, 1988).
485 BNS Inc. v. Koppers Co., 683 F. Supp. 458 (D. Del. 1988).
486 Amanda Acquisition Corp. v. Universal Foods Corp., 877 F.2d 496 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 110 S. Ct. 367 (1989).
487

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203 (Supp. 1988); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 180.726 (West

Supp. 1989). In CTS, the SEC and the United States filed a joint brief arguing that the
Indiana statute was invalid under the commerce clause. The United States, however, did
not argue that the Indiana statute was invalid under the supremacy clause, and the SEC
took no position on the preemption issue. Brief for the SEC and the United States as
Amici Curiae at 8-12, CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69 (1987) (Nos.
86-71 and 86-97). In contrast, in cases challenging the Delaware and Wisconsin statutes,
the SEC filed briefs arguing that the statutes violated both the commerce clause and the
supremacy clause. See Brief of the SEC, Amicus Curiae,, RP Acquisition v. Staley Continental, Inc., 686 F. Supp. 476 (D. Del. 1988) (No. 88-190) (Delaware statute); Brief of
the SEC, Amicus Curiae, RTE Corp. v. Mark IV Indus., No. 88-C-378 (E.D. Wis. May 6,
1988) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file) (Wisconsin statute), vacated as moot, [1987-1988
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 93,789 (E.D. Wis. June 22, 1988).
488 N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 912 (McKinney 1986 & Supp. 1990).
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between bidders and targets lasts three years rather than five. The
Delaware statute, also a post-CTS enactment, resembles the Wisconsin statute but is less restrictive. Under both statutes, the
three-year moratorium does not apply if the target board approves the business combination prior to the date the bidder
consummates its offer. 8 9 The Delaware statute, however, provides two other ways that a bidder may escape the moratorium: if
the bidder obtains in its offer eighty-five percent of the target
shares (excluding shares owned by director-officers and certain
employee stock plans), or if the business combination is approved
during the moratorium by the target board and two-thirds of the
disinterested target shareholders.4 90
In its evaluation of the Delaware business combination statute, the District Court of Delaware used the same standard of
dormant commerce clause scrutiny as the CTS Court and concluded that the Delaware statute did not impose an undue burden on
interstate commerce. 491 The court's preemption analysis, however, was somewhat unique. On the one hand, the court recognized
that the Delaware statute furthered the goals of the Williams Act
by protecting target shareholders from the coercive aspects of
some tender offers. On the other hand, the court observed that
by limiting the number of tender offers that shareholders receive,
the Delaware statute could also frustrate the purposes of the Act.
In this regard, the court realized that business combination statutes could eliminate hostile offers entirely because they effectively
deprive a bidder of "perhaps the most important fruit of gaining
control"-a business combination. 49 2 The court resolved the tension between its two observations by focusing primarily on the
exception in the Delaware statute for eighty-five percent share
acquisitions. The court ultimately concluded that this exception
saved the statute from preemption since it gave hostile offers for
Delaware corporations "a meaningful opportunity for success,"
despite management opposition.
In its examination of the Wisconsin business combination
statute, the Seventh Circuit rejected the Delaware District Court's
"meaningful opportunity for success" test-which would have in-

489
(West
490
491
492
493

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203(a)(1) (Supp. 1988); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 180.726(2)
Supp. 1989).
DEL. CODE ANN. tit 8 § 203(a)(2)-(3) (Supp. 1988).
BNS Inc. v. Koppers Co., 683 F. Supp 458, 472-73 (D. Del. 1988).
Id. at 468.
I& at 469-72.
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validated the Wisconsin statute under the supremacy clause-and
adopted an even laxer preemption standard. In formulating the
standard, the court considered discarding the plurality preemption
opinion in MITE and made the argument that the Williams Act
did not prevent the states from adopting laws that favor either
offerors or target management. 94 Like the CTS Court, the Seventh Circuit, however, "stopped short of [this] precipice" and
opined instead that state takeover laws were preempted by the
Williams Act only if they altered any of the procedures governed
by the Act. 95 Not persuaded that the Wisconsin statute tampered with. the tender offer procedures established by federal law,
the court concluded that the Wisconsin statute passed preemption
muster.49 Nevertheless, the court expressed its belief that the
statute harmed shareholders by restricting the number of tender
offers they would receive. But, the court found that this harm
had no bearing on the preemption'issue since the Williams Act
did not entitle shareholders to receive tender offers.4 97 Finally,
the court declined to adopt a "meaningful opportunity for success" test as the standard for evaluating the Wisconsin statute
under the commerce clause, concluding that "[t]he [C]ommerce
[C]lause does not demand498 that states leave bidders a 'meaningful
opportunity for success.'

The Supreme Court denied certiorari to the decision of the.
Seventh Circuit.4 9 If another circuit, however, adopts, the approach taken by the District Court of Delaware and declares a
Wisconsin-type business combination statute invalid, the Supreme
Court may decide to grant certiorari. If this happens, it seems
likely that the Supreme Court will opt for the reasoning of the
Seventh Circuit and reverse. Such a ruling by the Court would
have the effect of validating all business combination takeover
statutes, assuming, of course, that the legislation does not run
afoul of the commerce clause. This prediction is not meant to

494 This argument has also been advanced by some legal commentators. See, e.g.,
Fischel, supra note 53, at 71-74; Johnson & Millon, Misreading The Williams Act, 87 MICH.
L. REV. 1862 (1989) (arguing that Williams Act-preemption of state takeover legislation is
based on a "mistaken reading" of the Act).
495 Amanda Acquisition Corp. v. Universal Foods Corp., 877 F.2d 496, 503-04 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 367 (1989).
496 Id.at 504.
497 Id.at 500-02, 504-05.
498 Id.at 508-09.
499 Amanda Acquisition Corp. v. Universal Foods Corp., 110 S. Ct. 367, denying cer.
to 877 F.2d 496 (7th Cir. 1989).
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suggest that business combination statutes should be upheld. Even
if a business combination statute does not founder on a commerce clause argument, business combination legislation is in
conflict with and frustrates the purposes of the Williams Act and,
therefore, is preempted. By giving target management total or
substantial power to veto business combinations that are usually
essential to tender offers, business combination legislation has the
potential to eliminate from the tender offer process the target
shareholder choice contemplated by the Williams Act.
If tested, fair price and cash-out statutes-which nominally
protect target shareholders from coercive bids-will probably be
sustained, but like business combination statutes, they should not
be. Irrespective of the merits of a commerce clause challenge,
both types of statutes are void under the supremacy clause. Fair
price statutes impose supermajority and fair price requirements
for post-tender offer business combinations but then allow target
management to waive these requirements. In taking such a regulatory approach, fair price statutes give target management too
much power in negotiating with a bidder and, as a consequence,
upset the equitable balance between the contending sides. Cashout statutes require offerors in partial bids to purchase, upon
demand, shares that were not even sought in the offer. This requirement has the effect of eliminating partial bids. The Williams
Act clearly contemplates the use of partial bids as a method of
obtaining control,5"' and thus cash-out statutes conflict with federal law.
One final observation deserves mention. In the 1950s when
proxy control contests were in fashion, the states respected the
preemptive force of the federal proxy rules and did not experiment with their own regulation. In the 1960s and thereafter,
when cash tender offers, replaced proxy battles as the favored
method of capturing corporate control, the states responded differently to the new phenomenon. State legislatures adopted two
(and some would say three) generations of tender offer statutes.
Furthermore, while the state tender offer statutes were multiplying, state proxy regulation remained a virtual void.0 ' Before

500 For example, § 14(d)(6) of the Williams Act requires a bidder to purchase shares
pro rata in partial bids.
501 An interesting exception is the proxy regulation in Alaska of native Alaskan corporations. See ALASKA STAT. § 45.55.139 (1986); ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 3, § 08.315-

.365 (July 1990); see also Comment, State Regulation of Proxies in Alaska Native CotporatLions, 12 UCLA-ALAsKA L. REv. 69 (1982-1983). Congress, however, has specifically ex-
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CTS, this asymmetry between the regulation of proxy contests and
tender offers was explainable because it appeared to be only temporary. The states had simply exceeded their authority in attempting to regulate tender offers, and they were told so. After CTS,
however, the asymmetry becomes difficult to understand, since it
seems to be permanent." 2
CONCLUSION

The Ninetieth Congress, in 1968, instituted a national policy
for the regulation of tender offers. This federal policy sought to
protect investors involved in tender offers and to preserve,
through regulatory neutrality, the viability of the tender offer as a
method of corporate acquisition. The legislation that embodied
this policy-the Williams Act-was meant to have a substantial remedial component, a significant substantive dimension, -and strong
preemptive force. In its trilogy of tender offer cases decided under the Williams Act, the Supreme Court, however, has frustrated
these legislative intentions by misconstruing the text and purposes
of the Act. Consequently, the healthy development of federal
tender offer policy has been paralyzed. Piper limited the right of
tender offer participants to redress violations of the Act. Schreiber
gutted the Act of most of its substantive content. And CTS weakened considerably the Act's preemptive capability.
Questions concerning the implication of private actions, the
substantive scope of statutory provisions, and the preemptive au-

empted Alaska native corporations from the requirements of the federal securities laws.
43 U.S.C. § 1625 (1988).
502 If state legislatures conclude that proxy regulation at the state level is not preempted by the federal proxy rules and enact their own legislation, the asymmetry, of
course, will be eliminated. Although the courts have generally held that the federal
proxy rules have preemptive force, the strength of this force is beginning to be
questioned indirectly. Compare NUI Corp. v. Kimmelman, 593 F. Supp. 1457 (D.N.J.
1984) (holding that a state statute that prohibited the acquisition of control of a public
utility by means of a proxy campaign without the approval of a state utilities board was
preempted by the federal proxy rules because it interfered with the neutrality of the
federal rules), rev'd on other grounds, 765 F.2d 399 (3d Cir. 1985) with Business
Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406, 410-11 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (contending that the federal
proxy rules are primarily-although not exclusively-concerned with disclosure). As a
consequence, some state legislatures are starting to enact provisions that have an effect
on proxy, control contests, and these provisions conflict with the federal regulatory
scheme. The recent Pennsylvania disgorgement provision (see supra text accompanying
notes 474-77) is a prime example. The Pennsylvania statute, which classifies a person
who launches a proxy contest for corporate control as a "controlling person," discourages and impedes such contests and thus tips the balance in favor of the incumbent directors.
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thority of federal regulatory schemes are not wholly legal; they
are also inherently philosophical. And the Supreme Court's examination of these questions in Piper, Schreiber, and CTS could provide no better proof, since in all three cases the Court's legal
analysis was either shaped or bolstered by a distinct philosophy of
federal-state relations. This philosophy, which has been shared in
varying degrees by a majority of the members of the Burger and
Rehnquist Courts, is grounded on the notion that federal law
should be interpreted so that state law is not displaced on matters
that have traditionally been the province of the states. 0 3 The influence of this philosophy in Piper, Schreiber, and CTS is manifest.
In Piper, the Court refused to imply a federal remedy for deception in deference to a state remedy for the tort of interference
with a prospective advantage. In Schreiber, the Court declined to
establish a federal standard of conduct for corporate fiduciaries
and bowed to the business judgment rule of state corporation
law. And in CTS, the Court failed to find a preemptive conflict
between federal legislation and a state statute couched in terms of
substantive corporation law.
Whatever merit this philosophy may have in the abstract, its
influence on the Court's interpretation of the Williams Act in
Piper, Schreiber, and CTS is disturbing. It has facilitated an emasculation of the Act and has allowed state law to acquire a prominence in tender offer regulation that Congress never contemplated or intended. The Burger and Rehnquist Courts would disagree
and respond that if Congress had meant to limit the role of the
states in regulating tender offers, Congress would have explicitly
said so. But Congress' decision to remain largely silent is understandable. When Congress formulated its regulatory policy for
tender offers, it did not feel pressed to anticipate the ramifications of state law because the philosophy of federalism held by
the Warren Court at the time viewed federal legislation as a major restraint on the operation of state law.50 4 Thus, Congress assumed that a fairly comprehensive federal policy, of its own force,
would inhibit the development of any competing state policies.

503 See supra text following note 197; supra text accompanying notes 230-31. See generally Note, The Preemption Doctrine: Shifting Perspectives of Federalism and the Butger Court;
75 COLUM. L. REV. 623, 639-53 (1975) (observing the Burger Court's solicitude of the
states' interests in preemption cases).
504 See Note, supra note 503, at 638-39 (pointing out that the Court's shift in its
philosophy of federalism occurred around 1973); supra note 141 and accompanying text;
supra text following note 197.
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Although Congress thought that the Williams Act would restrict the states' role in tender offer regulation, it did not-intend
to exclude the states entirely from the regulatory process nor did
it fail to recognize the interstitial nature of federal law. Indeed,
Congress seldom adopts a complete and self-sufficient body of
law."0 Instances in which the Williams Act countenances or relies on state law have already been mentioned. First, the "savings
clause" contained in section 28(a) of the Exchange Act preserves
the rights and remedies of existing state law and allows concurrent state tender offer regulation as long as it does not conflict
with the federal scheme." 6 This clause would permit, therefore,
parallel or partly parallel state actions for deceit, interference with
a prospective advantage, and breaches of the duty of care or loyalty. Furthermore, state tender offer disclosure statutes, which are
in effect in many states 'today,0 7 would survive preemption scrutiny by virtue of this clause, since they supplement, rather than
obstruct, the operation of the federal statute. Second, the Williams Act implicitly adopts the state law of contracts as the body
of law for determining the contractual rights and remedies of the
offeror and target shareholders. This body of law, however, has
been modified in certain respects by the substantive provisions of
the Act.50 8
Suffice to say that this congressional vision of the relationship
between federal and state law in the regulation of tender offers is
a far cry from the relationship that exists today. State law has
been allowed to shape the substantive aspects of tender offer
regulation, while the Williams Act takes a back seat as a disclosure statute. State policy-or perhaps one should say the policy of
Delaware (approximately one-half of all New York Stock Exchange-listed companies are incorporated there)5 ° 9-has become
the national policy.
If today's Congress were to evaluate the Williams Act, it

505 Hart, The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. REv. 489, 498
(1954).
506 See supra note 397 and accompanying text.
507 See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 23-43-101 to -117 (1987); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 36-456 to -468 (West 1987 & Supp. 1990); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-2-3.1-0.5 to -2-3.1-11
(West 1989 & Supp. 1990); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 110C, §§ 1-13 (Law. Co-op. 1985); NJ.
STAT. ANN. §§ 49:5-1 to -19 (West Supp. 1990); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §§ 1600-1613
(McKinney 1986); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 48-35-101 to -113 (1988 & Supp. 1990); see also
notes 211-13 and accompanying text.
508 See supra text accompanying notes 354-58.
509 See Johnson & Millon, supra note 494, at 1862.
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would find that the premises and purposes which the Act incorporates are as necessary and as appropriate today as they were in
1968. Congress would reach this conclusion because its deliberations would reveal the following: First, the need for governmental
action to protect investors involved in tender offers has not
changed. Second, tender 6ffers can be beneficial to target shareholders and therefore investor protection should be accomplished
by a set of legal rules that do not impair the vigor of the tender
offer process. Third, the viability of the tender offer device can
be preserved only if the legal rules are neutral as between the
bidder and target management. And finally, neutrality can be
achieved only at the federal level and only with legislation that
curtails the role of state law, since state law consistently evinces a
distinct promanagement bias.510
A legislature that would give its stamp of approval to the
design Congress envisioned for tender offer regulation in 1968
would necessarily conclude that Piper, Schreiber, and CTS should
not be left intact. Indeed, as this Article has argued, the Supreme
Court's pronouncements in these three cases are at loggerheads
with Congress' plan. The recommendation of this Article is therefore plain. Congress should negate Piper, Schreiber, and CTS. In
addition to resurrecting the intentions of the Congress that enacted the Williams Act, such action would have two other desirable
effects. First, it would result in uniform tender offer regulation.

510 Scholars of law and economics generally argue that entrepreneurs choosing a
state of incorporation will search for a state that has a package of legal rules that maximizes shareholder welfare and that states will adopt rules that are in the interest of
shareholders in order to compete for the revenues produced by incorporations. These
scholars have therefore concluded that federal chartering of corporations or the establishment of federal standards of fiduciary conduct would be undesirable for economic reasons. This view was first proposed by Professor Winter, see Winter, State Law, Shareholder
Protection, and the Theosy of the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251 (1977), and it has been
subsequently advanced by others, see Easterbrook, Managers' Discretion and Investors' Welfare: Theories and Evidence, 9 DEL. J. CORP. L. 540 (1984); Fischel, The 'Race to the Bottom" Revisted: Reflections on Recent Developments in Delaware's Corporation Law, 76 Nw. U.L.
REV. 913 (1982). As two legal commentators have observed, the law and economics
scholars were "hoisted by their own petards" when the states adopted "antitakeover"
statutes since economic studies generally conclude that takeovers are beneficial to shareholders and the economy. See Johnson & Millon, supra note 494, at 1881-82. Indeed,
Professor Winter himself recognized the problem that state takeover statutes pose for his
view and therefore called for their elimination. See Winter, supra, at 287-89 (analyzing
first-generation statutes). Accepting Professor Winter's view of state takeover statutes, one
commentator has argued that economic analysis also calls for federal (and not state) law
to govern the defensive conduct of target management. See Fiflis, supra note 256, at 33031.
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And second, it would put tender offers and proxy battles on a
par from a regulatory perspective and thus place both methods of
capturing corporate control chiefly within the sphere of federal
governance.
Negating the Supreme Court's thiee tender offer cases would
not require elaborate legislation. Piper could be nullified by adding a subsection to the Williams Act that gives parties injured by
violations of the Act the express right to sue in law or equity. In
1988, Congress took similar action in the area of insider trading
by creating an express private action for damages to redress certain violations of rule 10b-5." Schreiber could be overturned by
defining the phrase "manipulative acts or practices" in section
14(e). The definition would provide that section 14(e) manipulative conduct encompasses, but is not limited to, unfair practices
that coerce or prevent the investment decisions of shareholders
involved in tender offers. This definition would make most defensive measures taken by target companies unlawful and would
therefore limit the significance of the common-law business judgment rule as a standard for reviewing the conduct of target directors seeking to resist a takeover attempt. Front-end loaded, twotier offers would also be illegal under the definition. Other partial
offers, however, would not be illegal since they are not structurally coercive. Finally, CTS could be voided by amending the Exchange Act with a provision that specifically preempts the various
types of state "antitakeover" statutes currently on the books and
that gives the SEC the authority to preempt other antitakeover
strategies that might be devised by the states in the future.
The above recommendations for congressional action do not
protect target shareholders from the potentially coercive nature of
partial offers; furthermore, the proposals tie the hands of target
managers and state legislators who have ostensibly acted to provide such protection. If legislators perceive this gap in shareholder
protection to be significant, Congress should consider the following additional amendment. Offerors who make partial bids must
pay a fair price (a price that at least equals the bid price) to target shareholders in any second-step business combination consummated during the two-year period after the termination of the
offer. This amendment may have some appeal for two reasons. It

511 The express remedy is contained in § 20A of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78t1 (1988), and it was created when Congress adopted the Insider Trading and Securities
Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-704, § 5, 102 Stat. 4677, 4680-81.
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gives a nod to the states by recognizing the utility of one of their
ideas. Also, it furthers the federal goal of investor protection by
extending the equal treatment of tendering shareholders to all
shareholders without unduly tipping the scales.
The possibility that Congress and state legislatures will take
dissimilar approaches to the same problem is inherent in federalism. In the case of tender offer regulation, the possibility has
occurred. This Article has expressed one view on how Congress
should reconcile these divergent approaches. It is hoped that Congress shares this view and has the conviction to act on it.

